references.bib

@misc{2008conac,
  title = {{{CONAC Chilean Corporation Against Cancer}} - "{{Brown}}"},
  year = {2008},
  month = apr,
  langid = {english}
}

@misc{2015smoking,
  title = {'{{Smoking Baby}}' {{Billboard Gives Parents Food}} for {{Thought After New Cancer Risk Study}}},
  year = {2015},
  month = oct,
  journal = {PETA},
  urldate = {2023-01-05},
  abstract = {Confirming earlier studies that were largely ignored, the World Health Organization has just classified processed meats as a Group 1 carcinogen, alongside tobacco. That's why PETA is now negotiating with outdoor advertisers in Sioux City\textemdash the highest pork-producing region in the nation\textemdash to run a billboard that shows a toddler smoking a stogie and the words "You Wouldn't Let Your Child Smoke. Like Smoking, Eating Meat Causes Heart Disease and Cancer. Go Vegan!"},
  howpublished = {https://www.peta.org/media/news-releases/smoking-baby-billboard-gives-parents-food-for-thought-after-new-cancer-risk-study/},
  langid = {american},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ILEU6ZCY/smoking-baby-billboard-gives-parents-food-for-thought-after-new-cancer-risk-study.html}
}

@misc{2022tobacco,
  title = {Tobacco},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  journal = {World Health Organization},
  urldate = {2023-01-10},
  howpublished = {https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tobacco},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/RPG82Q9V/tobacco.html}
}

@book{americanpsychiatricassociation2013diagnostic,
  title = {Diagnostic and {{Statistical Manual}} of {{Mental Disorders}}},
  author = {{American Psychiatric Association}},
  year = {2013},
  month = may,
  edition = {Fifth Edition},
  publisher = {{American Psychiatric Association}},
  doi = {10.1176/appi.books.9780890425596},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  isbn = {978-0-89042-555-8 978-0-89042-557-2},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/8DRM5YZN/americanpsychiatricassociation2013diagnostic.pdf}
}

@article{annis2005permutation,
  title = {Permutation, {{Parametric}}, and {{Bootstrap Tests}} of {{Hypotheses}}},
  author = {Annis, David H},
  year = {2005},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association},
  volume = {100},
  number = {472},
  pages = {1457--1458},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  issn = {0162-1459},
  doi = {10.1198/jasa.2005.s48},
  urldate = {2023-04-03},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/TTJXV85C/annis_2005_permutatio.pdf}
}

@incollection{asao2016tripartite,
  title = {The Tripartite Theory of Machiavellian Morality: {{Judgment}}, Influence, and Conscience as Distinct Moral Adaptations},
  booktitle = {The Evolution of Morality},
  author = {Asao, Kelly and Buss, David M},
  year = {2016},
  pages = {3--25},
  publisher = {{Springer}}
}

@article{baars2002conscious,
  title = {The Conscious Access Hypothesis: Origins and Recent Evidence},
  shorttitle = {The Conscious Access Hypothesis},
  author = {Baars, Bernard J.},
  year = {2002},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {47--52},
  issn = {13646613},
  doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01819-2},
  urldate = {2023-01-10},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QZT72NPR/baars_2002_the.pdf}
}

@article{banks2016Editorial,
  title = {Editorial: {{Evidence}} on {{Questionable Research Practices}}: {{The Good}}, the {{Bad}}, and the {{Ugly}}},
  shorttitle = {Editorial},
  author = {Banks, George C. and Rogelberg, Steven G. and Woznyj, Haley M. and Landis, Ronald S. and Rupp, Deborah E.},
  year = {2016},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Journal of Business and Psychology},
  volume = {31},
  number = {3},
  pages = {323--338},
  issn = {1573-353X},
  doi = {10.1007/s10869-016-9456-7},
  urldate = {2022-09-15},
  abstract = {Questionable research or reporting practices (QRPs) contribute to a growing concern regarding the credibility of research in the organizational sciences and related fields. Such practices include design, analytic, or reporting practices that may introduce biased evidence, which can have harmful implications for evidence-based practice, theory development, and perceptions of the rigor of science.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Ethics,Philosophy of science,Questionable research practices QRPs,Research methodology,Research methods},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/W9M4GZB7/banks_2016_editorial.pdf}
}

@article{barabasi2012network,
  title = {The Network Takeover},
  author = {Barab{\'a}si, Albert-L{\'a}szl{\'o}},
  year = {2012},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Nature Physics},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {14--16},
  publisher = {{Nature Publishing Group}},
  issn = {1745-2481},
  doi = {10.1038/nphys2188},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Reductionism, as a paradigm, is expired, and complexity, as a field, is tired. Data-based mathematical models of complex systems are offering a fresh perspective, rapidly developing into a new discipline: network science.},
  copyright = {2012 Nature Publishing Group, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited. All Rights Reserved.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2P4RL2X2/nphys2188.html}
}

@article{barth2013comparative,
  title = {Comparative {{Efficacy}} of {{Seven Psychotherapeutic Interventions}} for {{Patients}} with {{Depression}}: {{A Network Meta-Analysis}}},
  shorttitle = {Comparative {{Efficacy}} of {{Seven Psychotherapeutic Interventions}} for {{Patients}} with {{Depression}}},
  author = {Barth, J{\"u}rgen and Munder, Thomas and Gerger, Heike and N{\"u}esch, Eveline and Trelle, Sven and Znoj, Hansj{\"o}rg and J{\"u}ni, Peter and Cuijpers, Pim},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {PLOS Medicine},
  volume = {10},
  number = {5},
  pages = {e1001454},
  publisher = {{Public Library of Science}},
  issn = {1549-1676},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pmed.1001454},
  urldate = {2021-05-18},
  abstract = {J\"urgen Barth and colleagues use network meta-analysis - a novel methodological approach - to reexamine the comparative efficacy of seven psychotherapeutic interventions for adults with depression. Please see later in the article for the Editors' Summary},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Behavior,Depression,Drug therapy,Geriatric depression,Mental health therapies,Metaanalysis,Problem solving,Psychotherapy},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/S5URYTER/barth2013comparative.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7HWDNWBN/article.html}
}

@article{batson2007anger,
  title = {Anger at Unfairness: Is It Moral Outrage?},
  shorttitle = {Anger at Unfairness},
  author = {Batson, C. Daniel and Kennedy, Christopher L. and Nord, Lesley-Anne and Stocks, E. L. and Fleming, D'Yani A. and Marzette, Christian M. and Lishner, David A. and Hayes, Robin E. and Kolchinsky, Leah M. and Zerger, Tricia},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {European Journal of Social Psychology},
  volume = {37},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1272--1285},
  issn = {1099-0992},
  doi = {10.1002/ejsp.434},
  urldate = {2022-05-12},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JQ8V8BM8/batson2007anger.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BMVEKPR3/ejsp.html}
}

@article{batson2009pursuing,
  title = {Pursuing Moral Outrage: {{Anger}} at Torture},
  shorttitle = {Pursuing Moral Outrage},
  author = {Batson, C. Daniel and Chao, Mary C. and Givens, Jeffery M.},
  year = {2009},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {45},
  number = {1},
  pages = {155--160},
  issn = {00221031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.017},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Moral outrage\textemdash anger at violation of a moral standard\textemdash should be distinguished from anger at the harm caused by standard-violating behavior. Recent research that used experimental manipulation to disentangle these different forms of anger found evidence of personal and empathic anger, but not of moral outrage. We sought to extend this research by assessing anger at a more extreme moral violation: torture. If the person tortured is a member of one's group (nationality), anger may not be over the moral violation but over the harm done to one of ``us.'' In an experiment designed to create the necessary appraisal conditions, we found clear evidence of identity-relevant personal anger (anger when a person from one's nationality is tortured) but little evidence of moral outrage (anger even when a person from an identity-irrelevant nationality is tortured). Implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are discussed.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GSRPES34/1-s2.0-S0022103108001522-main.pdf}
}

@article{baysan2020causal,
  title = {Causal {{Emergence}} and {{Epiphenomenal Emergence}}},
  author = {Baysan, Umut},
  year = {2020},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  volume = {85},
  number = {4},
  pages = {891--904},
  issn = {1572-8420},
  doi = {10.1007/s10670-018-0055-z},
  urldate = {2021-05-20},
  abstract = {According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features (i.e., nomological necessitation and causal novelty) are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects of emergentism with this distinction in the background.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QDFYN6BI/baysan2020causal.pdf}
}

@article{beck2005current,
  title = {The Current State of Cognitive Therapy: {{A}} 40-{{Year}} Retrospective},
  author = {Beck, Aaron T.},
  year = {2005},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Archives of General Psychiatry},
  volume = {62},
  number = {9},
  eprint = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/articlepdf/1108411/yps40003.pdf},
  pages = {953--959},
  issn = {0003-990X},
  doi = {10.1001/archpsyc.62.9.953},
  abstract = {The basic framework of the cognitive theory of psychopathology and cognitive therapy of specific psychiatric disorders was developed more than 40 years ago. Since that time, there has been continuing progress in the development of cognitive theory and therapy and in the empirical testing of both. A substantial body of research supports the cognitive model of depression and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the various anxiety disorders. Cognitive therapy (CT), often labeled as the generic term cognitive behavior therapy, has been shown to be effective in reducing symptoms and relapse rates, with or without medication, in a wide variety of psychiatric disorders. Suggestions for future research and applications are presented.Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2005;62:953-959\textendash\textquestiondown},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GTM4PGZ7/beck2005current.pdf}
}

@article{ben-nunbloom2011we,
  title = {We're {{Closer}} than {{I Thought}}: {{Social Network Heterogeneity}}, {{Morality}}, and {{Political Persuasion}}},
  shorttitle = {We're {{Closer}} than {{I Thought}}},
  author = {{Ben-Nun Bloom}, Pazit and Levitan, Lindsey Clark},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Political Psychology},
  volume = {32},
  number = {4},
  pages = {643--665},
  issn = {1467-9221},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00826.x},
  urldate = {2022-09-16},
  abstract = {Literature in the area of social networks indicates that increases in perceived social network attitudinal heterogeneity generate increased openness to attitude change. Recent evidence in the area of morality, however, shows that morally based attitudes are particularly resistant to persuasion and can result in the rejection of disagreeing others. Positing that considering morality would reduce network influence, an experiment varied moral cues presented along with a non-network persuasive message while holding the actual content constant. Results demonstrate that morality and network composition interact to predict persuasion, such that when people are not cued to consider morality increased network heterogeneity predicts increased persuasion, but when identical messages are presented in a way that invokes morality the impact of network heterogeneity disappears or even reverses marginally. This interactive effect was replicated in two very different political issues: gay adoption and nationalized healthcare. Implications for persuasion by morally motivated sources independent of the effects of specific moral arguments are discussed.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {attitude strength,morality,persuasion,social networks},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JDEIUEK2/bloom2011werea.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NI2K9B24/ben-nun bloom_2011_we're.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SAGULU3M/bloom2011werea.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VFYZIGHD/bloom2011werea.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WVTUNWYC/bloom2011werea.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SV3TGQ58/j.1467-9221.2011.00826.html}
}

@article{berdahl2010neural,
  title = {A Neural Network Model of {{Borderline Personality Disorder}}},
  author = {Berdahl, Carl H.},
  year = {2010},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Neural Networks},
  volume = {23},
  number = {2},
  pages = {177--188},
  issn = {0893-6080},
  doi = {10.1016/j.neunet.2009.10.007},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {The etiology of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is unknown. This paper develops an etiological hypothesis by constructing a neural network with constraints from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and behavior. The neural network ascribes roles to the brainstem's periaqueductal gray, the amygdala, and the anterior cingulate/ventromedial prefrontal cortex (ACC/vmPFC). Neural network simulations show how these brain structures might interact during BPD behavior. The simulations suggest that long term depression (LTD) in ACC/vmPFC may explain several BPD symptoms. The network makes testable suggestions. The current work is the first-ever neural network simulation of BPD.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Aggression,Borderline Personality Disorder,Dissociation,Post traumatic stress disorder,Trauma},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/HKUQ6WES/S0893608009002640.html}
}

@article{bersoff1993culture,
  title = {Culture, Context, and the Development of Moral Accountability Judgments.},
  author = {Bersoff, David M. and Miller, Joan G.},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {Developmental Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {4},
  pages = {664--676},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  issn = {0012-1649},
  doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.29.4.664},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5MINXAAR/miller1993culture.pdf}
}

@article{bertolero2015modular,
  title = {The Modular and Integrative Functional Architecture of the Human Brain},
  author = {Bertolero, Maxwell A. and Yeo, B. T. Thomas and D'Esposito, Mark},
  year = {2015},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {112},
  number = {49},
  pages = {E6798-E6807},
  publisher = {{National Academy of Sciences}},
  issn = {0027-8424, 1091-6490},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.1510619112},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Network-based analyses of brain imaging data consistently reveal distinct modules and connector nodes with diverse global connectivity across the modules. How discrete the functions of modules are, how dependent the computational load of each module is to the other modules' processing, and what the precise role of connector nodes is for between-module communication remains underspecified. Here, we use a network model of the brain derived from resting-state functional MRI (rs-fMRI) data and investigate the modular functional architecture of the human brain by analyzing activity at different types of nodes in the network across 9,208 experiments of 77 cognitive tasks in the BrainMap database. Using an author\textendash topic model of cognitive functions, we find a strong spatial correspondence between the cognitive functions and the network's modules, suggesting that each module performs a discrete cognitive function. Crucially, activity at local nodes within the modules does not increase in tasks that require more cognitive functions, demonstrating the autonomy of modules' functions. However, connector nodes do exhibit increased activity when more cognitive functions are engaged in a task. Moreover, connector nodes are located where brain activity is associated with many different cognitive functions. Connector nodes potentially play a role in between-module communication that maintains the modular function of the brain. Together, these findings provide a network account of the brain's modular yet integrated implementation of cognitive functions.},
  chapter = {PNAS Plus},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {26598686},
  keywords = {cognition,graph theory,hubs,modularity,network},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XWQSZVFD/bertolero2015modular.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/M3YPKYID/E6798.html}
}

@article{borders2017bidirectional,
  title = {The Bidirectional Associations between State Anger and Rumination and the Role of Trait Mindfulness},
  author = {Borders, Ashley and Lu, Shou-En},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Aggressive Behavior},
  volume = {43},
  number = {4},
  pages = {342--351},
  issn = {1098-2337},
  doi = {10.1002/ab.21693},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Rumination is associated with exacerbated angry mood. Angry moods may also trigger rumination. However, research has not empirically tested the bidirectional associations of state rumination and anger, as experience sampling methodology can do. We predicted that state anger and rumination would be bi-directionally associated, both concurrently and over time, even controlling for trait anger and rumination. In addition, because mindfulness is associated with rumination and anger at the bivariate level, we examined the effect of trait mindfulness on the bidirectional association between state rumination and anger. We examined two hypotheses: (i) state rumination mediates the effect of trait mindfulness on state anger; and (ii) trait mindfulness weakens, or moderates, the bidirectional associations between state rumination and anger. In an experience-sampling study, 200 college students reported their current ruminative thinking and angry mood several times a day for 7 days. Mixed model analyses indicated that state anger and rumination predicted each other concurrently. In cross-lagged analyses, previous anger did not uniquely predict current rumination; previous rumination predicted current anger, although the effect was small. In support of our hypothesis, state rumination mediated the association between trait mindfulness and state anger. Additionally, trait mindfulness moderated the concurrent and cross-lagged associations between state rumination and anger, although the results were complex. This study contributes new information about the complex interplay of rumination and anger. Findings also add support to the theory that mindfulness decreases emotional reactivity. Aggr. Behav. 43:342\textendash 351, 2017. \textcopyright{} 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {anger,experience sampling,mindfulness,rumination},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/66MWH37G/ab.html}
}

@article{borsboom2003theoretical,
  title = {The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables.},
  author = {Borsboom, Denny and Mellenbergh, Gideon J. and {van Heerden}, Jaap},
  year = {2003},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Psychological Review},
  volume = {110},
  number = {2},
  pages = {203--219},
  issn = {1939-1471, 0033-295X},
  doi = {10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.203},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PPKNUFXQ/borsboom2003theoretical.pdf}
}

@article{borsboom2013network,
  title = {Network {{Analysis}}: {{An Integrative Approach}} to the {{Structure}} of {{Psychopathology}}},
  shorttitle = {Network {{Analysis}}},
  author = {Borsboom, Denny and Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O.J.},
  year = {2013},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Annual Review of Clinical Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {91--121},
  issn = {1548-5943, 1548-5951},
  doi = {10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050212-185608},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In network approaches to psychopathology, disorders result from the causal interplay between symptoms (e.g., worry \textrightarrow{} insomnia \textrightarrow{} fatigue), possibly involving feedback loops (e.g., a person may engage in substance abuse to forget the problems that arose due to substance abuse). The present review examines methodologies suited to identify such symptom networks and discusses network analysis techniques that may be used to extract clinically and scientifically useful information from such networks (e.g., which symptom is most central in a person's network). The authors also show how network analysis techniques may be used to construct simulation models that mimic symptom dynamics. Network approaches naturally explain the limited success of traditional research strategies, which are typically based on the idea that symptoms are manifestations of some common underlying factor, while offering promising methodological alternatives. In addition, these techniques may offer possibilities to guide and evaluate therapeutic interventions.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/47G6C3TM/annurev-clinpsy-050212-185608.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4ICRKCSJ/borsboom2013network.pdf}
}

@article{borsboom2017network,
  title = {A Network Theory of Mental Disorders},
  author = {Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2017},
  month = feb,
  journal = {World Psychiatry},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  pages = {5--13},
  issn = {17238617},
  doi = {10.1002/wps.20375},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In recent years, the network approach to psychopathology has been advanced as an alternative way of conceptualizing mental disorders. In this approach, mental disorders arise from direct interactions between symptoms. Although the network approach has led to many novel methodologies and substantive applications, it has not yet been fully articulated as a scientific theory of mental disorders. The present paper aims to develop such a theory, by postulating a limited set of theoretical principles regarding the structure and dynamics of symptom networks. At the heart of the theory lies the notion that symptoms of psychopathology are causally connected through myriads of biological, psychological and societal mechanisms. If these causal relations are sufficiently strong, symptoms can generate a level of feedback that renders them self-sustaining. In this case, the network can get stuck in a disorder state. The network theory holds that this is a general feature of mental disorders, which can therefore be understood as alternative stable states of strongly connected symptom networks. This idea naturally leads to a comprehensive model of psychopathology, encompassing a common explanatory model for mental disorders, as well as novel definitions of associated concepts such as mental health, resilience, vulnerability and liability. In addition, the network theory has direct implications for how to understand diagnosis and treatment, and suggests a clear agenda for future research in psychiatry and associated disciplines.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7WVJ6ENS/borsboom2017network.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/8SLB2PLQ/wps.20375.pdf}
}

@article{borsboom2019brain,
  title = {Brain Disorders? {{Not}} Really: {{Why}} Network Structures Block Reductionism in Psychopathology Research},
  shorttitle = {Brain Disorders?},
  author = {Borsboom, Denny and Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O. J. and Kalis, Annemarie},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {42},
  pages = {e2},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  issn = {0140-525X, 1469-1825},
  doi = {10.1017/S0140525X17002266},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion of real patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {networks,philosophy,psychometrics,psychopathology,reductionism},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DBKRHSBR/borsboom2019brain.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ASG3M9UV/D5A20455723B237C60E379D29F8797B1.html}
}

@article{borsboom2019reductionism,
  title = {Reductionism in Retreat},
  author = {Borsboom, Denny and Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O. J. and Kalis, Annemarie},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {42},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  address = {{New York, United Kingdom}},
  issn = {0140525X},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X18002091},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research BorsboomDenny Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42, e2. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X17002266 We address the commentaries on our target article in terms of four major themes. First, we note that virtually all commentators agree that mental disorders are not brain disorders in the common interpretation of these terms, and establish the consensus that explanatory reductionism is not a viable thesis. Second, we address criticisms to the effect that our article was misdirected or aimed at a straw man; we argue that this is unlikely, given the widespread communication of reductionist slogans in psychopathology research and society. Third, we tackle the question of whether intentionality, extended systems, and multiple realizability are as problematic as claimed in the target article, and we present a number of nuances and extensions with respect to our article. Fourth, we discuss the question of how the network approach should incorporate biological factors, given that wholesale reductionism is an unlikely option.},
  chapter = {Authors' Response},
  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} Cambridge University Press 2019},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Biology,Brain,Brain diseases,Brain research,Chronic fatigue syndrome,Hypotheses,Medical Sciences--Psychiatry And Neurology,Mental disorders,Psychology,Psychopathology,Questions,Realizability,Reductionism,Straw},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SYIJA8CN/borsboom2019reductionism.pdf}
}

@article{borsboom2021network,
  title = {Network Analysis of Multivariate Data in Psychological Science},
  author = {Borsboom, Denny and Deserno, Marie K. and Rhemtulla, Mijke and Epskamp, Sacha and Fried, Eiko I. and McNally, Richard J. and Robinaugh, Donald J. and Perugini, Marco and Dalege, Jonas and Costantini, Giulio and Isvoranu, Adela-Maria and Wysocki, Anna C. and {van Borkulo}, Claudia D. and {van Bork}, Riet and Waldorp, Lourens J.},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Nature Reviews Methods Primers},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  pages = {58},
  issn = {2662-8449},
  doi = {10.1038/s43586-021-00055-w},
  urldate = {2021-10-21},
  abstract = {In recent years, network analysis has been applied to identify and analyse patterns of statistical association in multivariate psychological data. In these approaches, network nodes represent variables in a data set, and edges represent pairwise conditional associations between variables in the data, while conditioning on the remaining variables. This Primer provides an anatomy of these techniques, describes the current state of the art and discusses open problems. We identify relevant data structures in which network analysis may be applied: cross-s ectional data, repeated measures and intensive longitudinal data. We then discuss the estimation of network structures in each of these cases, as well as assessment techniques to evaluate network robustness and replicability. Successful applications of the technique in different research areas are highlighted. Finally, we discuss limitations and challenges for future research.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/555KHZHI/borsboom2021network.pdf}
}

@article{borsboom2021theory,
  ids = {borsboom2021theorya,borsboom2021theoryb,borsboom2021theoryc},
  title = {Theory {{Construction Methodology}}: {{A Practical Framework}} for {{Building Theories}} in {{Psychology}}},
  shorttitle = {Theory {{Construction Methodology}}},
  author = {Borsboom, Denny and {van der Maas}, Han L. J. and Dalege, Jonas and Kievit, Rogier A. and Haig, Brian D.},
  year = {2021},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  volume = {16},
  number = {4},
  pages = {756--766},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1745-6916, 1745-6924},
  doi = {10.1177/1745691620969647},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {This article aims to improve theory formation in psychology by developing a practical methodology for constructing explanatory theories: theory construction methodology (TCM). TCM is a sequence of five steps. First, the theorist identifies a domain of empirical phenomena that becomes the target of explanation. Second, the theorist constructs a prototheory, a set of theoretical principles that putatively explain these phenomena. Third, the prototheory is used to construct a formal model, a set of model equations that encode explanatory principles. Fourth, the theorist investigates the explanatory adequacy of the model by formalizing its empirical phenomena and assessing whether it indeed reproduces these phenomena. Fifth, the theorist studies the overall adequacy of the theory by evaluating whether the identified phenomena are indeed reproduced faithfully and whether the explanatory principles are sufficiently parsimonious and substantively plausible. We explain TCM with an example taken from research on intelligence (the mutualism model of intelligence), in which key elements of the method have been successfully implemented. We discuss the place of TCM in the larger scheme of scientific research and propose an outline for a university curriculum that can systematically educate psychologists in the process of theory formation.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {abduction,formal modeling,mutualism,philosophy of science},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/8UGTYQ2X/TCMPaperRevisionDefinitive.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9GJTK29R/borsboom2021theory.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KNGVUBZJ/1745691620969647.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/MPMH4ILZ/1745691620969647 copy.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/TDFG7L8Z/1745691620969647.pdf}
}

@article{brady2017emotion,
  title = {Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks},
  author = {Brady, William J. and Wills, Julian A. and Jost, John T. and Tucker, Joshua A. and Van Bavel, Jay J.},
  year = {2017},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {114},
  number = {28},
  pages = {7313--7318},
  publisher = {{National Academy of Sciences}},
  issn = {0027-8424, 1091-6490},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.1618923114},
  urldate = {2021-05-28},
  abstract = {Political debate concerning moralized issues is increasingly common in online social networks. However, moral psychology has yet to incorporate the study of social networks to investigate processes by which some moral ideas spread more rapidly or broadly than others. Here, we show that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a process we call ``moral contagion.'' Using a large sample of social media communications about three polarizing moral/political issues (n = 563,312), we observed that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffusion by a factor of 20\% for each additional word. Furthermore, we found that moral contagion was bounded by group membership; moral-emotional language increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and conservative networks, and less between them. Our results highlight the importance of emotion in the social transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social network methods for studying morality. These findings offer insights into how people are exposed to moral and political ideas through social networks, thus expanding models of social influence and group polarization as people become increasingly immersed in social media networks.},
  chapter = {Social Sciences},
  copyright = {\textcopyright{}  . http://www.pnas.org/site/misc/userlicense.xhtml},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {28652356},
  keywords = {emotion,morality,politics,social media,social networks},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7HBLD3IH/brady2017emotion.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VUZJQ53I/7313.html}
}

@article{brady2020attentional,
  title = {Attentional Capture Helps Explain Why Moral and Emotional Content Go Viral},
  author = {Brady, William J. and Gantman, Ana P. and Van Bavel, Jay J.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
  volume = {149},
  number = {4},
  pages = {746--756},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-2222(Electronic),0096-3445(Print)},
  doi = {10.1037/xge0000673},
  abstract = {Our social media newsfeeds are filled with a variety of content all battling for our limited attention. Across 3 studies, we investigated whether moral and emotional content captures our attention more than other content and if this may help explain why this content is more likely to go viral online. Using a combination of controlled lab experiments and nearly 50,000 political tweets, we found that moral and emotional content are prioritized in early visual attention more than neutral content, and that such attentional capture is associated with increased retweets during political conversations online. Furthermore, we found that the differences in attentional capture among moral and emotional stimuli could not be fully explained by differences in arousal. These studies suggest that attentional capture is 1 basic psychological process that helps explain the increased diffusion of moral and emotional content during political discourse on social media, and shed light on ways in which political leaders, disinformation profiteers, marketers, and activist organizations can spread moralized content by capitalizing on natural tendencies of our perceptual systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Attentional Capture,Discourse Analysis,Emotional Content,Morality,Online Social Networks,Physiological Arousal,Social Media,Test Construction,Visual Attention},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/MVJWZZE6/2019-52292-001.html}
}

@misc{brady2021how,
  title = {How Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks},
  author = {Brady, William J. and McLoughlin, Killian and Doan, Tuan Nguyen and Crockett, Molly},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  institution = {{PsyArXiv}},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/gf7t5},
  urldate = {2021-05-29},
  abstract = {Moral outrage shapes fundamental aspects of human social life and is now widespread in online social networks. Here, we show how social learning processes amplify online moral outrage expressions over time. In two pre-registered observational studies of Twitter (7,331 users and 12.7 million total tweets) and two pre-registered behavioral experiments (N = 240), we find that positive social feedback for outrage expressions increases the likelihood of future outrage expressions, consistent with principles of reinforcement learning. We also find that outrage expressions are sensitive to expressive norms in users' social networks, over and above users' own preferences, suggesting that norm learning processes guide online outrage expressions. Moreover, expressive norms moderate social reinforcement of outrage: in ideologically extreme networks, where outrage expression is more common, users are less sensitive to social feedback when deciding whether to express outrage. Our findings highlight how platform design interacts with human learning mechanisms to impact moral discourse in digital public spaces.},
  keywords = {emotion,machine learning,morality,outrage,politics,reinforcement learning,Social and Behavioral Sciences,social media,social networks,social norms},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NZCN6CS8/brady2021how.pdf}
}

@article{brandt2015moralization,
  title = {Moralization and the 2012 {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Presidential Election Campaign}}},
  author = {Brandt, Mark J. and Wisneski, Daniel C. and Skitka, Linda J.},
  year = {2015},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Journal of Social and Political Psychology},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {211--237},
  issn = {2195-3325},
  doi = {10.5964/jspp.v3i2.434},
  urldate = {2022-06-22},
  abstract = {People vary in the extent to which they imbue an attitude with moral conviction; however, little is known about what makes an issue transform from a relatively non-moral preference to a moral conviction. In the context of the 2012 U.S. presidential election, we test if affect and beliefs (thoughts about harms and benefits) are antecedents or consequences of participants' moral conviction about their candidate preferences, or are some combination of both. Using a longitudinal design in the run-up to the election, we find that, overall, affect is both an antecedent and consequence, and beliefs about harms and benefits are only consequences, of changes in moral conviction related to candidate preferences. The affect results were consistent across liberals, conservatives, and moderates; however, the role of beliefs showed some differences between ideologues (liberals and conservatives) and moderates.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YZMBZSW2/brandt2015moralization.pdf}
}

@article{brandt2021evaluating,
  title = {Evaluating {{Belief System Networks}} as a {{Theory}} of {{Political Belief System Dynamics}}},
  author = {Brandt, Mark J. and Sleegers, Willem W. A.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Review},
  volume = {25},
  number = {2},
  pages = {159--185},
  doi = {doi.org/10.1177/10888683219937},
  abstract = {A theory of political belief system dynamics should incorporate causal connections between elements of the belief system and the possibility that belief systems are influenced by exogenous factors. These necessary components can be satisfied by conceptualizing an individual's belief system as a network of causally connected attitudes and identities which, via the interactions between the elements and the push of exogenous influences, produces the disparate phenomena in the belief systems literature. We implement this belief systems as networks theory in a dynamic Ising model and demonstrate that the theory can integrate at least six otherwise unrelated phenomenon in the political belief systems literature, including work on attitude consistency, cross-pressures, spillover effects, partisan cues, and ideological differences in attitude consensus. Our findings suggest that belief systems are not just one thing, but emerge from the interactions between the attitudes and identities in the belief system. All code is available: https://osf.io/aswy8/?view\_only=99aff77909094bddabb5d382f6db2622.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/AKPR8DWC/brandt_2021_evaluating.pdf}
}

@article{brandt2022betweenperson,
  title = {Between-Person Methods Provide Limited Insight about within-Person Belief Systems},
  author = {Brandt, Mark J. and Morgan, G. Scott},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {123},
  pages = {621--635},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315},
  doi = {10.1037/pspp0000404},
  abstract = {Belief systems are individual-level phenomena that describe the interrelationships of the political attitudes of a person. However, the modal study of the structure of political ideologies and beliefs uses cross-sectional survey data to estimate what is central to the belief system or the dimensionality of the belief system, aggregating across many people. Cross-sectional data, however, are ill-suited to the task of studying individual-level phenomena because they contain an unobservable mixture of within-person and between-person variation. In this project, we use longitudinal datasets from the Netherlands (representative) and the United States (convenience), spanning between 6 months and 10 years, to we ask whether between-subjects methods can help us understand the within-person structure of belief systems. First, we use Bayesian STARTS models (L\"udtke et al., 2018) to assess what type of variance cross-sectional studies are likely tapping into. We find that variability in measures of ideology and political beliefs is primarily due to stable between-person differences, with relatively smaller amounts of variation due to within-person differences. Second, we estimate between-person, within-person, and cross-sectional correlations between all items in our study and find that between-person correlations are larger and in some cases differ in their direction from within-person correlations. Furthermore, cross-sectional correlations are most similar to between-person correlations. Taken together, these findings indicate that the modal study may help describe differences between people, but is ill-suited to tell us about the structure of individuals' belief systems. New methods are necessary for a complete understanding of political belief systems that clarify both between- and within-person processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Ideology,Models,Political Attitudes,Surveys},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DE55BLR5/brandt_2022_between-pe.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4SZXVJPS/2022-19898-001.html}
}

@article{brandt2022measuring,
  title = {Measuring the Belief System of a Person.},
  author = {Brandt, Mark J.},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {123},
  number = {4},
  pages = {830--853},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/pspp0000416},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Theories of belief system structure and dynamics assume that belief systems are a personlevel construct. However, measures of belief system structure do not measure the structure of person-level belief systems and instead measure aggregated belief system structure (e.g., the belief system in a particular country). In this paper, I show that a measure of conceptual similarity between attitudes and identities of a belief system works as a valid, reliable, flexible, and efficient measure of person-level belief system structure. In Studies 1 (N = 387) 2 (N = 389), and 3 (N = 598), I show conceptual similarity judgments are reliable and are related to measures of political engagement, political knowledge, attitude consistency, and preference congruence as predicted by computational models of belief system dynamics. In Studies 4 (N = 981) and 5 (N = 983), I show that conceptual similarity judgments are affected by partisan frames and that changes in conceptual similarity judgments are associated with attitude change as predicted by computational models of belief system dynamics. Conceptual similarity judgments can be used with a variety of attitudes and identities in easy to administer studies. It provides a tool to fill an empirical gap identified by theories of belief system dynamics.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PFG4DR6X/brandt_2022_measuring.pdf}
}

@article{bringmann2016Assessing,
  ids = {bringmann2016assessing},
  title = {Assessing {{Temporal Emotion Dynamics Using Networks}}},
  author = {Bringmann, Laura F. and Pe, Madeline L. and Vissers, Nathalie and Ceulemans, Eva and Borsboom, Denny and Vanpaemel, Wolf and Tuerlinckx, Francis and Kuppens, Peter},
  year = {2016},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Assessment},
  volume = {23},
  number = {4},
  pages = {425--435},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1073-1911, 1552-3489},
  doi = {10.1177/1073191116645909},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Multivariate psychological processes have recently been studied, visualized, and analyzed as networks. In this network approach, psychological constructs are represented as complex systems of interacting components. In addition to insightful visualization of dynamics, a network perspective leads to a new way of thinking about the nature of psychological phenomena by offering new tools for studying dynamical processes in psychology. In this article, we explain the rationale of the network approach, the associated methods and visualization, and illustrate it using an empirical example focusing on the relation between the daily fluctuations of emotions and neuroticism. The results suggest that individuals with high levels of neuroticism had a denser emotion network compared with their less neurotic peers. This effect is especially pronounced for the negative emotion network, which is in line with previous studies that found a denser network in depressed subjects than in healthy subjects. In sum, we show how the network approach may offer new tools for studying dynamical processes in psychology.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/APBF5RG2/bringmann2016assessing.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZIW6CWYD/1073191116645909.pdf}
}

@article{bringmann2019what,
  ids = {bringmann2019whata},
  title = {What Do Centrality Measures Measure in Psychological Networks?},
  author = {Bringmann, Laura F. and Elmer, Timon and Epskamp, Sacha and Krause, Robert W. and Schoch, David and Wichers, Marieke and Wigman, Johanna T. W. and Snippe, Evelien},
  year = {2019},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Journal of Abnormal Psychology},
  volume = {128},
  number = {8},
  pages = {892--903},
  issn = {1939-1846, 0021-843X},
  doi = {10.1037/abn0000446},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In clinical psychology, networks of symptoms or affect states are increasingly used to study psychopathology. Such psychopathological networks are often further analyzed with centrality measures that indicate which symptoms or affect states are structurally important. We argue that the use of these centrality measures, which originally stem from social networks, is problematic in psychological networks, and propose several alternative ways forward.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LF834UWA/bringmann2019what.pdf}
}

@article{burger2022reporting,
  title = {Reporting Standards for Psychological Network Analyses in Cross-Sectional Data.},
  author = {Burger, Julian and Isvoranu, Adela-Maria and Lunansky, Gabriela and Haslbeck, Jonas M.B. and Epskamp, Sacha and Hoekstra, Ria H. A. and Fried, Eiko I. and Borsboom, Denny and Blanken, Tessa F.},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Psychological Methods},
  issn = {1939-1463, 1082-989X},
  doi = {10.1037/met0000471},
  urldate = {2022-09-28},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/W6GVSJS3/burger_2022_reporting.pdf}
}

@article{burton2021reconsidering,
  title = {Reconsidering Evidence of Moral Contagion in Online Social Networks},
  author = {Burton, Jason W. and Cruz, Nicole and Hahn, Ulrike},
  year = {2021},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Nature Human Behaviour},
  volume = {5},
  number = {12},
  pages = {1629--1635},
  publisher = {{Nature Publishing Group}},
  issn = {2397-3374},
  doi = {10.1038/s41562-021-01133-5},
  urldate = {2022-09-15},
  abstract = {The ubiquity of social media use and the digital data traces it produces has triggered a potential methodological shift in the psychological sciences away from traditional, laboratory-based experimentation. The hope is that, by using computational social science methods to analyse large-scale observational data from social media, human behaviour can be studied with greater statistical power and ecological validity. However, current standards of null hypothesis significance testing and correlational statistics seem ill-suited to markedly noisy, high-dimensional social media datasets. We explore this point by probing the moral contagion phenomenon, whereby the use of moral-emotional language increases the probability of message spread. Through out-of-sample prediction, model comparisons and specification curve analyses, we find that the moral contagion model performs no better than an implausible XYZ contagion model. This highlights the risks of using purely correlational evidence from large observational datasets and sounds a cautionary note for psychology's merge with big data.},
  copyright = {2021 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Psychology,Social sciences},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7I462YYF/burton_2021_reconsider.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VR7ZEIWG/s41562-021-01133-5.html}
}

@article{bushman2005chewing,
  title = {Chewing on {{It Can Chew You Up}}: {{Effects}} of {{Rumination}} on {{Triggered Displaced Aggression}}},
  shorttitle = {Chewing on {{It Can Chew You Up}}},
  author = {Bushman, Brad J. and Bonacci, Angelica M. and Pedersen, William C. and Vasquez, Eduardo A. and Miller, Norman},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {88},
  number = {6},
  pages = {969--983},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.969},
  abstract = {Ruminating about a provocation increases the likelihood of displaced aggression following a minor annoyance (trigger). In Study 1, provoked participants who ruminated for 25 min were more aggressive toward a fumbling confederate than were distracted participants. Provocation-induced negative affect was positively related to aggression but only among those who ruminated. Study 2 conceptually replicated Study 1 and also found that the more negatively people reacted to the trigger, the more likely the trigger was to increase displaced aggression. Study 3 replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 by using an 8-hr rumination period. All 3 studies suggest that ruminating about a provocation increases the likelihood that a minor triggering annoyance will increase displaced aggression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Aggressive Behavior,Rumination (Cognitive Process)},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2PH7WJUL/bushman2005chewing.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QIXHYX4N/2005-06516-006.html}
}

@article{cameron2015constructionist,
  title = {A Constructionist Review of Morality and Emotions: {{No}} Evidence for Specific Links between Moral Content and Discrete Emotions},
  shorttitle = {A Constructionist Review of Morality and Emotions},
  author = {Cameron, C. Daryl and Lindquist, Kristen A. and Gray, Kurt},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Review},
  volume = {19},
  number = {4},
  pages = {371--394},
  doi = {10.1177/1088868314566683},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/B9UGB5ZA/cameron2015constructionist.pdf}
}

@article{carpenter2021political,
  title = {Political {{Polarization}} and {{Moral Outrage}} on {{Social Media}}},
  author = {Carpenter, Jordan and Brady, William and Crockett, Molly and Weber, Rene and {Sinnott-Armstrong}, Walter},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Connecticut Law Review},
  volume = {52},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1107--1120},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/AI6GUMBV/Political Polarization and Moral Outrage on Social Media.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/HNXYX33M/52ConnLRev.pdf}
}

@article{chapman2014trait,
  ids = {chapman2014traitb},
  title = {Trait Physical Disgust Is Related to Moral Judgments Outside of the Purity Domain.},
  author = {Chapman, Hanah A. and Anderson, Adam K.},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  pages = {341--348},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1931-1516, 1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/a0035120},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Although there is an emerging consensus that disgust plays a role in human morality, it remains unclear whether this role is limited to transgressions that contain elements of physical disgust (e.g., gory murders, sexual crimes), or whether disgust is also involved in ``pure'' forms of morality. To address this issue, we examined the relationship between individual differences in the tendency to experience disgust toward physical stimuli (i.e., trait physical disgust) and reactions to pure moral transgressions. Across two studies, individuals higher in trait physical disgust judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than did their low-disgust counterparts, and were also more likely to moralize violations of social convention. Controlling for gender, trait anxiety, trait anger, and social conservatism did not eliminate trait disgust effects. These results suggest that disgust's role in morality is not limited to issues of purity or bodily norms, and that disgust may play a role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2IF6TEWW/chapman2014trait.pdf}
}

@incollection{chapman2018component,
  ids = {chapman2018componenta},
  title = {A {{Component Process Model}} of {{Disgust}}, {{Anger}}, and {{Moral Judgment}}},
  booktitle = {Atlas of Moral Psychology},
  author = {Chapman, Hanah A.},
  editor = {Gray, Kurt and Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2018},
  pages = {70--80},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{chatterjee2018vaping,
  title = {Is Vaping a Gateway to Smoking: A Review of the Longitudinal Studies},
  shorttitle = {Is Vaping a Gateway to Smoking},
  author = {Chatterjee, Kshitij and Alzghoul, Bashar and Innabi, Ayoub and Meena, Nikhil},
  year = {2018},
  month = jun,
  journal = {International Journal of Adolescent Medicine and Health},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  publisher = {{De Gruyter}},
  issn = {2191-0278},
  doi = {10.1515/ijamh-2016-0033},
  urldate = {2023-01-10},
  abstract = {Background: The use of e-cigarettes (ECs) is rising globally. There is concern that e-cigarette may actually lead to smoking, especially amongst adolescents. Objective: To perform a comprehensive review of literature reporting the longitudinal effects of e-cigarette use on onset of smoking among adolescents and young adults. Methods: A search was conducted using PubMed, Google Scholar, Scopus, and Web of Science in February 2016 to identify the studies containing data on EC use among adolescents and young adults (age\<30 years). We then narrowed our search to only include longitudinal studies with data on EC and conventional cigarette smoking among this population. Results: Four longitudinal studies were identified that analyzed the use of ECs and smoking at both baseline and follow-ups in the target population. These studies demonstrated that EC use is associated with an increase in combustible cigarette smoking, even amongst the adolescents who were not susceptible to smoking. Conclusion: This review highlights the strong evidence that not only are ECs are not an effective tool for smoking cessation among adolescents, they actually are associated with higher incidence of combustible cigarette smoking. Policy makers need to recognize of the insidious nature of this campaign by the tobacco industry and design policies to regulate it.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {adolescent,electronic cigarettes,smoking/psychology}
}

@article{chen2016temporal,
  title = {Temporal Features of Black and White Neutral Words Processing after Moral Disgust Priming},
  author = {Chen, Wei and Pu, Ming-hui and Feng, Shen-mei and Zhu, Jin-fu},
  year = {2016},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Chinese Journal of Clinical Psychology},
  volume = {24},
  number = {5},
  pages = {784--787},
  publisher = {{Clinical Psychological Research Ctr}},
  issn = {1005-3611},
  abstract = {Objective: Discussing the time characteristics and neural mechanism of processing black and white neutral words after the activation of moral disgust, by applying event-related potential technique(ERPs) and semantic priming paradigm. Methods: Applied two-character word priming paradigm, which was presenting priming words(moral disgust words,non moral disgust words) first and then target words(black neutrals, white neutrals), and asking the participants to judge the character structure of target words. Processing feature was explored by investigating the differences in EEG indexes of different combinations. Results: Comparing to non moral disgust stimulations, black neutrals triggered greater N1 and N350 amplitudes after activation of moral disgust. Conclusion: Comparing to non moral disgust, after activation of moral disgust,black and white target words related to metaphor of moral concepts obtain more cognitive resources and more refined processing. After activation of moral disgust, individuals tend to relief and release disgust and maintain their favorable moral images by inclining to white, the metaphor of moral purity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,Black \& white metaphor,Disgust,Electroencephalography,ERPs,Evoked Potentials,Moral purifying,Priming}
}

@article{cheng2021effect,
  title = {The Effect of Anger on Malevolent Creativity and Strategies for Its Emotion Regulation},
  author = {Cheng, Rui and Lu, Kelong and Hao, Ning},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Acta Psychologica Sinica},
  volume = {53},
  number = {8},
  pages = {847},
  issn = {0439-755X},
  doi = {10.3724/SP.J.1041.2021.00847},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The current study aimed to explore the effect of anger on malevolent creativity and its underlying mechanisms and to determine whether such an effect could be modulated by strategies of emotional regulation. Experiment 1 compared the differences of malevolent creativity between individuals in anger, sadness, and neutral emotions and found that individuals in anger produced more and more novel malevolent ideas, emotional arousal, and implicit aggression mediate the effect of anger on the malevolent creative performance. Experiment 2 explored how different emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal, expressive inhibition) influenced the malevolent creative performance of angry individuals. It was found that the cognitive reappraisal group and the expression inhibition group had lower levels of malevolent creativity than the control group. Emotional arousal and implicit aggression mediated the effects of two kinds of emotion regulation strategies on malevolent creativity. These results suggest that anger promotes creativity by enhancing implicit aggression and emotional arousal, and the cognitive reappraisal and expression inhibition strategies can be used as effective strategies to weaken the malevolent creativity of the angry individuals.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5EJL7PGC/cheng2021effect.pdf}
}

@article{chowdhry2015not,
  title = {Not All Negative Emotions Lead to Concrete Construal},
  author = {Chowdhry, Nivriti and Winterich, Karen Page and Mittal, Vikas and Morales, Andrea C.},
  year = {2015},
  month = dec,
  journal = {International Journal of Research in Marketing},
  volume = {32},
  number = {4},
  pages = {428--430},
  issn = {0167-8116},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ijresmar.2015.03.006},
  urldate = {2021-05-27},
  abstract = {Labroo and Patrick (2009) show that positively- (negatively-) valenced emotions are associated with a relatively more (less) abstract construal. However, similarly valenced emotions may differ on other dimensions, impacting construal level. Replicating Labroo and Patrick (2009), happiness is associated with a relatively more abstract construal than sadness. Extending their findings, disgust is associated with a relatively more abstract construal than sadness. This difference in construal level results in disgust and sadness impacting brand-extension judgments differently.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Brand extension,Construal level,Disgust,Emotion,Happiness,Valence},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/D64VNR64/S0167811615000701.html}
}

@incollection{cosmides1994Origins,
  ids = {cosmides1994origin,cosmides1994originsa},
  title = {Origins of Domain Specificity: {{The}} Evolution of Functional Organization},
  shorttitle = {Origins of Domain Specificity},
  booktitle = {Mapping the {{Mind}}},
  author = {Cosmides, Leda and Tooby, John},
  editor = {Hirschfeld, Lawrence A. and Gelman, Susan A.},
  year = {1994},
  month = apr,
  edition = {First},
  pages = {85--116},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511752902.005},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  isbn = {978-0-521-41966-6 978-0-521-42993-1 978-0-511-75290-2},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FYYKPMCU/cosmides1994origins.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SK257R3Z/10.1.1.140.7758.pdf}
}

@article{costantini2015state,
  title = {State of the {{aRt}} Personality Research: {{A}} Tutorial on Network Analysis of Personality Data in {{R}}},
  shorttitle = {State of the {{aRt}} Personality Research},
  author = {Costantini, Giulio and Epskamp, Sacha and Borsboom, Denny and Perugini, Marco and M{\~o}ttus, Ren{\'e} and Waldorp, Lourens J. and Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O. J.},
  year = {2015},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Journal of Research in Personality},
  series = {R {{Special Issue}}},
  volume = {54},
  pages = {13--29},
  issn = {0092-6566},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jrp.2014.07.003},
  urldate = {2021-10-06},
  abstract = {Network analysis represents a novel theoretical approach to personality. Network approaches motivate alternative ways of analyzing data, and suggest new ways of modeling and simulating personality processes. In the present paper, we provide an overview of network analysis strategies as they apply to personality data. We discuss different ways to construct networks from typical personality data, show how to compute and interpret important measures of centrality and clustering, and illustrate how one can simulate on networks to mimic personality processes. All analyses are illustrated using a data set on the commonly used HEXACO questionnaire using elementary R-code that readers may easily adapt to apply to their own data.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Centrality,Clustering,HEXACO,Latent variables,Network analysis,Personality traits,Psychometrics},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/AXDED5YM/costantini2015state.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/3Q82NZA5/S0092656614000701.html}
}

@article{cramer2010Comorbidity,
  ids = {cramer2010comorbidity},
  title = {Comorbidity: {{A}} Network Perspective},
  shorttitle = {Comorbidity},
  author = {Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O. J. and Waldorp, Lourens J. and {van der Maas}, Han L. J. and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2010},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {33},
  number = {2-3},
  pages = {137--150},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  issn = {0140-525X, 1469-1825},
  doi = {10.1017/S0140525X09991567},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {The pivotal problem of comorbidity research lies in the psychometric foundation it rests on, that is, latent variable theory, in which a mental disorder is viewed as a latent variable that causes a constellation of symptoms. From this perspective, comorbidity is a (bi)directional relationship between multiple latent variables. We argue that such a latent variable perspective encounters serious problems in the study of comorbidity, and offer a radically different conceptualization in terms of a network approach, where comorbidity is hypothesized to arise from direct relations between symptoms of multiple disorders. We propose a method to visualize comorbidity networks and, based on an empirical network for major depression and generalized anxiety, we argue that this approach generates realistic hypotheses about pathways to comorbidity, overlapping symptoms, and diagnostic boundaries, that are not naturally accommodated by latent variable models: Some pathways to comorbidity through the symptom space are more likely than others; those pathways generally have the same direction (i.e., from symptoms of one disorder to symptoms of the other); overlapping symptoms play an important role in comorbidity; and boundaries between diagnostic categories are necessarily fuzzy.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {comorbidity,complex networks,generalized anxiety,latent variable models,major depression},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4SEJ3ZTA/cramer2010comorbidity.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XN934VVZ/is-there-a-contradiction-between-the-network-and-latent-variable-perspectives-2.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JXKS645N/4A9FE571B49A9150DFABCD5845EC0B3D.html}
}

@article{cramer2010complex,
  title = {Complex Realities Require Complex Theories: {{Refining}} and Extending the Network Approach to Mental Disorders},
  shorttitle = {Complex Realities Require Complex Theories},
  author = {Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O. J. and Waldorp, Lourens J. and {van der Maas}, Han L. J. and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2010},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {33},
  number = {2-3},
  pages = {178--193},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  address = {{New York, United Kingdom}},
  issn = {0140525X},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10000920},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {The majority of commentators agree on one thing: Our network approach might be the prime candidate for offering a new perspective on the origins of mental disorders. In our response, we elaborate on refinements (e.g., cognitive and genetic levels) and extensions (e.g., to Axis II disorders) of the network model, as well as discuss ways to test its validity. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]},
  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} Cambridge University Press 2010},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Biology,Medical Sciences--Psychiatry And Neurology,Mental disorders,Morbidity,Psychology,Quantitative psychology},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LIFPLJ5C/cramer2010complex.pdf}
}

@article{cramer2012dimensions,
  title = {Dimensions of {{Normal Personality}} as {{Networks}} in {{Search}} of {{Equilibrium}}: {{You Can}}'t like {{Parties}} If You {{Don}}'t like {{People}}},
  shorttitle = {Dimensions of {{Normal Personality}} as {{Networks}} in {{Search}} of {{Equilibrium}}},
  author = {Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O. J. and Van Der Sluis, Sophie and Noordhof, Arjen and Wichers, Marieke and Geschwind, Nicole and Aggen, Steven H. and Kendler, Kenneth S. and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2012},
  month = jul,
  journal = {European Journal of Personality},
  volume = {26},
  number = {4},
  pages = {414--431},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Ltd}},
  issn = {0890-2070},
  doi = {10.1002/per.1866},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {In one currently dominant view on personality, personality dimensions (e.g. extraversion) are causes of human behaviour, and personality inventory items (e.g. `I like to go to parties' and `I like people') are measurements of these dimensions. In this view, responses to extraversion items correlate because they measure the same latent dimension. In this paper, we challenge this way of thinking and offer an alternative perspective on personality as a system of connected affective, cognitive and behavioural components. We hypothesize that these components do not hang together because they measure the same underlying dimension; they do so because they depend on one another directly for causal, homeostatic or logical reasons (e.g. if one does not like people and it is harder to enjoy parties). From this `network perspective', personality dimensions emerge out of the connectivity structure that exists between the various components of personality. After outlining the network theory, we illustrate how it applies to personality research in four domains: (i) the overall organization of personality components; (ii) the distinction between state and trait; (iii) the genetic architecture of personality; and (iv) the relation between personality and psychopathology. Copyright \textcopyright{} 2012 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {latent variable models,networks,normal personality,personality traits},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DK8AUNI5/cramer2012dimensions.pdf}
}

@article{csardi2006igraph,
  title = {The Igraph Software Package for Complex Network Research},
  author = {Csardi, Gabor and Nepusz, Tamas},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {InterJournal, Complex Systems},
  volume = {1695},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1--9}
}

@article{cuijpers2020network,
  title = {A Network Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Psychotherapies, Pharmacotherapies and Their Combination in the Treatment of Adult Depression},
  author = {Cuijpers, Pim and Noma, Hisashi and Karyotaki, Eirini and H. Vinkers, Christiaan and Cipriani, Andrea and Furukawa, Toshi A.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {World Psychiatry},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {92--107},
  issn = {2051-5545},
  doi = {10.1002/wps.20701},
  urldate = {2021-05-18},
  abstract = {No network meta-analysis has examined the relative effects of psychotherapies, pharmacotherapies and their combination in the treatment of adult depression, while this is a very important clinical issue. We conducted systematic searches in bibliographical databases to identify randomized trials in which a psychotherapy and a pharmacotherapy for the acute or long-term treatment of depression were compared with each other, or in which the combination of a psychotherapy and a pharmacotherapy was compared with either one alone. The main outcome was treatment response (50\% improvement between baseline and endpoint). Remission and acceptability (defined as study drop-out for any reason) were also examined. Possible moderators that were assessed included chronic and treatment-resistant depression and baseline severity of depression. Data were pooled as relative risk (RR) using a random-effects model. A total of 101 studies with 11,910 patients were included. Depression in most studies was moderate to severe. In the network meta-analysis, combined treatment was more effective than psychotherapy alone (RR=1.27; 95\% CI: 1.14-1.39) and pharmacotherapy alone (RR=1.25; 95\% CI: 1.14-1.37) in achieving response at the end of treatment. No significant difference was found between psychotherapy alone and pharmacotherapy alone (RR=0.99; 95\% CI: 0.92-1.08). Similar results were found for remission. Combined treatment (RR=1.23; 95\% CI: 1.05-1.45) and psychotherapy alone (RR=1.17; 95\% CI: 1.02-1.32) were more acceptable than pharmacotherapy. Results were similar for chronic and treatment-resistant depression. The combination of psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy seems to be the best choice for patients with moderate depression. More research is needed on long-term effects of treatments (including cost-effectiveness), on the impact of specific pharmacological and non-pharmacological approaches, and on the effects in specific populations of patients.},
  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2020 World Psychiatric Association},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {acceptability,antidepressants,chronic depression,cognitive behavior therapy,combined treatment,Depression,interpersonal therapy,network meta-analysis,pharmacotherapy,psychotherapy,treatment-resistant depression},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ABT3LZNS/cuijpers2020network.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/MXEIAMXU/wps.html}
}

@article{cunningham2007iterative,
  title = {The {{Iterative Reprocessing Model}}: {{A Multilevel Framework}} for {{Attitudes}} and {{Evaluation}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Iterative Reprocessing Model}}},
  author = {Cunningham, William A. and Zelazo, Philip David and Packer, Dominic J. and Van Bavel, Jay J.},
  year = {2007},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Social Cognition},
  volume = {25},
  number = {5},
  pages = {736--760},
  issn = {0278-016X},
  doi = {10.1521/soco.2007.25.5.736},
  urldate = {2021-05-11},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SHV9VZU3/cunningham2007iterative.pdf}
}

@article{curry2019mapping,
  title = {Mapping Morality with a Compass: {{Testing}} the Theory of `Morality-as-Cooperation' with a New Questionnaire},
  shorttitle = {Mapping Morality with a Compass},
  author = {Curry, Oliver Scott and Chesters, Matthew J. and Van Lissa, Caspar J.},
  year = {2019},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Journal of Research in Personality},
  volume = {78},
  pages = {106--124},
  issn = {0092-6566},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jrp.2018.10.008},
  urldate = {2021-05-26},
  abstract = {Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. MAC uses game theory to identify distinct types of cooperation, and predicts that each will be considered morally relevant, and each will give rise to a distinct moral domain. Here we test MAC's predictions by developing a new self-report measure of morality, the Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire (MAC-Q), and comparing its psychometric properties to those of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Over four studies, the results support the MAC-Q's seven-factor model of morality, but not the MFQ's five-factor model. Thus MAC emerges as the best available compass with which to explore the moral landscape.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Cooperation,Game theory,Moral foundations,Morality,Scale development},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/V58LLZR6/curry2019mapping.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/HV4Z924T/S0092656618303568.html}
}

@article{cushman2006Role,
  title = {The {{Role}} of {{Conscious Reasoning}} and {{Intuition}} in {{Moral Judgment}}: {{Testing Three Principles}} of {{Harm}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Role}} of {{Conscious Reasoning}} and {{Intuition}} in {{Moral Judgment}}},
  author = {Cushman, Fiery and Young, Liane and Hauser, Marc},
  year = {2006},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {17},
  number = {12},
  pages = {1082--1089},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0956-7976},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x},
  urldate = {2021-05-12},
  abstract = {Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9YX9J2J8/cushman2006role.pdf}
}

@article{cushman2015deconstructing,
  title = {Deconstructing Intent to Reconstruct Morality},
  author = {Cushman, Fiery},
  year = {2015},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology},
  series = {Morality and Ethics},
  volume = {6},
  pages = {97--103},
  issn = {2352-250X},
  doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.06.003},
  urldate = {2021-05-29},
  abstract = {Mental state representations are a crucial input to human moral judgment. This fact is often summarized by saying that we restrict moral condemnation to `intentional' harms. This simple description is the beginning of a theory, however, not the end of one. There is rich internal structure to the folk concept of intentional action, which comprises a series of causal relations between mental states, actions and states of affairs in the world. Moral judgment shows nuanced patterns of sensitivity to all three of these elements: mental states (like beliefs and desires), the actions that a person performs, and the consequences of those actions. Deconstructing intentional action into its elemental fragments will enable future theories to reconstruct our understanding of moral judgment.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CCVPLGY7/S2352250X15001657.html}
}

@article{cusimano2021morality,
  ids = {cusimano2021moralitya},
  title = {Morality Justifies Motivated Reasoning in the Folk Ethics of Belief},
  author = {Cusimano, Corey and Lombrozo, Tania},
  year = {2021},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {209},
  pages = {104513},
  issn = {00100277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104513},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e. g., that one's friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situ\- ations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral considerations affect how people evaluate others' beliefs. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally beneficial beliefs demand less evidence than morally risky beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and on that basis, sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Belief,Lay epistemics,Moral judgment,Motivated reasoning,Optimism},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/INNHE2MX/1-s2.0-S0010027720303322-main.pdf}
}

@article{dalege2016formalized,
  title = {Toward a Formalized Account of Attitudes: {{The Causal Attitude Network}} ({{CAN}}) Model.},
  shorttitle = {Toward a Formalized Account of Attitudes},
  author = {Dalege, Jonas and Borsboom, Denny and {van Harreveld}, Frenk and {van den Berg}, Helma and Conner, Mark and {van der Maas}, Han L. J.},
  year = {2016},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Psychological Review},
  volume = {123},
  number = {1},
  pages = {2--22},
  issn = {1939-1471, 0033-295X},
  doi = {10.1037/a0039802},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {This article introduces the Causal Attitude Network (CAN) model, which conceptualizes attitudes as networks consisting of evaluative reactions and interactions between these reactions. Relevant evaluative reactions include beliefs, feelings, and behaviors toward the attitude object. Interactions between these reactions arise through direct causal influences (e.g., the belief that snakes are dangerous causes fear of snakes) and mechanisms that support evaluative consistency between related contents of evaluative reactions (e.g., people tend to align their belief that snakes are useful with their belief that snakes help maintain ecological balance). In the CAN model, the structure of attitude networks conforms to a small-world structure: evaluative reactions that are similar to each other form tight clusters, which are connected by a sparser set of ``shortcuts'' between them. We argue that the CAN model provides a realistic formalized measurement model of attitudes and therefore fills a crucial gap in the attitude literature. Furthermore, the CAN model provides testable predictions for the structure of attitudes and how they develop, remain stable, and change over time. Attitude strength is conceptualized in terms of the connectivity of attitude networks and we show that this provides a parsimonious account of the differences between strong and weak attitudes. We discuss the CAN model in relation to possible extensions, implication for the assessment of attitudes, and possibilities for further study.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/47UQI8MC/dalege2016formalized.pdf}
}

@article{dalege2017networka,
  title = {Network {{Analysis}} on {{Attitudes}}: {{A Brief Tutorial}}},
  shorttitle = {Network {{Analysis}} on {{Attitudes}}},
  author = {Dalege, Jonas and Borsboom, Denny and {van Harreveld}, Frenk and {van der Maas}, Han L. J.},
  year = {2017},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {8},
  number = {5},
  pages = {528--537},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1948-5506, 1948-5514},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550617709827},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In this article, we provide a brief tutorial on the estimation, analysis, and simulation on attitude networks using the programming language R. We first discuss what a network is and subsequently show how one can estimate a regularized network on typical attitude data. For this, we use open-access data on the attitudes toward Barack Obama during the 2012 American presidential election. Second, we show how one can calculate standard network measures such as community structure, centrality, and connectivity on this estimated attitude network. Third, we show how one can simulate from an estimated attitude network to derive predictions from attitude networks. By this, we highlight that network theory provides a framework for both testing and developing formalized hypotheses on attitudes and related core social psychological constructs.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5PBAQWFD/tutorial.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JP32S2RR/dalege2017networka.pdf}
}

@article{dalege2017networkb,
  title = {Network {{Structure Explains}} the {{Impact}} of {{Attitudes}} on {{Voting Decisions}}},
  author = {Dalege, Jonas and Borsboom, Denny and {van Harreveld}, Frenk and Waldorp, Lourens J. and {van der Maas}, Han L. J.},
  year = {2017},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Scientific Reports},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {4909},
  publisher = {{Nature Publishing Group}},
  issn = {2045-2322},
  doi = {10.1038/s41598-017-05048-y},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {Attitudes can have a profound impact on socially relevant behaviours, such as voting. However, this effect is not uniform across situations or individuals, and it is at present difficult to predict whether attitudes will predict behaviour in any given circumstance. Using a network model, we demonstrate that (a) more strongly connected attitude networks have a stronger impact on behaviour, and (b) within any given attitude network, the most central attitude elements have the strongest impact. We test these hypotheses using data on voting and attitudes toward presidential candidates in the US presidential elections from 1980 to 2012. These analyses confirm that the predictive value of attitude networks depends almost entirely on their level of connectivity, with more central attitude elements having stronger impact. The impact of attitudes on voting behaviour can thus be reliably determined before elections take place by using network analyses.},
  copyright = {2017 The Author(s)},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NMLSPLAG/dalege2017network.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/I3EYH4YM/s41598-017-05048-y.html}
}

@article{dalege2018attitudinal,
  title = {The {{Attitudinal Entropy}} ({{AE}}) {{Framework}} as a {{General Theory}} of {{Individual Attitudes}}},
  author = {Dalege, Jonas and Borsboom, Denny and {van Harreveld}, Frenk and {van der Maas}, Han L. J.},
  year = {2018},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
  volume = {29},
  number = {4},
  pages = {175--193},
  issn = {1047-840X, 1532-7965},
  doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2018.1537246},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {This article introduces the Attitudinal Entropy (AE) framework, which builds on the Causal Attitude Network model that conceptualizes attitudes as Ising networks. The AE framework rests on three propositions. First, attitude inconsistency and instability are two related indications of attitudinal entropy, a measure of randomness derived from thermodynamics. Second, energy of attitude configurations serves as a local processing strategy to reduce the global entropy of attitude networks. Third, directing attention to and thinking about attitude objects reduces attitudinal entropy. We first discuss several determinants of attitudinal entropy reduction and show that several findings in the attitude literature, such as the mere thought effect on attitude polarization and the effects of heuristic versus systematic processing of arguments, follow from the AE framework. Second, we discuss the AE framework's implications for ambivalence and cognitive dissonance.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DLMEFYQ2/dalege2018attitudinal.pdf}
}

@article{dalege2019network,
  title = {A {{Network Perspective}} on {{Attitude Strength}}: {{Testing}} the {{Connectivity Hypothesis}}},
  shorttitle = {A {{Network Perspective}} on {{Attitude Strength}}},
  author = {Dalege, Jonas and Borsboom, Denny and {van Harreveld}, Frenk and {van der Maas}, Han L. J.},
  year = {2019},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {10},
  number = {6},
  pages = {746--756},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1948-5506},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550618781062},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {Attitude strength is a key characteristic of attitudes. Strong attitudes are durable and impactful, while weak attitudes are fluctuating and inconsequential. Recently, the causal attitude network (CAN) model was proposed as a comprehensive measurement model of attitudes, which conceptualizes attitudes as networks of causally connected evaluative reactions (i.e., beliefs, feelings, and behavior toward an attitude object). Here, we test the central postulate of the CAN model that highly connected attitude networks correspond to strong attitudes. We use data from the American National Election Studies 1980?2012 on attitudes toward presidential candidates (N = 18,795). We first show that political interest predicts connectivity of attitude networks toward presidential candidates. Second, we show that connectivity is strongly related to two defining features of strong attitudes?stability of the attitude and the attitude?s impact on behavior. We conclude that network theory provides a promising framework to advance the understanding of attitude strength.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/MUY6EEC7/dalege2019network.pdf}
}

@article{dalege2020accurate,
  title = {Accurate by {{Being Noisy}}: {{A Formal Network Model}} of {{Implicit Measures}} of {{Attitudes}}},
  shorttitle = {Accurate by {{Being Noisy}}},
  author = {Dalege, Jonas and {van der Maas}, Han L. J.},
  year = {2020},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Social Cognition},
  volume = {38},
  number = {Supplement},
  pages = {s26-s41},
  issn = {0278-016X},
  doi = {10.1521/soco.2020.38.supp.s26},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In this article, we model implicit attitude measures using our network theory of attitudes. The model rests on the assumption that implicit measures limit attitudinal entropy reduction, because implicit measures represent a measurement outcome that is the result of evaluating the attitude object in a quick and effortless manner. Implicit measures therefore assess attitudes in high entropy states (i.e., inconsistent and unstable states). In a simulation, we illustrate the implications of our network theory for implicit measures. The results of this simulation show a paradoxical result: Implicit measures can provide a more accurate assessment of conflicting evaluative reactions to an attitude object (e.g., evaluative reactions not in line with the dominant evaluative reactions) than explicit measures, because they assess these properties in a noisier and less reliable manner. We conclude that our network theory of attitudes increases the connection between substantive theorizing on attitudes and psychometric properties of implicit measures.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BBJBAIRI/soco.2020.38.supp.s26-2.pdf}
}

@article{debeurs2017network,
  title = {Network {{Analysis}}: {{A Novel Approach}} to {{Understand Suicidal Behaviour}}},
  shorttitle = {Network {{Analysis}}},
  author = {De Beurs, Derek},
  year = {2017},
  month = mar,
  journal = {International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health},
  volume = {14},
  number = {3},
  pages = {219},
  publisher = {{Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute}},
  doi = {10.3390/ijerph14030219},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Although suicide is a major public health issue worldwide, we understand little of the onset and development of suicidal behaviour. Suicidal behaviour is argued to be the end result of the complex interaction between psychological, social and biological factors. Epidemiological studies resulted in a range of risk factors for suicidal behaviour, but we do not yet understand how their interaction increases the risk for suicidal behaviour. A new approach called network analysis can help us better understand this process as it allows us to visualize and quantify the complex association between many different symptoms or risk factors. A network analysis of data containing information on suicidal patients can help us understand how risk factors interact and how their interaction is related to suicidal thoughts and behaviour. A network perspective has been successfully applied to the field of depression and psychosis, but not yet to the field of suicidology. In this theoretical article, I will introduce the concept of network analysis to the field of suicide prevention, and offer directions for future applications and studies.},
  copyright = {http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {network analysis,personalized treatment,suicide,symptoms},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GR76BKDJ/debeurs2017network.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/F4HXSPU3/219.html}
}

@article{debeurs2019exploring,
  title = {Exploring the Psychology of Suicidal Ideation: {{A}} Theory Driven Network Analysis},
  shorttitle = {Exploring the Psychology of Suicidal Ideation},
  author = {De Beurs, D. and Fried, Eiko I. and Wetherall, K. and Cleare, S. and O' Connor, D. B. and Ferguson, E. and O'Carroll, R. E. and O' Connor, R. C.},
  year = {2019},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Behaviour Research and Therapy},
  volume = {120},
  pages = {103419},
  issn = {0005-7967},
  doi = {10.1016/j.brat.2019.103419},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {Two leading theories within the field of suicide prevention are the interpersonal psychological theory of suicidal behaviour (IPT) and the integrated motivational-volitional (IMV) model. The IPT posits that suicidal thoughts emerge from high levels of perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness. The IMV model is a multivariate framework that conceptualizes defeat and entrapment as key drivers of suicide ideation. We applied network analysis to cross-sectional data collected as part of the Scottish Wellbeing Study, in which a nationally representative sample of 3508 young adults (18\textendash 34 years) completed a battery of psychological measures. Network analysis can help us to understand how the different theoretical components interact and how they relate to suicide ideation. Within a network that included only the core factors from both models, internal entrapment and perceived burdensomeness were most strongly related to suicide ideation. The core constructs defeat, external entrapment and thwarted belonginess were mainly related to other factors than suicide ideation. Within the network of all available psychological factors, 12 of the 20 factors were uniquely related to suicide ideation, with perceived burdensomeness, internal entrapment, depressive symptoms and history of suicide ideation explaining the most variance. None of the factors was isolated, and we identified four larger clusters: mental wellbeing, interpersonal needs, personality, and suicide-related factors. Overall, the results suggest that relationships between suicide ideation and psychological risk factors are complex, with some factors contributing direct risk, and others having indirect impact.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Network analysis,Risk factors,Suicide,Theory},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/RUCFWU7P/debeurs2019exploring.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VRKC9DNX/S0005796719301056.html}
}

@article{denson2012effects,
  title = {The {{Effects}} of {{Analytical Rumination}}, {{Reappraisal}}, and {{Distraction}} on {{Anger Experience}}},
  author = {Denson, Thomas F. and Moulds, Michelle L. and Grisham, Jessica R.},
  year = {2012},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Behavior Therapy},
  series = {Direct-to-{{Consumer Marketing}} of {{Evidence-Based Psychological Interventions}}},
  volume = {43},
  number = {2},
  pages = {355--364},
  issn = {0005-7894},
  doi = {10.1016/j.beth.2011.08.001},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The manner in which individuals recall negative life events has important affective consequences. The present experiment investigated the effects of emotion regulation strategies on anger experience. One hundred and twenty-one undergraduates recalled an anger-inducing memory and were instructed to engage in either analytical rumination, cognitive reappraisal, or distraction for 20 minutes. In the remaining (control) condition, participants were instructed to write about their thoughts but were not given any emotion regulation instructions. Rumination maintained anger, whereas participants in the remaining conditions reported decreased anger following the writing task. Our results suggest that reappraisal facilitates adaptive processing of anger-inducing memories and distraction facilitates rapid reductions in anger experience. These findings have implications for the management of clinical populations that commonly experience difficulty with anger regulation.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {anger,distraction,reappraisal,rumination},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NBX7ZJW8/denson2012effects.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YC8ALZNV/S0005789411001134.html}
}

@article{descioli2012Indelible,
  ids = {descioli2012indelible,descioli2012indelibleb},
  title = {Indelible {{Victims}} and {{Persistent Punishers}} in {{Moral Cognition}}},
  author = {DeScioli, Peter and Gilbert, Sarah S. and Kurzban, Robert},
  year = {2012},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
  volume = {23},
  number = {2},
  pages = {143--149},
  publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  issn = {1047-840X, 1532-7965},
  doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2012.666199},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NJ3LVUBU/descioli2012indelibleb.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QXXG62EI/descioli2012indelible.pdf}
}

@article{dostilio2016network,
  title = {The {{Network Model}} of {{Depression}} as a {{Basis}} for {{New Therapeutic Strategies}} for {{Treating Major Depressive Disorder}} in {{Parkinson}}'s {{Disease}}},
  author = {D'Ostilio, Kevin and Garraux, Ga{\"e}tan},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience},
  volume = {10},
  publisher = {{Frontiers}},
  issn = {1662-5161},
  doi = {10.3389/fnhum.2016.00161},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {The high prevalence of major depressive disorder in people with Parkinson's disease, its negative impact on health-related quality of life and the low response rate to conventional pharmacological therapies call to seek innovative treatments. Here, we review the new approaches for treating major depressive disorder in patients with Parkinson's disease within the framework of the network model of depression. According to this model, major depressive disorder reflects maladaptive neuronal plasticity. Non-invasive brain stimulation using high frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation over the prefrontal cortex has been proposed as a feasible and effective strategy with minimal risk. The neurobiological basis of its therapeutic effect may involve neuroplastic modifications in limbic and cognitive networks. However, the way this networks reorganize might be strongly influenced by the environment. To address this issue, we propose a combined strategy that includes non-invasive brain stimulation together with cognitive and behavioral interventions.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Cognitive and behavioral therapy,Depression,neurostimulation,Parkinson's disease,Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4K6EZHH8/dostilio2016network.pdf}
}

@article{dungan2017relevance,
  ids = {dungan2017relevancea},
  title = {The Relevance of Moral Norms in Distinct Relational Contexts: {{Purity}} versus Harm Norms Regulate Self-Directed Actions},
  shorttitle = {The Relevance of Moral Norms in Distinct Relational Contexts},
  author = {Dungan, James A. and Chakroff, Alek and Young, Liane},
  editor = {Eriksson, Kimmo},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  volume = {12},
  number = {3},
  pages = {e0173405},
  publisher = {{Public Library of Science (PLoS)}},
  issn = {1932-6203},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0173405},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CITHGBVM/dungan2017relevance.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SU7YKG27/dungan2017relevance.pdf}
}

@article{ekman1992argument,
  title = {An Argument for Basic Emotions},
  author = {Ekman, Paul},
  year = {1992},
  month = may,
  journal = {Cognition and Emotion},
  volume = {6},
  number = {3-4},
  pages = {169--200},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  issn = {0269-9931},
  doi = {10.1080/02699939208411068},
  urldate = {2021-05-29},
  abstract = {Emotions are viewed as having evolved through their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life-tasks. Each emotion has unique features: signal, physiology, and antecedent events. Each emotion also has characteristics in common with other emotions: rapid onset, short duration, unbidden occurrence, automatic appraisal, and coherence among responses. These shared and unique characteristics are the product of our evolution, and distinguish emotions from other affective phenomena.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/I2F9GAL4/ekman1992argument.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/L7YVKJHJ/02699939208411068.html}
}

@article{ellemers2019psychology,
  ids = {ellemers2019psychologyb},
  title = {The {{Psychology}} of {{Morality}}: {{A Review}} and {{Analysis}} of {{Empirical Studies Published From}} 1940 {{Through}} 2017},
  shorttitle = {The {{Psychology}} of {{Morality}}},
  author = {Ellemers, Naomi and {van der Toorn}, Jojanneke and Paunov, Yavor and {van Leeuwen}, Thed},
  options = {useprefix=true},
  year = {2019},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Review},
  volume = {23},
  number = {4},
  eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868318811759},
  pages = {332--366},
  issn = {1088-8683, 1532-7957},
  doi = {10.1177/1088868318811759},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {We review empirical research on (social) psychology of morality to identify which issues and relations are well documented by existing data and which areas of inquiry are in need of further empirical evidence. An electronic literature search yielded a total of 1,278 relevant research articles published from 1940 through 2017. These were subjected to expert content analysis and standardized bibliometric analysis to classify research questions and relate these to (trends in) empirical approaches that characterize research on morality. We categorize the research questions addressed in this literature into five different themes and consider how empirical approaches within each of these themes have addressed psychological antecedents and implications of moral behavior. We conclude that some key features of theoretical questions relating to human morality are not systematically captured in empirical research and are in need of further investigation.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KUPERXBQ/ellemers2019psychology.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/RBJ2AH5A/ellemers2019psychologyb.pdf}
}

@article{epskamp2012qgraph,
  title = {Qgraph: {{Network Visualizations}} of {{Relationships}} in {{Psychometric Data}}},
  shorttitle = {{\textbf{Qgraph}}},
  author = {Epskamp, Sacha and Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O. J. and Waldorp, Lourens J. and Schmittmann, Verena D. and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Statistical Software},
  volume = {48},
  number = {4},
  issn = {1548-7660},
  doi = {10.18637/jss.v048.i04},
  urldate = {2021-10-08},
  abstract = {We present the qgraph package for R, which provides an interface to visualize data through network modeling techniques. For instance, a correlation matrix can be represented as a network in which each variable is a node and each correlation an edge; by varying the width of the edges according to the magnitude of the correlation, the structure of the correlation matrix can be visualized. A wide variety of matrices that are used in statistics can be represented in this fashion, for example matrices that contain (implied) covariances, factor loadings, regression parameters and p values. qgraph can also be used as a psychometric tool, as it performs exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, using sem and lavaan; the output of these packages is automatically visualized in qgraph, which may aid the interpretation of results. In this article, we introduce qgraph by applying the package functions to data from the NEO-PI-R, a widely used personality questionnaire.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/UNDYQNPE/epskamp2012qgraph.pdf}
}

@misc{epskamp2016regularized,
  title = {Regularized {{Gaussian Psychological Networks}}: {{Brief Report}} on the {{Performance}} of {{Extended BIC Model Selection}}},
  shorttitle = {Regularized {{Gaussian Psychological Networks}}},
  author = {{Epskamp, S.}},
  year = {2016},
  month = jun,
  publisher = {{arXiv.org}},
  urldate = {2022-09-28},
  abstract = {In recent literature, the Gaussian Graphical model (GGM; Lauritzen, 1996), a network of partial correlation coefficients, has been used to capture potential dynamic relationships between psychological variables. The GGM can be estimated using regularization in combination with model selection using the extended Bayesian Information Criterion (Foygel and Drton, 2010). I term this methodology GeLasso, and asses its performance using a plausible psychological network structure with both continuous and ordinal datasets. Simulation results indicate that GeLasso works well as an out-of-the-box method to estimate a psychological network structure.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{epskamp2017estimatinga,
  title = {Estimating Psychological Networks and Their Accuracy: {{A}} Tutorial Paper},
  author = {Epskamp, Sacha and Borsboom, Denny and Fried, Eiko I.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Behavior Research Methods},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2PCKGL3T/epskamp2018estimating.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JXZ9TNIV/epskamp2018estimating.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/V5SZCRQ4/tutorial_inference.pdf}
}

@article{epskamp2017estimatingb,
  ids = {epskamp2017estimating},
  title = {Estimating Psychopathological Networks: {{Be}} Careful What You Wish For},
  shorttitle = {Estimating Psychopathological Networks},
  author = {Epskamp, Sacha and Kruis, Joost and Marsman, Maarten},
  editor = {Marinazzo, Daniele},
  year = {2017},
  month = jun,
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  volume = {12},
  number = {6},
  pages = {e0179891},
  issn = {1932-6203},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0179891},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Network models, in which psychopathological disorders are conceptualized as a complex interplay of psychological and biological components, have become increasingly popular in the recent psychopathological literature (Borsboom, et. al., 2011). These network models often contain significant numbers of unknown parameters, yet the sample sizes available in psychological research are limited. As such, general assumptions about the true network are introduced to reduce the number of free parameters. Incorporating these assumptions, however, means that the resulting network will lead to reflect the particular structure assumed by the estimation method\textemdash a crucial and often ignored aspect of psychopathological networks. For example, observing a sparse structure and simultaneously assuming a sparse structure does not imply that the true model is, in fact, sparse. To illustrate this point, we discuss recent literature and show the effect of the assumption of sparsity in three simulation studies.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LKF8ZCN2/pone.0179891.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/W5W4633C/epskamp2017estimating.pdf}
}

@article{epskamp2017generalized,
  title = {Generalized {{Network Psychometrics}}: {{Combining Network}} and {{Latent Variable Models}}},
  shorttitle = {Generalized {{Network Psychometrics}}},
  author = {Epskamp, Sacha and Rhemtulla, Mijke and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2017},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Psychometrika},
  volume = {82},
  number = {4},
  pages = {904--927},
  issn = {1860-0980},
  doi = {10.1007/s11336-017-9557-x},
  urldate = {2023-03-24},
  abstract = {We introduce the network model as a formal psychometric model, conceptualizing the covariance between psychometric indicators as resulting from pairwise interactions between observable variables in a network structure. This contrasts with standard psychometric models, in which the covariance between test items arises from the influence of one or more common latent variables. Here, we present two generalizations of the network model that encompass latent variable structures, establishing network modeling as parts of the more general framework of structural equation modeling (SEM). In the first generalization, we model the covariance structure of latent variables as a network. We term this framework latent network modeling (LNM) and show that, with LNM, a unique structure of conditional independence relationships between latent variables can be obtained in an explorative manner. In the second generalization, the residual variance\textendash covariance structure of indicators is modeled as a network. We term this generalization residual network modeling (RNM) and show that, within this framework, identifiable models can be obtained in which local independence is structurally violated. These generalizations allow for a general modeling framework that can be used to fit, and compare, SEM models, network models, and the RNM and LNM generalizations. This methodology has been implemented in the free-to-use software package lvnet, which contains confirmatory model testing as well as two exploratory search algorithms: stepwise search algorithms for low-dimensional datasets and penalized maximum likelihood estimation for larger datasets. We show in simulation studies that these search algorithms perform adequately in identifying the structure of the relevant residual or latent networks. We further demonstrate the utility of these generalizations in an empirical example on a personality inventory dataset.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {network models,simulation study,software,structural equation modeling},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YR827LJG/epskamp_2017_generalize.pdf}
}

@article{epskamp2018gaussian,
  title = {The {{Gaussian Graphical Model}} in {{Cross-Sectional}} and {{Time-Series Data}}},
  author = {Epskamp, Sacha and Waldorp, Lourens J. and M{\~o}ttus, Ren{\'e} and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2018},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Multivariate Behavioral Research},
  volume = {53},
  number = {4},
  pages = {453--480},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  issn = {0027-3171},
  doi = {10.1080/00273171.2018.1454823},
  urldate = {2023-03-24},
  abstract = {We discuss the Gaussian graphical model (GGM; an undirected network of partial correlation coefficients) and detail its utility as an exploratory data analysis tool. The GGM shows which variables predict one-another, allows for sparse modeling of covariance structures, and may highlight potential causal relationships between observed variables. We describe the utility in three kinds of psychological data sets: data sets in which consecutive cases are assumed independent (e.g., cross-sectional data), temporally ordered data sets (e.g., n = 1 time series), and a mixture of the 2 (e.g., n {$>$} 1 time series). In time-series analysis, the GGM can be used to model the residual structure of a vector-autoregression analysis (VAR), also termed graphical VAR. Two network models can then be obtained: a temporal network and a contemporaneous network. When analyzing data from multiple subjects, a GGM can also be formed on the covariance structure of stationary means\textemdash the between-subjects network. We discuss the interpretation of these models and propose estimation methods to obtain these networks, which we implement in the R packages graphicalVAR and mlVAR. The methods are showcased in two empirical examples, and simulation studies on these methods are included in the supplementary materials.},
  pmid = {29658809},
  keywords = {exploratory-data analysis,multilevel modeling,multivariate analysis,network modeling,Time-series analysis},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KE6U8S2S/epskamp_2018_the.pdf}
}

@article{epskamp2018tutorial,
  ids = {epskamp2018tutoriala},
  title = {A {{Tutorial}} on {{Regularized Partial Correlation Networks}}},
  author = {Epskamp, Sacha and Fried, Eiko I.},
  year = {2018},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Psychological Methods},
  volume = {23},
  number = {4},
  eprint = {1607.01367},
  primaryclass = {stat},
  pages = {617--634},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1463, 1082-989X},
  doi = {10.1037/met0000167},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Recent years have seen an emergence of network modeling applied to moods, attitudes, and problems in the realm of psychology. In this framework, psychological variables are understood to directly affect each other rather than being caused by an unobserved latent entity. In this tutorial, we introduce the reader to estimating the most popular network model for psychological data: the partial correlation network. We describe how regularization techniques can be used to efficiently estimate a parsimonious and interpretable network structure in psychological data. We show how to perform these analyses in R and demonstrate the method in an empirical example on post-traumatic stress disorder data. In addition, we discuss the effect of the hyperparameter that needs to be manually set by the researcher, how to handle non-normal data, how to determine the required sample size for a network analysis, and provide a checklist with potential solutions for problems that can arise when estimating regularized partial correlation networks.},
  archiveprefix = {arxiv},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Methodology,Models,Neural Networks,Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,Statistical Analysis,Statistics - Applications,Statistics - Methodology},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4NZKXET8/epskamp2018tutorial.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JVEX7KHZ/1607.01367.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/W8B3QQBZ/2018-13501-001.html}
}

@article{ernst2000efficacy,
  title = {Efficacy of Ginger for Nausea and Vomiting: A Systematic Review of Randomized Clinical Trials},
  shorttitle = {Efficacy of Ginger for Nausea and Vomiting},
  author = {Ernst, E and Pittler, M H},
  year = {2000},
  month = mar,
  journal = {British Journal of Anaesthesia},
  volume = {84},
  number = {3},
  pages = {367--371},
  issn = {0007-0912},
  doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.bja.a013442},
  urldate = {2021-05-11},
  abstract = {Ginger (Zingiber officinale) is often advocated as beneficial for nausea and vomiting. Whether the herb is truly efficacious for this condition is, however, still a matter of debate. We have performed a systematic review of the evidence from randomized controlled trials for or against the efficacy of ginger for nausea and vomiting. Six studies met all inclusion criteria and were reviewed. Three on postoperative nausea and vomiting were identified and two of these suggested that ginger was superior to placebo and equally effective as metoclopramide. The pooled absolute risk reduction for the incidence of postoperative nausea, however, indicated a non-significant difference between the ginger and placebo groups for ginger 1 g taken before operation (absolute risk reduction 0.052 (95\% confidence interval -0.082 to 0.186)). One study was found for each of the following conditions: seasickness, morning sickness and chemotherapy-induced nausea. These studies collectively favoured ginger over placebo.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CB6LGYJ9/ernst2000efficacy.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BX23F98E/S0007091217388372.html}
}

@article{ernst2004permutation,
  title = {Permutation {{Methods}}: {{A Basis}} for {{Exact Inference}}},
  shorttitle = {Permutation {{Methods}}},
  author = {Ernst, Michael D.},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Statistical Science},
  volume = {19},
  number = {4},
  eprint = {4144438},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {676--685},
  publisher = {{Institute of Mathematical Statistics}},
  issn = {0883-4237},
  urldate = {2023-04-03},
  abstract = {The use of permutation methods for exact inference dates back to Fisher in 1935. Since then, the practicality of such methods has increased steadily with computing power. They can now easily be employed in many situations without concern for computing difficulties. We discuss the reasoning behind these methods and describe situations when they are exact and distribution-free. We illustrate their use in several examples.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZDEDTZEU/ernst_2004_permutatio.pdf}
}

@article{evans2013dualprocess,
  title = {Dual-{{Process Theories}} of {{Higher Cognition}}: {{Advancing}} the {{Debate}}},
  shorttitle = {Dual-{{Process Theories}} of {{Higher Cognition}}},
  author = {Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. and Stanovich, Keith E.},
  year = {2013},
  month = may,
  journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {223--241},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1745-6916},
  doi = {10.1177/1745691612460685},
  urldate = {2021-05-14},
  abstract = {Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {dual processes,dual systems,individual differences,rationality,working memory},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/EWVYPLXC/evans2013dualprocess.pdf}
}

@article{eyal2008judging,
  title = {Judging near and Distant Virtue and Vice},
  author = {Eyal, Tal and Liberman, Nira and Trope, Yaacov},
  year = {2008},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {44},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1204--1209},
  issn = {0022-1031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2008.03.012},
  urldate = {2021-05-27},
  abstract = {We propose that people judge immoral acts as more offensive and moral acts as more virtuous when the acts are psychologically distant than near. This is because people construe more distant situations in terms of moral principles, rather than attenuating situation-specific considerations. Results of four studies support these predictions. Study 1 shows that more temporally distant transgressions (e.g., eating one's dead dog) are construed in terms of moral principles rather than contextual information. Studies 2 and 3 further show that morally offensive actions are judged more severely when imagined from a more distant temporal (Study 2) or social (Study 3) perspective. Finally, Study 4 shows that moral acts (e.g., adopting a disabled child) are judged more positively from temporal distance. The findings suggest that people more readily apply their moral principles to distant rather than proximal behaviors.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Construal level theory,Moral judgment,Psychological distance},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VR3V9W9W/eyal2008judging.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6G97TD5C/S0022103108000462.html}
}

@article{feinberg2019understanding,
  title = {Understanding the Process of Moralization: {{How}} Eating Meat Becomes a Moral Issue.},
  shorttitle = {Understanding the Process of Moralization},
  author = {Feinberg, Matthew and Kovacheff, Chloe and Teper, Rimma and Inbar, Yoel},
  year = {2019},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {117},
  number = {1},
  pages = {50--72},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/pspa0000149},
  urldate = {2021-05-11},
  abstract = {A large literature demonstrates that moral convictions guide many of our thoughts, behaviors, and social interactions. Yet, we know little about how these moral convictions come to exist. In the present research we explore moralization\textemdash the process by which something that was morally neutral takes on moral properties\textemdash{} examining what factors facilitate and deter it. In 3 longitudinal studies participants were presented with morally evocative stimuli about why eating meat should be viewed as a moral issue. Study 1 tracked students over a semester as they took a university course that highlighted the suffering animals endure because of human meat consumption. In Studies 2 and 3 participants took part in a mini-course we developed which presented evocative videos aimed at inducing moralization. In all 3 studies, we assessed participants' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and cognitions at multiple time points to track moral changes and potential factors responsible for such changes. A variety of factors, both cognitive and affective, predicted participants' moralization or lack thereof. Model testing further pointed to two primary conduits of moralization: the experience of moral emotions (e.g., disgust, guilt) felt when contemplating the issue, and moral piggybacking (connecting the issue at hand with one's existing fundamental moral principles). Moreover, we found individual differences, such as how much one holds their morality as central to their identity, also predicted the moralization process. We discuss the broad theoretical and applied implications of our results.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KFM964U9/feinberg2019understanding.pdf}
}

@misc{feldman-barrett2021psychology,
  title = {Psychology Is in a Crisis. {{But}} Not the One You're Thinking Of},
  author = {{Feldman-Barrett}, Lisa},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {BBC Science Focus Magazine},
  urldate = {2021-08-15},
  abstract = {Can we still have faith in psychology in the face of the `replication crisis'? Perhaps, but the field has a much larger problem to tackle.},
  howpublished = {https://www.sciencefocus.com/the-human-body/replication-crisis/},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/86BZIAWV/replication-crisis.html}
}

@article{fernbach2013political,
  ids = {fernbachpolitical},
  title = {Political {{Extremism Is Supported}} by an {{Illusion}} of {{Understanding}}},
  author = {Fernbach, Philip M. and Rogers, Todd and Fox, Craig R. and Sloman, Steven A.},
  year = {2013},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {24},
  number = {6},
  pages = {939--946},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0956-7976},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797612464058},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {People often hold extreme political attitudes about complex policies. We hypothesized that people typically know less about such policies than they think they do (the illusion of explanatory depth) and that polarized attitudes are enabled by simplistic causal models. Asking people to explain policies in detail both undermined the illusion of explanatory depth and led to attitudes that were more moderate (Experiments 1 and 2). Although these effects occurred when people were asked to generate a mechanistic explanation, they did not occur when people were instead asked to enumerate reasons for their policy preferences (Experiment 2). Finally, generating mechanistic explanations reduced donations to relevant political advocacy groups (Experiment 3). The evidence suggests that people's mistaken sense that they understand the causal processes underlying policies contributes to political polarization.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,attitudes,causal models,causality,decision making,explanation,extremism,illusion of explanatory depth,judgment,mechanism,moderation,polarization,policymaking,political psychology,public policy},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SSK2XQNL/fernbach2013political.pdf}
}

@article{fields2008white,
  title = {White Matter in Learning, Cognition and Psychiatric Disorders},
  author = {Fields, R. Douglas},
  year = {2008},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Trends in Neurosciences},
  volume = {31},
  number = {7},
  pages = {361--370},
  issn = {0166-2236},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tins.2008.04.001},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {White matter is the brain region underlying the gray matter cortex, composed of neuronal fibers coated with electrical insulation called myelin. Previously of interest in demyelinating diseases such as multiple sclerosis, myelin is attracting new interest as an unexpected contributor to a wide range of psychiatric disorders, including depression and schizophrenia. This is stimulating research into myelin involvement in normal cognitive function, learning and IQ. Myelination continues for decades in the human brain; it is modifiable by experience, and it affects information processing by regulating the velocity and synchrony of impulse conduction between distant cortical regions. Cell-culture studies have identified molecular mechanisms regulating myelination by electrical activity, and myelin also limits the critical period for learning through inhibitory proteins that suppress axon sprouting and synaptogenesis.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BR4LXCK8/fields2008white.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/UMSWIRE7/S016622360800132X.html}
}

@article{food,
  title = {Food Taboos: Their Origins and Purposes | {{SpringerLink}}}
}

@inproceedings{foygel2010extended,
  title = {Extended {{Bayesian Information Criteria}} for {{Gaussian Graphical Models}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Neural Information Processing Systems}}},
  author = {Foygel, Rina and Drton, Mathias},
  year = {2010},
  volume = {23},
  publisher = {{Curran Associates, Inc.}},
  urldate = {2023-03-25},
  abstract = {Gaussian graphical models with sparsity in the inverse covariance matrix are of significant interest in many modern applications. For the problem of recovering the graphical structure, information criteria provide useful optimization objectives for algorithms searching through sets of graphs or for selection of tuning parameters of other methods such as the graphical lasso, which is a likelihood penalization technique. In this paper we establish the asymptotic consistency of an extended Bayesian information criterion for Gaussian graphical models in a scenario where both the number of variables p and the sample size n grow. Compared to earlier work on the regression case, our treatment allows for growth in the number of non-zero parameters in the true model, which is necessary in order to cover connected graphs. We demonstrate the performance of this criterion on simulated data when used in conjuction with the graphical lasso, and verify that the criterion indeed performs better than either cross-validation or the ordinary Bayesian information criterion when p and the number of non-zero parameters q both scale with n.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/UWTIANDV/foygel_2010_extended.pdf}
}

@article{fried2017moving,
  ids = {fried2019moving},
  title = {Moving {{Forward}}: {{Challenges}} and {{Directions}} for {{Psychopathological Network Theory}} and {{Methodology}}},
  author = {Fried, Eiko I. and Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O J},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  volume = {12},
  number = {6},
  pages = {999--1020},
  abstract = {Since the introduction of mental disorders as networks of causally interacting symptoms, this novel framework has received considerable attention. The past years have resulted in over 40 scientific publications and numerous conference symposia and workshops. Now is an excellent moment to take stock of the network approach: What are its most fundamental challenges, and what are potential ways forward in addressing them? After a brief conceptual introduction, we first discuss challenges to network theory: (1) What is the validity of the network approach beyond some commonly investigated disorders such as major depression? (2) How do we best define psychopathological networks and their constituent elements? And (3) how can we gain a better understanding of the causal nature and real-life underpinnings of associations among symptoms? Next, after a short technical introduction to network modeling, we discuss challenges to network methodology: (4) heterogeneity of samples studied with network analytic models, and (5) a lurking replicability crisis in this strongly data-driven and exploratory field. Addressing these challenges may propel the network approach from its adolescence into adulthood and promises advances in understanding psychopathology both at the nomothetic and idiographic level.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NELE7C7X/fried_moving.pdf}
}

@article{fried2018replicability,
  title = {Replicability and {{Generalizability}} of {{Posttraumatic Stress Disorder}} ({{PTSD}}) {{Networks}}: {{A Cross-Cultural Multisite Study}} of {{PTSD Symptoms}} in {{Four Trauma Patient Samples}}},
  shorttitle = {Replicability and {{Generalizability}} of {{Posttraumatic Stress Disorder}} ({{PTSD}}) {{Networks}}},
  author = {Fried, Eiko I. and Eidhof, Marloes B. and Palic, Sabina and Costantini, Giulio and {Huisman-van Dijk}, Hilde M. and Bockting, Claudi L. H. and Engelhard, Iris and Armour, Cherie and Nielsen, Anni B. S. and Karstoft, Karen-Inge},
  year = {2018},
  month = may,
  journal = {Clinical Psychological Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {3},
  pages = {335--351},
  issn = {2167-7026, 2167-7034},
  doi = {10.1177/2167702617745092},
  urldate = {2022-09-28},
  abstract = {The growing literature conceptualizing mental disorders like posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as networks of interacting symptoms faces three key challenges. Prior studies predominantly used (a) small samples with low power for precise estimation, (b) nonclinical samples, and (c) single samples. This renders network structures in clinical data, and the extent to which networks replicate across data sets, unknown. To overcome these limitations, the present cross-cultural multisite study estimated regularized partial correlation networks of 16 PTSD symptoms across four data sets of traumatized patients receiving treatment for PTSD (total N = 2,782). Despite differences in culture, trauma type, and severity of the samples, considerable similarities emerged, with moderate to high correlations between symptom profiles (0.43\textendash 0.82), network structures (0.62\textendash 0.74), and centrality estimates (0.63\textendash 0.75). We discuss the importance of future replicability efforts to improve clinical psychological science and provide code, model output, and correlation matrices to make the results of this article fully reproducible.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/D2VPRT82/fried_2018_replicabil.pdf}
}

@article{fried2020systems,
  title = {Systems All the Way down: Embracing Complexity in Mental Health Research},
  shorttitle = {Systems All the Way Down},
  author = {Fried, Eiko I. and Robinaugh, Donald J.},
  year = {2020},
  month = dec,
  journal = {BMC Medicine},
  volume = {18},
  number = {1},
  pages = {205, s12916-020-01668-w},
  issn = {1741-7015},
  doi = {10.1186/s12916-020-01668-w},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In this editorial for the collection on complexity in mental health research, we introduce and summarize the inaugural contributions to this collection: a series of theoretical, methodological, and empirical papers that aim to chart a path forward for investigating mental health in all its complexity. A central theme emerges from these contributions: if we are to make genuine progress in explaining, predicting, and treating mental illness, we must study the systems from which psychopathology emerges. As the articles in this collection make clear, the systems that give rise to psychopathology encompass a host of components across biological, psychological, and social levels of analysis, intertwined in a web of complex interactions. The task of advancing our understanding of these systems will be a challenging one. Yet, this challenge presents a unique opportunity. From physics to ecology, there is a rapidly evolving body of interdisciplinary research dedicated to investigating complex systems. This work provides clear guidance for psychiatric research, opportunities for collaboration, and a set of tools and concepts from which we can draw in our efforts to understand mental health, helping us move toward our ultimate aim of improving the prevention and treatment of psychopathology.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6XNAGB8Q/Fried-Robinaugh2020_Article_SystemsAllTheWayDownEmbracingC.pdf}
}

@article{fried2020theories,
  title = {Theories and {{Models}}: {{What They Are}}, {{What They Are}} for, and {{What They Are About}}},
  shorttitle = {Theories and {{Models}}},
  author = {Fried, Eiko I.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {336--344},
  issn = {1047-840X, 1532-7965},
  doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2020.1854011},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/28B3FQWK/fried2020theories.pdf}
}

@article{friedman2008sparse,
  title = {Sparse Inverse Covariance Estimation with the Graphical Lasso},
  author = {Friedman, Jerome and Hastie, Trevor and Tibshirani, Robert},
  year = {2008},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Biostatistics},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {432--441},
  issn = {1465-4644, 1468-4357},
  doi = {10.1093/biostatistics/kxm045},
  urldate = {2021-10-06},
  abstract = {We consider the problem of estimating sparse graphs by a lasso penalty applied to the inverse covariance matrix. Using a coordinate descent procedure for the lasso, we develop a simple algorithm\textemdash the graphical lasso\textemdash that is remarkably fast: It solves a 1000-node problem ({$\sim$}500 000 parameters) in at most a minute and is 30\textendash 4000 times faster than competing methods. It also provides a conceptual link between the exact problem and the approximation suggested by Meinshausen and Bu\textasciidieresis hlmann (2006). We illustrate the method on some cell-signaling data from proteomics.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/AMYFPG3V/pdf}
}

@article{fullana2020diagnostic,
  title = {Diagnostic Biomarkers for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: {{A}} Reasonable Quest or Ignis Fatuus?},
  shorttitle = {Diagnostic Biomarkers for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder},
  author = {Fullana, Miquel A. and Abramovitch, Amitai and Via, Esther and {L{\'o}pez-Sola}, Clara and Goldberg, Ximena and Reina, Nuria and Fortea, Lydia and Solanes, Aleix and Buckley, Matthew J. and {Ramella-Cravaro}, Valentina and Carvalho, Andr{\'e} F. and {Tortella-Feliu}, Miquel and Vieta, Eduard and {Soriano-Mas}, Carles and L{\'a}zaro, Luisa and Stein, Dan J. and {Fern{\'a}ndez de la Cruz}, Lorena and {Mataix-Cols}, David and Radua, Joaquim},
  year = {2020},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Neuroscience \& Biobehavioral Reviews},
  volume = {118},
  pages = {504--513},
  issn = {01497634},
  doi = {10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.08.008},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7ZXVF33T/fullana2020diagnostic.pdf}
}

@article{gable2015anger,
  title = {Anger Perceptually and Conceptually Narrows Cognitive Scope},
  author = {Gable, Philip A. and Poole, Bryan D. and {Harmon-Jones}, Eddie},
  year = {2015},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {109},
  number = {1},
  pages = {163--174},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  issn = {0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0039226},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {For the last 50 years, research investigating the effect of emotions on scope of cognitive processing was based on models proposing that affective valence determined cognitive scope. More recently, our motivational intensity model suggests that this past work had confounded valence with motivational intensity. Research derived from this model supports the idea that motivational intensity, rather than affective valence, explains much of the variance emotions have on cognitive scope. However, the motivational intensity model is limited in that the empirical work has examined only positive affects high in approach and negative affects high in avoidance motivation. Thus, perhaps only approach-positive and avoidance-negative states narrow cognitive scope. The present research was designed to clarify these conceptual issues by examining the effect of anger, a negatively valenced approach-motivated state, on cognitive scope. Results revealed that anger narrowed attentional scope relative to a neutral state and that attentional narrowing to anger was similar to the attentional narrowing caused by high approach-motivated positive affects (Study 1). This narrowing of attention was related to trait approach motivation (Studies 2 and Study 3). Anger also narrowed conceptual cognitive categorization (Study 4). Narrowing of categorization related to participants' approach motivation toward anger stimuli. Together, these results suggest that anger, an approach-motivated negative affect, narrows perceptual and conceptual cognitive scope. More broadly, these results support the conceptual model that motivational intensity per se, rather than approach-positive and avoidance-negative states, causes a narrowing of cognitive scope. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Affective Valence,anger,Anger,Approach Avoidance,attention,Attention,categorization,Cognitive Processes,motivation,Motivation,scope},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WTFHN89G/gable2015anger.pdf}
}

@article{gantman2014moral,
  title = {The Moral Pop-out Effect: {{Enhanced}} Perceptual Awareness of Morally Relevant Stimuli},
  shorttitle = {The Moral Pop-out Effect},
  author = {Gantman, Ana P. and Van Bavel, Jay J.},
  year = {2014},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {132},
  number = {1},
  pages = {22--29},
  issn = {0010-0277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2014.02.007},
  urldate = {2021-05-18},
  abstract = {People perceive religious and moral iconography in ambiguous objects, ranging from grilled cheese to bird feces. In the current research, we examined whether moral concerns can shape awareness of perceptually ambiguous stimuli. In three experiments, we presented masked moral and non-moral words around the threshold for conscious awareness as part of a lexical decision task. Participants correctly identified moral words more frequently than non-moral words\textemdash a phenomenon we term the moral pop-out effect. The moral pop-out effect was only evident when stimuli were presented at durations that made them perceptually ambiguous, but not when the stimuli were presented too quickly to perceive or slowly enough to easily perceive. The moral pop-out effect was not moderated by exposure to harm and cannot be explained by differences in arousal, valence, or extremity. Although most models of moral psychology assume the initial perception of moral stimuli, our research suggests that moral beliefs and values may shape perceptual awareness.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Ambiguity,Awareness,Morality,Perception,Vision},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/X6N6ECDW/gantman2014moral.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BKW84TZ8/S0010027714000328.html}
}

@techreport{gantman2015behavior,
  type = {{{SSRN Scholarly Paper}}},
  title = {Behavior Is {{Multiply Determined}} and {{Perception Has Multiple Components}}: {{The Case}} of {{Moral Perception}}},
  shorttitle = {Behavior Is {{Multiply Determined}} and {{Perception Has Multiple Components}}},
  author = {Gantman, Ana P. and Van Bavel, Jay J.},
  year = {2015},
  month = nov,
  number = {ID 2695248},
  address = {{Rochester, NY}},
  institution = {{Social Science Research Network}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2695248},
  urldate = {2021-05-18},
  abstract = {We introduce two propositions for understanding top-down effects on perception. First, perception is not unitary but composed of multiple components. Second, behavior is determined by multiple processes. We re-analyze Firestone \& Scholl's (2014) own data, finding that it casts serious doubt on their claims that semantic priming fully explains moral pop-out. This case study underscores the importance of these propositions.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {cognition,cognitive penetrability,Morality,perception},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/W6L4RZU9/gantman2015behavior.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QBYKBE7T/papers.html}
}

@article{gantman2016see,
  title = {See for Yourself: {{Perception}} Is Attuned to Morality},
  shorttitle = {See for Yourself},
  author = {Gantman, Ana P. and Van Bavel, Jay J.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {20},
  number = {2},
  pages = {76--77},
  publisher = {{Elsevier Science}},
  address = {{Netherlands}},
  issn = {1879-307X(Electronic),1364-6613(Print)},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2015.12.001},
  abstract = {Comments on an article by C. Firestone and B. J. Scholl (see record 2016-04031-002). Firestone and Scholl argued that moral perception does not exist. They claimed that moral perception is not about morality, that evidence of moral perception reflects visual processing `in a trivial and unexciting sense', or does not pertain to perception. We list the evidence for their claims below and invite you, the reader, to be the judge. We also disagree with Firestone and Scholl's. We also disagree with their interpretation of the moral pop-out effect. We found that people correctly detect moral words (e.g., kill) more frequently than non-moral words [e.g., die; matched for length and frequency, but only when the words were presented near the threshold for awareness. Moreover, the moral popout effect remained after adjusting for ratings of word valence, emotionality, and intensity. We suggested that moral words more readily reached perceptual awareness compared with non-moral words. We fail to see how hitting a small child does not pertain to morality, knowing that expectations of justice affect attention is unexciting, or formal claims about similarity can be made without randomly assigning people to conditions or even presenting similar data. Clearly, moral perception is a provocative topic. Perhaps the only thing we can agree on is that more research is needed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Attention,Behavior,Morality,Self-Perception},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/I5A8U8ZI/2016-04031-003.html}
}

@article{gates2016monte,
  title = {A {{Monte Carlo Evaluation}} of {{Weighted Community Detection Algorithms}}},
  author = {Gates, Kathleen M. and Henry, Teague and Steinley, Doug and Fair, Damien A.},
  year = {2016},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Frontiers in Neuroinformatics},
  volume = {10},
  issn = {1662-5196},
  doi = {10.3389/fninf.2016.00045},
  urldate = {2022-09-29},
  abstract = {The past decade has been marked with a proliferation of community detection algorithms that aim to organize nodes (e.g., individuals, brain regions, variables) into modular structures that indicate subgroups, clusters, or communities. Motivated by the emergence of big data across many fields of inquiry, these methodological developments have primarily focused on the detection of communities of nodes from matrices that are very large. However, it remains unknown if the algorithms can reliably detect communities in smaller graph sizes (i.e., 1000 nodes and fewer) which are commonly used in brain research. More importantly, these algorithms have predominantly been tested only on binary or sparse count matrices and it remains unclear the degree to which the algorithms can recover community structure for different types of matrices, such as the often used cross-correlation matrices representing functional connectivity across predefined brain regions. Of the publicly available approaches for weighted graphs that can detect communities in graph sizes of at least 1000, prior research has demonstrated that Newman's spectral approach (i.e., Leading Eigenvalue), Walktrap, Fast Modularity, the Louvain method (i.e., multilevel community method), Label Propagation, and Infomap all recover communities exceptionally well in certain circumstances. The purpose of the present Monte Carlo simulation study is to test these methods across a large number of conditions, including varied graph sizes and types of matrix (sparse count, correlation, and reflected Euclidean distance), to identify which algorithm is optimal for specific types of data matrices. The results indicate that when the data are in the form of sparse count networks (such as those seen in diffusion tensor imaging), Label Propagation and Walktrap surfaced as the most reliable methods for community detection. For dense, weighted networks such as correlation matrices capturing functional connectivity, Walktrap consistently outperformed the other approaches for recovering communities.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/X2YPANT3/Gates et al. - 2016 - A Monte Carlo Evaluation of Weighted Community Det.pdf}
}

@article{gawronski2012back,
  title = {Back to the {{Future}} of {{Dissonance Theory}}: {{Cognitive Consistency}} as a {{Core Motive}}},
  shorttitle = {Back to the {{Future}} of {{Dissonance Theory}}},
  author = {Gawronski, Bertram},
  year = {2012},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Social Cognition},
  volume = {30},
  number = {6},
  pages = {652--668},
  publisher = {{Guilford Publications Inc.}},
  issn = {0278-016X},
  doi = {10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.652},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {In his theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) described cognitive consistency as a psychological need that is as basic as hunger and thirst. Over the past decades, however, the idea of cognitive consistency as a core motive has been replaced by an increasingly narrow focus on dissonance-related changes in attitudes and alternative accounts that attribute such changes to mechanisms of ego-defense. The current article aims at reviving the idea of cognitive consistency as a core motive, arguing that inconsistency serves as an epistemic cue for errors in one's system of beliefs. Because inconsistency can often be resolved in multiple ways, motivated reasoning can bias processes of inconsistency resolution toward desired conclusions, although motivated distortions are constrained by the need for cognitive consistency. The ubiquity of consistency processes is illustrated through its role in various instances of threat-compensation (e.g., victim derogation, self-verification, system justification) and the insights that can be gained from reconceptualizing various social psychological phenomena in terms of cognitive consistency (e.g., prejudice-related belief systems, dispositional inference, stability of first impressions).},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/E8SK8TGM/soco.2012.30.6.html}
}

@incollection{gawronski2012cognitive,
  title = {Cognitive Consistency as a Basic Principle of Social Information Processing},
  booktitle = {Cognitive Consistency: {{A}} Fundamental Principle in Social Cognition},
  author = {Gawronski, Bertram and Strack, Fritz},
  year = {2012},
  pages = {1--16},
  publisher = {{Guilford Press}},
  address = {{New York, NY, US}},
  abstract = {In the initial sections of this introduction, the authors note the increasingly narrow perspective that has dominated research on cognitive consistency from the 1950s to the dawn of the new millennium. Counter to this development, the last decade has seen a resurgence of the original proposal that cognitive consistency represents a basic principle of human thought. As the chapters of this volume illustrate, consistency principles play a fundamental role at various levels of social information processing, ranging from micro-level to macro-level processes. A careful analysis of these processes\textemdash including their commonalities and differences\textemdash may help move toward the forgotten goal of consistency theories to provide a unifying framework for understanding human cognition. This book is intended as a step in this direction, and the authors are eager to see the research that will be inspired by the theoretical ideas outlined in its chapters. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  isbn = {978-1-60918-946-4 978-1-60918-948-8},
  keywords = {Cognition,Cognitive Dissonance,Social Cognition},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9IQIR6XX/2012-11410-001.html}
}

@incollection{gerow2011cognitive,
  title = {Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Adolescents},
  booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Adolescence},
  author = {{Southam-Gerow}, M.A. and McLeod, B.D. and Brown, R.C. and Quinoy, A.M. and Avny, S.B.},
  editor = {Brown, B. Bradford and Prinstein, Mitchell J.},
  year = {2011},
  pages = {100--108},
  publisher = {{Academic Press}},
  address = {{San Diego}},
  doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-373951-3.00106-X},
  abstract = {Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is mental health treatment with strong scientific evidence supporting its use with adolescents for a variety of problems. This article provides a broad overview of CBT with adolescents divided into three main sections. In the first section, the theories underlying the CBT approach are described. Specifically, behavior theory and cognitive theory are reviewed. Further, how the two theories have been integrated into what is called cognitive-behavior theory is discussed. In the second section, a description of specific interventions found in CBT and which modalities are used to deliver CBT is provided. Finally, in the third section, scientific evidence on the use of CBT for four common problem areas for adolescents is described: (a) anxiety disorders, (b) depression, (c) externalizing behavior problems, and (d) eating disorders.},
  isbn = {978-0-12-373951-3},
  keywords = {Adolescent,Anxiety,Behavior,CBT,Children,Classical conditioning,Cognitive,Evidence-based treatment,Exposure,Operant conditioning}
}

@article{ghelfi2020reexamining,
  title = {Reexamining the Effect of Gustatory Disgust on Moral Judgment: {{A}} Multilab Direct Replication of Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011)},
  author = {Ghelfi, Eric and Christopherson, Cody D and Urry, Heather L and Lenne, Richie L and Legate, Nicole and Ann Fischer, Mary and Wagemans, Fieke M.A. and Wiggins, Brady and Barrett, Tamara and Bornstein, Michelle and others},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {3--23},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}}
}

@article{gilbert1998shame,
  title = {Shame, Social Roles and Status: {{The}} Psychobiological Continuum from Monkey to Human},
  author = {Gilbert, Paul and McGuire, M},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology and culture},
  pages = {99--125}
}

@article{giner-sorolla2017purity,
  title = {Beyond Purity: {{Moral}} Disgust toward Bad Character},
  shorttitle = {Beyond Purity},
  author = {{Giner-Sorolla}, Roger and Chapman, Hanah A.},
  year = {2017},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {28},
  number = {1},
  pages = {80--91},
  issn = {0956-7976, 1467-9280},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797616673193},
  abstract = {Previous studies support a link between moral disgust and impurity, while anger is linked to harm. We challenge this strict correspondence, and show that disgust is sensitive to information about moral character, even for harm violations. By contrast, anger is sensitive to information about actions, including their moral wrongness and consequences. Study 1 examined disgust and anger toward an action that indicates especially bad moral character (animal cruelty) versus an action that is more wrong (domestic abuse). Animal cruelty was associated with more disgust, whereas domestic abuse was associated with more anger. Studies 2 and 3 manipulated character by varying the agent's desire to cause harm, and also varied the action's harmful consequences. Desire to harm predicted only disgust (controlling for anger), while consequences were more closely related to anger (controlling for disgust). Taken together, these results indicate disgust responds to evidence of bad moral character, not just to impurity.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CLXLHGYM/giner-sorolla2017purity.pdf}
}

@incollection{giner-sorolla2018what,
  ids = {giner-sorolla2018whatb},
  title = {What {{Makes Moral Disgust Special}}? {{An Integrative Functional Review}}},
  shorttitle = {What {{Makes Moral Disgust Special}}?},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Experimental Social Psychology}}},
  author = {{Giner-Sorolla}, Roger and Kupfer, Tom and Sabo, John},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {57},
  pages = {223--289},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.10.001},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The role of disgust in moral psychology has been a matter of much controversy and experimentation over the past 20 or so years. We present here an integrative look at the literature, organized according to the four functions of emotion proposed by integrative functional theory (IFT): appraisal, associative, self-regulation and communicative. Regarding appraisals, we review experimental, personality, and neuroscientific work that has shown differences between elicitors of disgust and anger in moral contexts, with disgust responding more to bodily-moral violations such as incest, and anger responding more to socio-moral violations such as theft. We also present new evidence for interpreting the phenomenon of socio-moral disgust as an appraisal of bad character in a person. The associative nature of disgust is shown by evidence for ``unreasoning disgust,'' in which associations to bodily-moral violations are not accompanied by elaborated reasons, and not modified by appraisals such as harm or intent. We also critically examine the literature about the ability of incidental disgust to intensify moral judgments associatively. For disgust's self-regulation function, we consider the possibility that disgust serves as an existential defense, regulating avoidance of thoughts that might threaten our basic self-image as living humans. Finally, we discuss new evidence from our lab that moral disgust serves a communicative function, implying that expressions of disgust serve to signal one's own moral intentions even when a different emotion is felt internally on the basis of appraisal. Within the scope of the literature, there is evidence that all four functions of Giner-Sorolla's (2012) integrative functional theory of emotion (IFT) may be operating, and that their variety can help explain some of the paradoxes of disgust.},
  isbn = {978-0-12-814689-7},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/33842BHM/giner-sorolla2018whatb.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZP4L2KAP/giner-sorolla2018what.pdf}
}

@article{golino2017exploratory,
  title = {Exploratory Graph Analysis: {{A}} New Approach for Estimating the Number of Dimensions in Psychological Research},
  shorttitle = {Exploratory Graph Analysis},
  author = {Golino, Hudson F. and Epskamp, Sacha},
  year = {2017},
  month = jun,
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  volume = {12},
  number = {6},
  pages = {e0174035},
  publisher = {{Public Library of Science}},
  issn = {1932-6203},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0174035},
  urldate = {2022-09-29},
  abstract = {The estimation of the correct number of dimensions is a long-standing problem in psychometrics. Several methods have been proposed, such as parallel analysis (PA), Kaiser-Guttman's eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule, multiple average partial procedure (MAP), the maximum-likelihood approaches that use fit indexes as BIC and EBIC and the less used and studied approach called very simple structure (VSS). In the present paper a new approach to estimate the number of dimensions will be introduced and compared via simulation to the traditional techniques pointed above. The approach proposed in the current paper is called exploratory graph analysis (EGA), since it is based on the graphical lasso with the regularization parameter specified using EBIC. The number of dimensions is verified using the walktrap, a random walk algorithm used to identify communities in networks. In total, 32,000 data sets were simulated to fit known factor structures, with the data sets varying across different criteria: number of factors (2 and 4), number of items (5 and 10), sample size (100, 500, 1000 and 5000) and correlation between factors (orthogonal, .20, .50 and .70), resulting in 64 different conditions. For each condition, 500 data sets were simulated using lavaan. The result shows that the EGA performs comparable to parallel analysis, EBIC, eBIC and to Kaiser-Guttman rule in a number of situations, especially when the number of factors was two. However, EGA was the only technique able to correctly estimate the number of dimensions in the four-factor structure when the correlation between factors were .7, showing an accuracy of 100\% for a sample size of 5,000 observations. Finally, the EGA was used to estimate the number of factors in a real dataset, in order to compare its performance with the other six techniques tested in the simulation study.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Covariance,Developmental psychology,Eigenvalues,Factor analysis,Network analysis,Psychology,Psychometrics,Simulation and modeling},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/95Z67AKQ/golino_2017_explorator.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/59W4BKQ2/article.html}
}

@article{goodwin2008psychology,
  title = {The Psychology of Meta-Ethics: {{Exploring}} Objectivism},
  shorttitle = {The Psychology of Meta-Ethics},
  author = {Goodwin, Geoffrey P. and Darley, John M.},
  year = {2008},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {106},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1339--1366},
  issn = {0010-0277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.007},
  urldate = {2023-03-23},
  abstract = {How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Ethical disagreement,Ethical objectivism,Meta-ethics,Moral cognition,Moral reasoning},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QD3IUFRE/goodwin_2008_the.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/P357F56K/S001002770700176X.html}
}

@article{graham2009liberals,
  ids = {graham2009liberal,graham2009liberalsa},
  title = {Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations.},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Haidt, Jonathan and Nosek, Brian A.},
  year = {2009},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {96},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1029--1046},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0015141},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/8XXFLLXH/graham2009liberals.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VDFEL9J3/graham2009liberalsb.pdf}
}

@article{graham2011mapping,
  ids = {graham2011mappingb},
  title = {Mapping the Moral Domain.},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Nosek, Brian A. and Haidt, Jonathan and Iyer, Ravi and Koleva, Spassena and Ditto, Peter H.},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {101},
  number = {2},
  eprint = {21244182},
  eprinttype = {pmid},
  pages = {366--385},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0021847},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically-grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) based on a theoretical model of five universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/ reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so present new findings about morality: 1. Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a five-factor structure of moral concerns. 2. Convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant. 3. We establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.},
  langid = {english},
  pmcid = {PMC3116962},
  pmid = {21244182},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6B6SZ3ZY/graham2011mapping.pdf}
}

@article{graham2012sacred,
  title = {Sacred Values and Evil Adversaries: {{A}} Moral Foundations Approach.},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Haidt, Jonathan},
  year = {2012},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}}
}

@article{graham2012unbearable,
  title = {The {{Unbearable Vagueness}} of ``{{Essence}}'': {{Forty-Four Clarification Questions}} for {{Gray}}, {{Young}}, and {{Waytz}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Unbearable Vagueness}} of ``{{Essence}}''},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Iyer, Ravi},
  year = {2012},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
  volume = {23},
  number = {2},
  pages = {162--165},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  issn = {1047-840X, 1532-7965},
  doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2012.667767},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/P6U3LKNR/graham2012unbearable.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SFQD9UG3/graham2012.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/IX2EMUDW/1047840X.2012.html}
}

@incollection{graham2013moral,
  title = {Moral Foundations Theory: {{The}} Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism},
  shorttitle = {Chapter Two - Moral Foundations Theory},
  booktitle = {Advances in Experimental Social Psychology},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Haidt, Jonathan and Koleva, Sena and Motyl, Matt and Iyer, Ravi and Wojcik, Sean P. and Ditto, Peter H.},
  editor = {Devine, Patricia and Plant, Ashby},
  year = {2013},
  month = jan,
  volume = {47},
  pages = {55--130},
  publisher = {{Academic Press}},
  doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4},
  abstract = {Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter, we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory and detail the empirical findings that MFT has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and moral psychology.},
  keywords = {Cultural learning,Intuition,Method-theory coevolution,Morality,Nativism,Pluralism}
}

@article{graham2015explaining,
  title = {Explaining Away Differences in Moral Judgment},
  author = {Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2015},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {8},
  pages = {869--873},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550615592242}
}

@article{graham2015when,
  title = {When {{Values}} and {{Behavior Conflict}}: {{Moral Pluralism}} and {{Intrapersonal Moral Hypocrisy}}},
  shorttitle = {When {{Values}} and {{Behavior Conflict}}},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Meindl, Peter and Koleva, Spassena and Iyer, Ravi and Johnson, Kate M.},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Social and Personality Psychology Compass},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {158--170},
  issn = {1751-9004},
  doi = {10.1111/spc3.12158},
  urldate = {2021-05-26},
  abstract = {The authors review the various ways moral hypocrisy has been defined and operationalized by social psychologists, concentrating on three general types: moral duplicity, moral double standards, and moral weakness. While most approaches have treated moral hypocrisy as an interpersonal phenomenon, requiring public claims, preaching (versus practicing), or judgments of others (versus oneself), this paper also considers intrapersonal moral hypocrisy \textendash{} that is, conflicts between values and behavior that may exist even in the absence of public pronouncements or judgments. Current attempts to understand and combat intrapersonal moral hypocrisy are aided by moral pluralism, the idea that there are many different moral values, which may come into conflict both between and within individuals. Examples are given to illustrate how taking into account individual differences in values can help to reduce moral hypocrisy. The authors close by considering the possibility that in a pluralistic world, reducing intrapersonal moral hypocrisy might not always be a normatively desired end goal.},
  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 John Wiley \& Sons Ltd},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WNYN62CQ/graham2015when.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/F68IPITF/spc3.html}
}

@incollection{graham2018moral,
  ids = {grayatlas},
  title = {Moral Foundations Theory: On the Advantages of Moral Pluralism over Moral Monism},
  booktitle = {Atlas of Moral Psychology},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Haidt, Jonathan and Motyl, Matt and Meindl, Peter and Iskiwitch, Carol and Mooijman, Marlon},
  editor = {Gray, Kurt and Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2018},
  pages = {211--225},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{gray2009moral,
  ids = {gray2009moralb},
  title = {Moral Typecasting: {{Divergent}} Perceptions of Moral Agents and Moral Patients.},
  shorttitle = {Moral Typecasting},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and Wegner, Daniel M.},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {96},
  number = {3},
  pages = {505--520},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0013748},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Moral agency is the capacity to do right or wrong, whereas moral patiency is the capacity to be a target of right or wrong. Through 7 studies, the authors explored moral typecasting\textemdash an inverse relation between perceptions of moral agency and moral patiency. Across a range of targets and situations, goodand evil-doers (moral agents) were perceived to be less vulnerable to having good and evil done to them. The recipients of good and evil (moral patients), in turn, were perceived as less capable of performing good or evil actions. Moral typecasting stems from the dyadic nature of morality and explains curious effects such as people's willingness to inflict greater pain on those who do good than those who do nothing.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DSHPDQLT/gray2009moral.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SJVDB4TJ/gray2009moralb.pdf}
}

@article{gray2012mind,
  title = {Mind {{Perception Is}} the {{Essence}} of {{Morality}}},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and Young, Liane and Waytz, Adam},
  year = {2012},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
  volume = {23},
  number = {2},
  pages = {101--124},
  issn = {1047-840X, 1532-7965},
  doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2012.651387},
  urldate = {2021-05-24},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GSQBLLBV/gray2012mind.pdf}
}

@incollection{gray2012morality,
  ids = {gray2012moralityb},
  title = {Morality Takes Two: {{Dyadic}} Morality and Mind Perception.},
  shorttitle = {Morality Takes Two},
  booktitle = {The Social Psychology of Morality: {{Exploring}} the Causes of Good and Evil.},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and Wegner, Daniel M.},
  editor = {Mikulincer, Mario and Shaver, Phillip R.},
  year = {2012},
  pages = {109--127},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{Washington}},
  doi = {10.1037/13091-006},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  isbn = {978-1-4338-1011-4},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/EAMZWEEZ/gray2012morality.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Q6SN6ABH/gray2012moralityb.pdf}
}

@article{gray2014harm,
  ids = {gray2014harmb},
  title = {Harm Concerns Predict Moral Judgments of Suicide: {{Comment}} on {{Rottman}}, {{Kelemen}} and {{Young}} (2014)},
  shorttitle = {Harm Concerns Predict Moral Judgments of Suicide},
  author = {Gray, Kurt},
  year = {2014},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {133},
  number = {1},
  pages = {329--331},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {00100277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2014.06.007},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Two prominent theories offer different perspectives on the role of harm in moral cognition. Dyadic morality suggests that harm-related concerns are pervasive, whereas moral pluralism suggests that these concerns apply only to canonically harmful violations (e.g., murder), and not impure violations (e.g., suicide). Rottman et al. (2014) contrast these two theories by examining moral judgments of suicide. They conclude that suicide wrongness is independent of harm, therefore arguing against dyadic morality and for moral pluralism. However, these conclusions may be overstated; across all these studies, a meta-analysis reveals that harm is a significant predictor of suicide judgments. Moreover, the association between harm and suicide wrongness may be suppressed in individual studies by insufficient power, restrictive exclusion criteria, a single bivariate outlier, and reliance upon the conventional significance threshold of p {$<$} .05. In revised analyses harm is robustly associated with suicide wrongness, consistent with dyadic morality.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/8HEE7GEM/gray2014harmb.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/S7L6EYGJ/gray2014harm.pdf}
}

@article{gray2014myth,
  ids = {gray2014mytha,gray2014mythb},
  title = {The Myth of Harmless Wrongs in Moral Cognition: {{Automatic}} Dyadic Completion from Sin to Suffering.},
  shorttitle = {The Myth of Harmless Wrongs in Moral Cognition},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and Schein, Chelsea and Ward, Adrian F.},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
  volume = {143},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1600--1615},
  issn = {1939-2222, 0096-3445},
  doi = {10.1037/a0036149},
  urldate = {2021-05-24},
  abstract = {When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QKDPWHL7/gray2014myth.pdf}
}

@article{gray2015impure,
  ids = {gray2015impurea,gray2015impureb},
  title = {Impure or {{Just Weird}}? {{Scenario Sampling Bias Raises Questions About}} the {{Foundation}} of {{Morality}}},
  shorttitle = {Impure or {{Just Weird}}?},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and Keeney, Jonathan E.},
  year = {2015},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {8},
  pages = {859--868},
  issn = {1948-5506, 1948-5514},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550615592241},
  urldate = {2021-05-24},
  abstract = {Moral psychologists have used scenarios of abuse and murder to operationalize harm and chicken-masturbation and dog-eating to operationalize impurity. These scenarios reveal different patterns of moral judgment across harm and purity, ostensibly supporting distinct moral mechanisms, modules, or ``foundations.'' However, these different patterns may stem not from differences in moral content per se but instead from biased sampling that confounds content with weirdness and severity. Supporting this hypothesis, frequently used impurity scenarios are weirder and less severe than both harm scenarios (Study 1) and participant-generated impurity scenarios (Study 2). Weirdness and severity\textemdash not content\textemdash also appear to drive differences between act and character evaluations (Study 3). Also problematic for modular accounts are extremely high correlations between harm and impurity (rs {$>$} .86), and findings that harm scenarios assess impurity better than researcher-devised impurity scenarios. Overall, patterns of moral judgment previously ascribed to distinct moral mechanisms may reflect domain-general moral cognition.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/92LD6NH3/gray2015impure.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CWBM8UBM/gray2015impure.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JVW4KBV3/gray2015impure.pdf}
}

@article{gray2017how,
  ids = {gray2017howa},
  title = {How to Think about Emotion and Morality: Circles, Not Arrows},
  shorttitle = {How to Think about Emotion and Morality},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and Schein, Chelsea and Cameron, C Daryl},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology},
  volume = {17},
  pages = {41--46},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {2352250X},
  doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.06.011},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/HN3H73LW/gray2017how.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/V6N3AN84/gray2017how.pdf}
}

@article{gray2022affective,
  title = {The Affective Harm Account ({{AHA}}) of Moral Judgment: {{Reconciling}} Cognition and Affect, Dyadic Morality and Disgust, Harm and Purity},
  shorttitle = {The Affective Harm Account ({{AHA}}) of Moral Judgment},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and MacCormack, Jennifer K. and Henry, Teague and Banks, Emmie and Schein, Chelsea and {Armstrong-Carter}, Emma and Abrams, Samantha and Muscatell, Keely A.},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {123},
  pages = {1199--1222},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315},
  doi = {10.1037/pspa0000310},
  abstract = {Moral psychology has long debated whether moral judgment is rooted in harm versus affect. We reconcile this debate with the affective harm account (AHA) of moral judgment. The AHA understands harm as an intuitive perception (i.e., perceived harm), and divides ``affect'' into two: embodied visceral arousal (i.e., gut feelings) and stimulus-directed affective appraisals (e.g., ratings of disgustingness). The AHA was tested in a randomized, double-blind pharmacological experiment with healthy young adults judging the immorality, harmfulness, and disgustingness of everyday moral scenarios (e.g., lying) and unusual purity scenarios (e.g., sex with a corpse) after receiving either a placebo or the {$\beta$}-blocker propranolol (a drug that dampens visceral arousal). Results confirmed the three key hypotheses of the AHA. First, perceived harm and affective appraisals are neither competing nor independent but intertwined. Second, although both perceived harm and affective appraisals predict moral judgment, perceived harm is consistently relevant across all scenarios (in line with the theory of dyadic morality), whereas affective appraisals are especially relevant in unusual purity scenarios (in line with affect-as-information theory). Third, the ``gut feelings'' of visceral arousal are not as important to morality as often believed. Dampening visceral arousal (via propranolol) did not directly impact moral judgment, but instead changed the relative contribution of affective appraisals to moral judgment\textemdash and only in unusual purity scenarios. By embracing a constructionist view of the mind that blurs traditional dichotomies, the AHA reconciles historic harm-centric and current affect-centric theories, parsimoniously explaining judgment differences across various moral scenarios without requiring any ``moral foundations.'' (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Deception,Disgust,Dyads,Emotions,Judgment,Mind,Morality,Perceptual Stimulation,Propranolol,Sexual Arousal,Social Cognition},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/J6IB5SCM/gray2022affective.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/3LSRWZPE/doiLanding.html}
}

@article{gray2022problem,
  title = {The {{Problem}} of {{Purity}} in {{Moral Psychology}}},
  author = {Gray, Kurt and DiMaggio, Nicholas and Schein, Chelsea and Kachanoff, Frank},
  year = {2022},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Review},
  pages = {10888683221124741},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1088-8683},
  doi = {10.1177/10888683221124741},
  urldate = {2023-03-24},
  abstract = {Academic AbstractThe idea of ?purity? transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal \textasciitilde 9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity?unlike other moral constructs?is not understood by what it is but what it isn?t: obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm?the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/65ISNLZH/gray_2022_the.pdf}
}

@article{gutierrez2007anger,
  title = {Anger, Disgust, and Presumption of Harm as Reactions to Taboo-Breaking Behaviors.},
  author = {Gutierrez, Roberto and {Giner-Sorolla}, Roger},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {853--868},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  doi = {10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.853},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CKW2R9ML/gutierrez2007anger.pdf}
}

@article{haidt1993affect,
  title = {Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?},
  author = {Haidt, Jonathan and Koller, Silvia Helena and Dias, Maria G.},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {65},
  number = {4},
  eprint = {8229648},
  eprinttype = {pmid},
  pages = {613--628},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.65.4.613},
  pmid = {8229648},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,Adult,Affect,Age Differences,Age Factors,Child,Cross Cultural Differences,Cross-Cultural Comparison,Culture,Female,Humans,Judgment,Male,Morality,Morals,Socioeconomic Status},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4Z9QGB5T/haidt1993affect.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/TRN6Y7X2/doiLanding.html}
}

@incollection{haidt2001emotional,
  ids = {haidt2008emotional},
  title = {The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: {{A}} Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment},
  booktitle = {Reasoning},
  author = {Haidt, Jonathan},
  editor = {Adler, Jonathan E. and Rips, Lance J.},
  year = {2001},
  pages = {1024--1052},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511814273.055},
  keywords = {2008,causality,Causality,Intuition,Judgment,Models,moral judgment,Morality,Philosophies,philosophy,psychology,Psychology,Psychosocial Factors,rationalist model,Rationality,reasoning,Reasoning,social intuitionist model},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LHUJ7BLR/haidt2001emotional.pdf}
}

@article{haidt2007when,
  title = {When Morality Opposes Justice: {{Conservatives}} Have Moral Intuitions That Liberals May Not Recognize},
  author = {Haidt, Jonathan and Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2007},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Social Justice Research},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {98--116},
  issn = {1573-6725},
  doi = {10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z},
  abstract = {Researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. On this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs appears to be immoral, and has been explained as a product of various non-moral processes such as system justification or social dominance orientation. In this article we argue that, from an anthropological perspective, the moral domain is usually much broader, encompassing many more aspects of social life and valuing institutions as much or more than individuals. We present theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that there are five psychological systems that provide the foundations for the world's many moralities. The five foundations are psychological preparations for detecting and reacting emotionally to issues related to harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Political liberals have moral intuitions primarily based upon the first two foundations, and therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations.}
}

@article{hechler2018difference,
  title = {On the Difference between Moral Outrage and Empathic Anger: {{Anger}} about Wrongful Deeds or Harmful Consequences},
  shorttitle = {On the Difference between Moral Outrage and Empathic Anger},
  author = {Hechler, Stefanie and Kessler, Thomas},
  year = {2018},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {76},
  pages = {270--282},
  issn = {0022-1031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.005},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Moral violations seem to elicit moral outrage because of the wrongfulness of the deed. However, recent studies have questioned the existence of moral outrage, because moral violations are confounded with the harm done to victims. Such harm elicits empathic anger rather than moral outrage (Batson et al., 2007; Batson et al., 2009). Thus, moral outrage is triggered by the wrongfulness of an action (i.e., a perpetrator's intention to harm), whereas empathic anger is triggered by its harmfulness (i.e., the actual harm done). Four studies (N\,=\,1065) in varying contexts orthogonally crossed these antecedents of anger to differentiate between moral outrage and empathic anger. The results demonstrate that anger mainly emerged from the intention to harm, rather than the actual harm done. In contrast, the actual harm elicited empathy with victims. The findings suggest that anger about moral violations emerges separately from empathic reactions, although these reactions are difficult to distinguish in most instances. Likewise, the intention to harm provoked a willingness to punish the perpetrator much more than the actual harm did. Moral violations thus elicit moral outrage independently of their harmful consequences, even though such anger may often overlap with concern for others.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Anger,Emotions,Empathy,Morality,Retaliation},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/TVQHS6FT/S002210311730046X.html}
}

@article{heino2017commentary,
  title = {Commentary: {{Reproducibility}} in {{Psychological Science}}: {{When Do Psychological Phenomena Exist}}?},
  shorttitle = {Commentary},
  author = {Heino, Matti T. J. and Fried, Eiko I. and LeBel, Etienne P.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {8},
  issn = {1664-1078},
  urldate = {2023-03-28},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/D67FBDFE/heino_2017_commentary.pdf}
}

@misc{hipolito2023mind,
  title = {Mind as {{Motion}}: {{Patterns}} from {{Psychology}} to {{Neurobiology}}},
  shorttitle = {Mind as {{Motion}}},
  author = {Hip{\'o}lito, In{\^e}s and van Geert, Paul and Pessoa, Luiz},
  year = {2023},
  month = mar,
  publisher = {{PsyArXiv}},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/2dtp6},
  urldate = {2023-03-23},
  abstract = {This paper argues for a shift in focus in psychology towards dynamic processes. It first draws on Embodied and Enactive Cognitive Science to theoretically develop psychological phenomena as emergent from interactions between embodied experience and sociocultural context. The paper, then, employs Complex Systems Theory to explain the intricacies of psychological processes and shows how they influence neural dynamics. The proposed approach emphasises the interactional processes underlying psychological phenomena and bridges the gap between different levels of abstraction in cognitive science.},
  archiveprefix = {arxiv},
  langid = {american},
  keywords = {Behavioral Neuroscience,Cognitive Psychology,Complex Systems Theory,Developmental Psychology,Dynamical Systems Theor,Embodiment,Enculturation,Interactional Processes,Neuroscience,Psychological Experience,radical enactivism,Social and Behavioral Sciences},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/H5A55C2F/hipólito‬_2023_mind as.pdf}
}

@article{hofer2021Rock,
  ids = {hofer2020rock},
  title = {Between a {{Rock}} and a {{Hard Place}}: {{The Role}} of {{Moral Intuitions}} and {{Social Distance}} in {{Determining Moral Judgments}} of an {{Agent}} in a {{Moral Dilemma}}},
  shorttitle = {Between a {{Rock}} and a {{Hard Place}}},
  author = {Hofer, Matthias and Tamborini, Ron and Ryffel, Fabian A.},
  year = {2021},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Journal of Media Psychology},
  volume = {33},
  number = {3},
  pages = {103--112},
  publisher = {{Hogrefe Publishing}},
  address = {{Germany}},
  issn = {1864-1105, 2151-2388},
  doi = {10.1027/1864-1105/a000284},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Applying logic from both the model of intuitive morality and exemplars and construal level theory, we examined the impact of baseline moral intuition salience and social distance on the moral judgment of a narrative character confronted with a moral dilemma. After completing a measure of baseline intuition salience, participants in an experiment first read an article about a fighter pilot who shot down a plane and then judged the pilot's actions as morally right or wrong. The article indicated that the plane had been hijacked by a terrorist who wanted to let it crash into a nearby stadium, and that the pilot shot down the plane to save the spectators in the stadium. Participants were randomly assigned to read the article either as if they were the pilot (social distance low) or as objectively as possible (social distance high). Results showed that baseline intuition salience and social distance interacted in determining moral judgment. Finally, moral judgment predicted whether participants would find the pilot guilty or not. In a second study using the same design as in the first study, we ensured that readers focused on different aspects of the dilemma depending on social distance.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Intuition,Judgment,Morality,Narratives,Physical Distancing,Social Dilemma,Terrorism,Theories},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4ND4HVRV/ContentServer.asp.pdf}
}

@incollection{hollon2013cognitive,
  title = {Cognitive and Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies.},
  booktitle = {Bergin and {{Garfield}}'s {{Handbook}} of {{Psychotherapy}} and {{Behavior Change}}},
  author = {Hollon, S.D. and Beck, Aaron T.},
  editor = {Lambert, Michael Jay},
  year = {2013},
  volume = {6},
  pages = {393--442},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
  abstract = {Praise for Bergin and Garfield's Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change, Sixth Edition "Not only is this a unique resource, it is the only book that all practitioners and researchers must read to ensure that they are in touch with the extraordinary advances that the field has made over the last years. Many of us have all five previous editions; the current volume is an essential addition to this growing, wonderful series." \textemdash Peter Fonagy, PhD, FBA, Freud Memorial Professor of Psychoanalysis and Head of the Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College London "As either researcher or clinician living in the contemporary world of accountability, this invaluable edition of the Handbook is a must for one's professional library." \textemdash Marvin R. Goldfried, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Psychology, Stony Brook University The classic reference on psychotherapy\textemdash revised for the twenty-first century Keeping pace with the rapid changes that are taking place in the field, Bergin and Garfield's Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change, Sixth Edition endures as the most important overview of research findings in psychotherapy for professionals, academics, researchers, and students. This bestselling resource presents authoritative thinking on the pressing questions, issues, and controversies in psychotherapy research and practice today. Thorough and comprehensive, the new edition examines:  New findings made possible by neuro-imaging and gene research Qualitative research designs and methods for understanding emotional problems Research in naturalistic settings that capitalizes on the curiosity of providers of services Practice-relevant findings, as well as methodological issues that will help direct future research},
  googlebooks = {7VsGNYd5PqsC},
  isbn = {978-1-118-03820-8},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Psychology / General,Psychology / Psychotherapy / General}
}

@article{hoorelbeke2016interplay,
  title = {The Interplay between Cognitive Risk and Resilience Factors in Remitted Depression: {{A}} Network Analysis},
  shorttitle = {The Interplay between Cognitive Risk and Resilience Factors in Remitted Depression},
  author = {Hoorelbeke, Kristof and Marchetti, Igor and De Schryver, Maarten and Koster, Ernst H. W.},
  year = {2016},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Affective Disorders},
  volume = {195},
  pages = {96--104},
  issn = {1573-2517},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jad.2016.02.001},
  abstract = {BACKGROUND: Individuals in remission from depression are at increased risk for developing future depressive episodes. Several cognitive risk- and resilience factors have been suggested to account for this vulnerability. In the current study we explored how risk- and protective factors such as cognitive control, adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation, residual symptomatology, and resilience relate to one another in a remitted depressed (RMD) sample. METHODS: We examined the relationships between these constructs in a cross-sectional dataset of 69 RMD patients using network analyses in order to obtain a comprehensive, data-driven view on the interplay between these constructs. We subsequently present an association network, a concentration network, and a relative importance network. RESULTS: In all three networks resilience formed the central hub, connecting perceived cognitive control (i.e., working memory complaints), emotion regulation, and residual symptomatology. The contribution of the behavioral measure for cognitive control in the network was negligible. Moreover, the directed relative importance network indicates bidirectional influences between these constructs, with all indicators of centrality suggesting a key role of resilience in remission from depression. LIMITATIONS: The presented findings are cross-sectional and networks are limited to a fixed set of key constructs in the literature pertaining cognitive vulnerability for depression. CONCLUSIONS: These findings indicate the importance of resilience to successfully cope with stressors following remission from depression. Further in-depth studies will be essential to identify the specific underlying resilience mechanisms that may be key to successful remission from depression.},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {26878206},
  keywords = {Adult,Affective Symptoms,Behavior,Cognition,Cognitive control,Cross-Sectional Studies,Databases; Factual,Depression,Female,Humans,Male,Memory Disorders,Memory; Short-Term,Middle Aged,Models; Psychological,Network,Neuropsychological Tests,Protective Factors,Psychomotor Performance,Remission,Resilience,Resilience; Psychological,Risk Factors,Vulnerability},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/X73CZEU4/hoorelbeke2016interplay.pdf}
}

@article{horberg2009disgust,
  ids = {horberg2009disgusta},
  title = {Disgust and the Moralization of Purity.},
  author = {Horberg, E. J. and Oveis, Christopher and Keltner, Dacher and Cohen, Adam B.},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {97},
  number = {6},
  pages = {963--976},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0017423},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Guided by appraisal-based models of the influence of emotion upon judgment, we propose that disgust moralizes\textemdash that is, amplifies the moral significance of\textemdash protecting the purity of the body and soul. Three studies documented that state and trait disgust, but not other negative emotions, moralize the purity moral domain but not the moral domains of justice or harm/care. In Study 1, integral feelings of disgust, but not integral anger, predicted stronger moral condemnation of behaviors violating purity. In Study 2, experimentally induced disgust, compared with induced sadness, increased condemnation of behaviors violating purity and increased approval of behaviors upholding purity. In Study 3, trait disgust, but not trait anger or trait fear, predicted stronger condemnation of purity violations and greater approval of behaviors upholding purity. We found that, confirming the domain specificity of the disgust\textendash purity association, disgust was unrelated to moral judgments about justice (Studies 1 and 2) or harm/care (Study 3). Finally, across studies, individuals of lower socioeconomic status (SES) were more likely than individuals of higher SES to moralize purity but not justice or harm/care.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9JHT32G7/horberg2009disgust.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WHX897XQ/horberg2009disgust.pdf}
}

@book{hsiao1934principles,
  title = {Principles of {{Gestalt}} Psychology},
  author = {Hsiao, H. H.},
  year = {1934},
  publisher = {{National Editing Bureau}},
  address = {{Oxford}},
  abstract = {This book, being primarily devoted to an exposition of the principles of Gestalt psychology, treats concisely but adequately the origin of the Gestalt school, connotation and denotation of Gestalt, analysis of the figure-ground phenomenon, the whole-part relationship, and the problem of organization and the internal and external world. The author also discusses the relation of the Gestalt school to introspectionism and behaviorism on the one hand, and to the Grazerschule and Leipzigerschule (Entwicklungspsychologie) in Germany on the other hand, pointing out their differences in standpoints, problems, and methods of study. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {GENERAL,GESTALT,No terms assigned,PSYCHOLOGY}
}

@article{huitt2003piaget,
  title = {Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development},
  author = {Huitt, William and Hummel, John},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Educational psychology interactive},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1--5}
}

@article{hutcherson2011moral,
  ids = {hutcherson2011morala,hutcherson2011moralb},
  title = {The Moral Emotions: {{A}} Social\textendash Functionalist Account of Anger, Disgust, and Contempt.},
  shorttitle = {The Moral Emotions},
  author = {Hutcherson, Cendri A. and Gross, James J.},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {100},
  number = {4},
  pages = {719--737},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0022408},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, \& Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, \& Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social\textendash functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1\textendash 3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social\textendash functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/8SBRJT8Q/hutcherson2011moral.pdf}
}

@article{huxley1874hypothesis,
  title = {On the {{Hypothesis}} That {{Animals}} Are {{Automata}}, and Its {{History}} *},
  author = {Huxley, Thomas Henry},
  year = {1874},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Nature},
  volume = {10},
  number = {253},
  pages = {362--366},
  publisher = {{Nature Publishing Group}},
  issn = {1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/010362a0},
  urldate = {2021-05-19},
  abstract = {AT this period of the meeting of the British Association I am quite sure it is hardly necessary for me to call to your minds the nature of the business which takes place at our sectional meetings. We there register the progress which science has made during the past year, and we do our best to advance that progress by original communications and free discussion. But when the honourable task of delivering this evening's lecture was imposed upon me, or rather as my friend the President has just said, when I undertook to deliver it, it occurred to me that the occasion of an evening lecture might be turned to a different purpose, that we might with much propriety and advantage turn our minds back to the past to consider what had been done by the great men of old, who ``had gone down into the grave with their weapons of war,'' but who had fought bravely for the cause of truth while they yet lived\textemdash to recognise their merits, and to show ourselves duly grateful for their services. I propose, therefore, to take a retrospect of the condition of that branch of science with which it is my business to be more or less familiar\textemdash not to a very remote period, for I shall go no further back than the seventeenth century, and the observations which I shall have to offer you will be confined almost entirely to the biological science of the time between the middle of the seventeenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries. I propose to show what great ideas in biological science took their origin at that time, in what manner the speculations then originated have been developed, and iu what relation they stand to what is now understood to be the body of scientific biological truth. The middle of the sixteenth century, or rather the early part of it, is one of the great epochs of biological science. It was at that time that an idea, which had been dimly advocated previously, took the solid form which can only be given to scientific ideas by the definite observation of fact\textemdash I mean the idea that vital phenomena, like all other phenomena of the physical world, are capable of mechanical explanation, that they are reducible to law and order, and that the study of biology, in the long run, is an application of the great sciences of physics and chemistry. The man to whom we are indebted for first bringing that idea into a plain and tangible shape, I am proud to say, was an Englishman, William Harvey. Harvey was the first clearly to explain the mechanism of the circulation of the blood, and by that remarkable discovery of his, and by the clearness and precision with which he reduced that process to its mechanical elements, he laid the foundation of a scientific theory of the larger part of the processes of living beings\textemdash those processes, in fact, which we now call processes of sustentation\textemdash and by his studies of development he, further, first laid the foundation of a scientific knowledge of reproduction. But besides these great powers of living beings, there remains another class of functions-those of the nervous system\textemdash with which Harvey did not grapple. It was, indeed, left for a contemporary of his, a man who, as he himself tells us, was mainly stimulated in these inquiries by the brilliant researches of Harvey\textemdash R\'en\'e Descartes\textemdash to play a part in relation to the phenomena of the nervous system, which, in my judgment, is equal in value to that which Harvey played in regard to the circulation. And when we consider who Descartes was, how brief the span of his life, I think it is a truly wonderful circumstance that this man, who died at fifty-four, should be one of the recognised leaders of philosophy\textemdash that, as I am informed by competent authority, he was one of I the first and most original mathematicians who has ever lived, and that, at the same time, the fertility of his intellect and the grasp of his genius should have been so great that he could take rank, as I believe he must, beside the immorial Harvey as a physiologist. And you must recollect that Descartes was not merely, as some had been, a happy speculator. He was a working anatomist and physiologist, conversant with all the anatomical and physiological lore of his time, and practised in all methods by which anatomical and physiological discoveries were then made; and it is related of him\textemdash and a most characteristic anecdote it is, and one which should ever put to silence those shallow talkers who speak of Descartes as a merely hypothetical and speculative philosopher\textemdash that a friend once calling upon him in Holland begged to be shown his library. Descartes led him into a sort of shed, and, drawing aside a curtain, displayed a dissecting-room full of bodies of animals in course of dissection, and said, ``There is my library.'' It would take us a very long time if I were to attempt to pursue the method which would be requisite for the full establishment of all that I am about to say; that is to say, if I were to quote the several passages of Descartess works which bear out my ascription to him of the several propositions which I am going to bring before you. And I must beg you, therefore, to be so good as to take it on my authority for the present, although for the present only, that there are to be found clearly expressed in Descartes' works the propositions which I shall proceed to lay before you, and each of which I shall compare as we go on, as briefly as may be, with the existing state of physiological science, in order that you may see in what position with respect to physiology\textemdash ay, even to the advanced physiology of the present time\textemdash this man stood. And, happily, the matters with which we shall treat are such as to require no extensive knowledge of anatomy\textemdash no more, in fact, than such as, I presume, must be familiar to almost every person.},
  copyright = {1874 Nature Publishing Group},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YGGZLB4F/huxley1874hypothesis.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5D9GGB9X/010362a0.html}
}

@article{insel2015brain,
  ids = {insel2015braina},
  title = {Brain Disorders? {{Precisely}}},
  shorttitle = {Brain Disorders?},
  author = {Insel, Thomas R. and Cuthbert, Bruce N.},
  year = {2015},
  month = may,
  journal = {Science},
  volume = {348},
  number = {6234},
  pages = {499--500},
  issn = {0036-8075, 1095-9203},
  doi = {10.1126/science.aab2358},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Precision medicine comes to psychiatry           ,                             Mental disorders represent a public health challenge of staggering proportions. In the most recent Global Burden of Disease study, mental and substance abuse disorders constitute the leading source of years lost to disability from all medical causes (                                1                              ). The World Health Organization estimates over 800,000 suicides each year globally, nearly all of which are a consequence of a mental disorder (                                2                              ). These high morbidity and mortality figures speak to the potential for overall health gains if mental disorders can be more effectively diagnosed and treated. Could a ``precision medicine'' approach find traction here?},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QYQ35QG4/insel2015brain.pdf}
}

@article{isler2021are,
  title = {Are We at All Liberal at Heart? {{High-powered}} Tests Find No Effect of Intuitive Thinking on Moral Foundations},
  shorttitle = {Are We at All Liberal at Heart?},
  author = {Isler, Ozan and Yilmaz, Onurcan and Do{\u g}ruyol, Burak},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {92},
  pages = {104050},
  issn = {00221031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104050},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Two opposing views define the debate on the moral principles underlying human behavior. One side argues a central role for five moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity), while the other argues that two of these (care, fairness) capture the essence of human moral concerns. In an experiment comparing these two views, Wright and Baril (2011) found that conservatives under cognitive load devalue loyalty, authority and sanctity, and become more liberal. Their finding of common intuitive concern with care and fairness supports the two-foundation perspective. In two high-powered preregistered experiments (N = 3275), we used time-pressure to induce intuitive thinking and tested Wright and Baril's finding that ``we are all liberals at heart.'' Although the manipulations worked as intended, Study 1 failed to identify an effect on the moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ). We conjectured that familiarity with standard survey items may weaken intuition manipulations by eliciting stable opinions. In Study 2, we therefore used not only the MFQ but also novel moral foundations vignettes. Study 2 failed to find an effect of time-pressure on either questionnaire type. An internal Bayesian meta-analysis indicated strong evidence against an effect of intuitive thinking on moral foundations.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Core foundations,Intuitive thinking,Moral foundations questionnaire,Moral foundations vignettes,Time-pressure},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/3CJN45LG/Isler et al 2021.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LZPK765U/isler2021area.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9SBFKFJF/S0022103120303905.html}
}

@article{isvoranu2017network,
  title = {A {{Network Approach}} to {{Psychosis}}: {{Pathways Between Childhood Trauma}} and {{Psychotic Symptoms}}},
  shorttitle = {A {{Network Approach}} to {{Psychosis}}},
  author = {Isvoranu, Adela-Maria and {van Borkulo}, Claudia D. and Boyette, Lindy-Lou and Wigman, Johanna T. W. and Vinkers, Christiaan H. and Borsboom, Denny and {Group Investigators}},
  year = {2017},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Schizophrenia Bulletin},
  volume = {43},
  number = {1},
  pages = {187--196},
  issn = {0586-7614, 1745-1701},
  doi = {10.1093/schbul/sbw055},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5TGHCWZ2/isvoranu2017network.pdf}
}

@article{iyer2012understanding,
  title = {Understanding {{Libertarian Morality}}: {{The Psychological Dispositions}} of {{Self-Identified Libertarians}}},
  shorttitle = {Understanding {{Libertarian Morality}}},
  author = {Iyer, Ravi and Koleva, Spassena and Graham, Jesse and Ditto, Peter and Haidt, Jonathan},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  volume = {7},
  number = {8},
  pages = {e42366},
  publisher = {{Public Library of Science}},
  issn = {1932-6203},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0042366},
  urldate = {2021-05-26},
  abstract = {Libertarians are an increasingly prominent ideological group in U.S. politics, yet they have been largely unstudied. Across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, we sought to understand the moral and psychological characteristics of self-described libertarians. Based on an intuitionist view of moral judgment, we focused on the underlying affective and cognitive dispositions that accompany this unique worldview. Compared to self-identified liberals and conservatives, libertarians showed 1) stronger endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding principle, and weaker endorsement of all other moral principles; 2) a relatively cerebral as opposed to emotional cognitive style; and 3) lower interdependence and social relatedness. As predicted by intuitionist theories concerning the origins of moral reasoning, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences. Our findings add to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Emotions,Interpersonal relationships,Moral philosophy,Personality,Political parties,Psychological attitudes,Questionnaires,Social psychology},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/EKDVDDPM/iyer2012understanding.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/UQ54UL45/article.html}
}

@misc{jackler1951marlboro,
  title = {Marlboro 1951 {{Baby Advertisement}}},
  year = {1951},
  collaborator = {Jackler, Robert K},
  langid = {english},
  lccn = {NMAH.AC.1224}
}

@article{janoff-bulman2013surveying,
  ids = {janoff-bulman2013surveyinga},
  title = {Surveying the {{Moral Landscape}}: {{Moral Motives}} and {{Group-Based Moralities}}},
  shorttitle = {Surveying the {{Moral Landscape}}},
  author = {{Janoff-Bulman}, Ronnie and Carnes, Nate C.},
  year = {2013},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Review},
  volume = {17},
  number = {3},
  pages = {219--236},
  issn = {1088-8683, 1532-7957},
  doi = {10.1177/1088868313480274},
  urldate = {2021-05-26},
  abstract = {We present a new six-cell Model of Moral Motives that applies a fundamental motivational distinction in psychology to the moral domain. In addition to moral motives focused on the self or another, we propose two group-based moralities, both communal in orientation, but reflecting distinct moral motives (Social Order/Communal Solidarity vs. Social Justice/Communal Responsibility) as well as differences in construals of group entitativity.The two group-based moralities have implications for intragroup homogeneity as well as intergroup conflict. Our model challenges the conclusions of Haidt and colleagues that only conservatives (not liberals) are group oriented and embrace a binding morality.We explore the implications of this new model for politics in particular and for the self-regulation versus social regulation of morality more generally.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/63ZIZBMM/janoff-bulman2013surveying.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LP6LX2YD/1088868313480274.pdf}
}

@article{jones2008moral,
  title = {Moral Hypervigilance: The Influence of Disgust Sensitivity in the Moral Domain},
  shorttitle = {Moral Hypervigilance},
  author = {Jones, Andrew and Fitness, Julie},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Emotion (Washington, D.C.)},
  volume = {8},
  number = {5},
  pages = {613--627},
  issn = {1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/a0013435},
  abstract = {Evidence exists that immoral behavior can elicit disgust. The authors thus proposed that highly disgust-sensitive individuals would be particularly repelled by exposure to transgressors and, consequently, would think and behave in ways aimed at reducing the risk of such exposure occurring--a syndrome the authors call moral hypervigilance. To examine these ideas, the authors began in Study 1 by testing the notion that people are disgusted by moral deviants. Evidence was found that participants exposed to descriptions of criminals experienced disgust. Across 2 further studies, disgust sensitivity (DS) was found to be associated with phenomena indicative of moral hypervigilance. In Study 2, mock jurors high on DS were biased toward conviction. In Study 3, DS predicted several hypothesized outcomes: higher estimates of the probability that suspects described in crime vignettes were culpable; a proclivity to attribute evilness to, and recommend lengthy sentences for, criminals; and inflated perceptions of community crime levels.},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {18837611},
  keywords = {Adult,Anger,Anxiety,Attention,Character,Crime,Emotions,Female,Homicide,Humans,Judgment,Jurisprudence,Male,Morals,Social Values}
}

@article{jones2018network,
  ids = {jones2018networka},
  title = {A Network Perspective on Comorbid Depression in Adolescents with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder},
  author = {Jones, Payton J. and Mair, Patrick and Riemann, Bradley C. and Mugno, Beth L. and McNally, Richard J.},
  year = {2018},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Anxiety Disorders},
  volume = {53},
  pages = {1--8},
  issn = {08876185},
  doi = {10.1016/j.janxdis.2017.09.008},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {People with obsessive-compulsive disorder [OCD] frequently suffer from depression, a comorbidity associated with greater symptom severity and suicide risk. We examined the associations between OCD and depression symptoms in 87 adolescents with primary OCD. We computed an association network, a graphical LASSO, and a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to model symptom interactions. Models showed OCD and depression as separate syndromes linked by bridge symptoms. Bridges between the two disorders emerged between obsessional problems in the OCD syndrome, and guilt, concentration problems, and sadness in the depression syndrome. A directed network indicated that OCD symptoms directionally precede depression symptoms. Concentration impairment emerged as a highly central node that may be distinctive to adolescents. We conclude that the network approach to mental disorders provides a new way to understand the etiology and maintenance of comorbid OCD-depression. Network analysis can improve research and treatment of mental disorder comorbidities by generating hypotheses concerning potential causal symptom structures and by identifying symptoms that may bridge disorders.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Adolescent psychopathology,Comorbidity,Depression,Network analysis,Obsessive-compulsive disorder},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/52PQ22M4/1-s2.0-S0887618517300993-main.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/N9UP22MY/jones2018network.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XZ2H933V/S0887618517300993.html}
}

@article{jylkka2021incidental,
  title = {Incidental Disgust Does Not Cause Moral Condemnation of Neutral Actions},
  author = {Jylkk{\"a}, Jussi and H{\"a}rk{\"o}nen, Johanna and Hy{\"o}n{\"a}, Jukka},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Cognition and Emotion},
  volume = {35},
  number = {1},
  pages = {96--109},
  issn = {0269-9931, 1464-0600},
  doi = {10.1080/02699931.2020.1810639},
  urldate = {2021-05-11},
  abstract = {Emotivism in moral psychology holds that making moral judgements is at least partly an affective process. Three emotivist hypotheses can be distinguished: the elicitation hypothesis (that moral transgressions elicit emotions); the amplification hypothesis (that disgust amplifies moral judgments); and the moralisation hypothesis (that affect moralises the non-moral). Even though the moralisation hypothesis is the strongest and most radical form of emotivism, it has not been systematically experimentally tested. Most previous studies have used as stimuli morally wrong actions, and thus they cannot answer whether disgust is sufficient to moralise an otherwise neutral action. In Experiment 1 (N = 87) we tested the effect of incidental disgust on morally neutral scenarios, and in Experiment 2 (N = 510) the differential effect of disgust on neutral and wrong scenarios. The results did not support either the moralisation or the amplification hypothesis. Instead, Bayesian analyses provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis that incidental disgust does not affect moral ratings. The results are in line with a recent meta-analysis suggesting that disgust has no effect on moral ratings.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/96TRP29I/jylkka2021incidental.pdf}
}

@book{kahneman2011thinking,
  title = {Thinking, Fast and Slow},
  author = {Kahneman, Daniel},
  year = {2011},
  series = {Thinking, Fast and Slow},
  pages = {499},
  publisher = {{Farrar, Straus and Giroux}},
  address = {{New York, NY, US}},
  abstract = {In the highly anticipated Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman takes us on a groundbreaking tour of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think. System 1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. Kahneman exposes the extraordinary capabilities\textemdash and also the faults and biases\textemdash of fast thinking, and reveals the pervasive influence of intuitive impressions on our thoughts and behavior. The impact of loss aversion and overconfidence on corporate strategies, the difficulties of predicting what will make us happy in the future, the challenges of properly framing risks at work and at home, the profound effect of cognitive biases on everything from playing the stock market to planning the next vacation\textemdash each of these can be understood only by knowing how the two systems shape our judgments and decisions. Engaging the reader in a lively conversation about how we think, Kahneman reveals where we can and cannot trust our intuitions and how we can tap into the benefits of slow thinking. He offers practical and enlightening insights into how choices are made in both our business and our personal lives\textemdash and how we can use different techniques to guard against the mental glitches that often get us into trouble. Thinking, Fast and Slow will transform the way you think about thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  isbn = {978-0-374-27563-1 978-1-4299-6935-2},
  keywords = {Choice Behavior,Cognitive Processes,Decision Making,Intuition,Judgment,Mind,Thinking},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SBPTZY5C/2011-26535-000.html}
}

@article{karinen2019cognitive,
  ids = {karinen2019cognitivea},
  title = {Cognitive and Personality Correlates of Trait Disgust and Their Relationship to Condemnation of Nonpurity Moral Transgressions.},
  author = {Karinen, Annika K. and Chapman, Hanah A.},
  year = {2019},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {19},
  number = {5},
  pages = {889--902},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  issn = {1931-1516, 1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/emo0000489},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Cognition,conscientiousness,Conscious (Personality Factor),deviance,Disgust,disgust sensitivity,Intuition,intuitive thinking,moral judgment,Morality,Personality,Personality Correlates,Thinking,Trust (Social Behavior)},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CGJDC2WF/karinen2020cognitive.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/MTFIEKKL/karinen2019cognitive.pdf}
}

@article{kavathatzopoulos1991kohlberg,
  title = {Kohlberg and {{Piaget}}: Differences and Similarities},
  shorttitle = {Kohlberg and {{Piaget}}},
  author = {Kavathatzopoulos, Iordanis},
  year = {1991},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Moral Education},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {47--54},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  issn = {0305-7240, 1465-3877},
  doi = {10.1080/0305724910200104},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Kohlberg's cognitive-stage-developmental theory is often described as a further development of Piaget's moral theory. In discussing the two theories, it is shown that Kohlberg attempts to describe the features of moral thought and not the formation of the independent moral function. Nevertheless, Kohlberg's later research, as well as research done by his disciples, approaches Piaget. In trying to study the issue of moral education in 'just communities', they reintroduce the Piagetian concept of cooperation in equality among the members of the group, and they use a collaborator or leader. However, their main interest remains in the description of the characteristics of the stages of individual moral reasoning and valuing of norms and community, and not the study of the process of acceleration towards the autonomous moral phase.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WLUJWFMM/kavathatzopoulos1991.pdf}
}

@article{kemper2018confront,
  ids = {kemper2017confront},
  title = {To {{Confront}} or to {{Avoid}}: {{How Do People Respond}} to {{Violations}} of {{Moral Norms}}?},
  shorttitle = {To {{Confront}} or to {{Avoid}}},
  author = {Kemper, Nathan S. and Newheiser, Anna-Kaisa},
  year = {2018},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {9},
  number = {6},
  pages = {734--743},
  issn = {1948-5506, 1948-5514},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550617722831},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {What do people want to do in response to witnessing someone violate a moral norm? Prior research posits that violations of distinct norms elicit specific emotions, specifically anger and disgust. We examined whether moral violations analogously elicit distinct behavioral responses, focusing on desires to confront and avoid moral violators. Participants read scenarios depicting harmful and impure actions (Study 1) or violations of all six content domains proposed by Moral Foundations Theory (Study 2). Bayesian inference revealed that participants expressed distinctively high levels of desire to avoid (vs. confront) violators of purity norms. Violations of other moral norms did not similarly elicit unique patterns of avoidance or confrontation. Thus, behavioral responses to moral violators depend in part on which norm was violated, with impure acts eliciting a uniquely strong avoidance response. Moral judgment can serve as a precursor to strategic action in the face of perceived immorality.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4AV9FAWQ/kemper2017confront.pdf}
}

@article{killen2011accidental,
  title = {The Accidental Transgressor: {{Morally-relevant}} Theory of Mind},
  shorttitle = {The Accidental Transgressor},
  author = {Killen, Melanie and Mulvey, Kelly Lynn and Richardson, Cameron and Jampol, Noah and Woodward, Amanda},
  year = {2011},
  month = may,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {119},
  number = {2},
  pages = {197--215},
  issn = {0010-0277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006},
  urldate = {2022-05-18},
  abstract = {To test young children's false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N=162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an ``accidental transgressor'' task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N=46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Developmental social cognition,Moral judgments,Social knowledge,Theory of mind},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/S22B5UV2/killen2011accidental.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GD7YB4ML/S0010027711000321.html}
}

@book{killen2014handbook,
  title = {Handbook of Moral Development},
  editor = {Killen, Melanie and Smetana, Judith G.},
  year = {2014},
  edition = {Second Edition},
  publisher = {{Psychology Press}},
  address = {{New York}},
  isbn = {978-1-84872-959-9 978-0-415-81844-5},
  langid = {english},
  lccn = {BF723.M54 H354 2014},
  keywords = {Moral development},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JQGSX9HN/Handbook of Moral Development-2.pdf}
}

@incollection{knobe2018there,
  ids = {grayatlas},
  title = {There {{Is No Important Distinction}} between {{Moral}} and {{Nonmoral Cognition}}},
  booktitle = {Atlas of Moral Psychology},
  author = {Knobe, Joshua},
  editor = {Gray, Kurt and Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2018},
  pages = {556--564},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{kohlberg1971from,
  title = {{{FROM IS TO OUGHT}}: {{How}} to {{Commit}} the {{Naturalistic Fallacy}} and {{Get Away}} with {{It}} in the {{Study}} of {{Moral Development}}},
  shorttitle = {{{FROM IS TO OUGHT}}},
  booktitle = {Cognitive {{Development}} and {{Epistemology}}},
  author = {Kohlberg, Lawrence},
  year = {1971},
  pages = {151--235},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-498640-4.50011-1},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  isbn = {978-0-12-498640-4},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Q6C5GLLG/kohlberg1971from.pdf}
}

@article{kohlberg1976moral,
  title = {Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach},
  author = {Kohlberg, Lawrence},
  year = {1976},
  journal = {Moral development and behavior},
  pages = {171--205},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/TR43NCPA/kohlberg1976moral.pdf}
}

@article{koleva2012tracing,
  ids = {koleva2012tracingb},
  title = {Tracing the Threads: {{How}} Five Moral Concerns (Especially {{Purity}}) Help Explain Culture War Attitudes},
  shorttitle = {Tracing the Threads},
  author = {Koleva, Spassena P. and Graham, Jesse and Iyer, Ravi and Ditto, Peter H. and Haidt, Jonathan},
  year = {2012},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Journal of Research in Personality},
  volume = {46},
  number = {2},
  pages = {184--194},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {00926566},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jrp.2012.01.006},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Commentators have noted that the issue stands taken by each side of the American ``culture war'' lack conceptual consistency and can even seem contradictory. We sought to understand the psychological underpinnings of culture war attitudes using Moral Foundations Theory. In two studies involving 24,739 participants and 20 such issues (e.g. abortion, immigration, same-sex marriage), we found that endorsement of five moral foundations predicted judgments about these issues over and above ideology, age, gender, religious attendance, and interest in politics. Our results suggest that dispositional tendencies, particularly a person's moral intuitions, may underlie, motivate, and unite ideological positions across a variety of issues and offer new insights into the multiple ``moral threads'' connecting disparate political positions.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LRJL6E9F/koleva2012tracingb.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YADGPC9S/koleva2012tracing.pdf}
}

@article{kollareth2022when,
  title = {When Judging Purity Norm Violations, the Perpetrator's Intention Matters},
  author = {Kollareth, Dolichan and Russell, James A.},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {European Journal of Social Psychology},
  volume = {52},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {931--943},
  issn = {1099-0992},
  doi = {10.1002/ejsp.2876},
  urldate = {2023-03-24},
  abstract = {Judgments about the morality of an act that harms another (an autonomy violation) depend on the perpetrator's intention, but judgments about an impure act (a purity violation) have little to do with the perpetrator's intention\textemdash or so it has been theorized. In contrast, our hypothesis, supported here in three studies of American internet users, is that the perpetrator's intention matters greatly in both domains. In two studies (N = 120 in each), the perpetrator's specific intention (benign, pernicious, or unspecified) significantly and substantially influenced moral judgments of impure acts. In a third study (N = 825) of morality judgments, intention weighed at least as much for purity as for autonomy violations: reasoning about perpetrator's intention decided whether both autonomy and purity violations were judged to be moral or immoral. In morality, intention matters.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {autonomy,harm,intention,moral domain,purity},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Y9BLXRKC/ejsp.html}
}

@article{kragel2016decoding,
  title = {Decoding the {{Nature}} of {{Emotion}} in the {{Brain}}},
  author = {Kragel, Philip A. and LaBar, Kevin S.},
  year = {2016},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {20},
  number = {6},
  pages = {444--455},
  issn = {1364-6613},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.011},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {A central, unresolved problem in affective neuroscience is understanding how emotions are represented in nervous system activity. After prior localization approaches largely failed, researchers began applying multivariate statistical tools to reconceptualize how emotion constructs might be embedded in large-scale brain networks. Findings from pattern analyses of neuroimaging data show that affective dimensions and emotion categories are uniquely represented in the activity of distributed neural systems that span cortical and subcortical regions. Results from multiple-category decoding studies are incompatible with theories postulating that specific emotions emerge from the neural coding of valence and arousal. This `new look' into emotion representation promises to improve and reformulate neurobiological models of affect.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {affect,emotion,fMRI,multivariate pattern analysis,neural decoding,valence},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/G4LLR4YU/kragel2016decoding.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/V5J3TUMV/S1364661316300043.html}
}

@book{kuhn1991skills,
  title = {The {{Skills}} of {{Argument}}},
  author = {Kuhn, Deanna},
  year = {1991},
  month = jul,
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  abstract = {The Skills of Argument presents a comprehensive, empirical study of informal reasoning as argument, involving subjects across the life span. Professor Kuhn asked her subjects questions that people have occasion to think and talk about in everyday life, such as "What causes prisoners to return to crime after they are released?" "What causes unemployment?" "What causes children to fail in school?" Subjects were asked to offer their own theories regarding the cause of the phenomenon and then asked to provide supporting evidence for their theories. This is the first major study of how people reason in everyday life, and it highlights the importance of argumentative reasoning in everyday thought. Professor Kuhn's findings address crucial issues in cognitive and developmental psychology, as well as in education, and her work will also appeal to philosophers, political scientists, and linguists interested in argumentative discourse.},
  googlebooks = {q0ra0DxRTNEC},
  isbn = {978-0-521-42349-6},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Psychology / Cognitive Psychology \& Cognition,Psychology / General}
}

@article{kunda1990case,
  title = {The {{Case}} for {{Motivated Reasoning}}},
  author = {Kunda, Ziva},
  year = {1990},
  journal = {Psychological Bulletin},
  volume = {108},
  number = {3},
  pages = {19},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  doi = {10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7TIQS85B/kunda1990case.pdf}
}

@article{kupfer2018why,
  ids = {kupfer2018whyb},
  title = {Why Are Injuries Disgusting? {{Comparing}} Pathogen Avoidance and Empathy Accounts.},
  shorttitle = {Why Are Injuries Disgusting?},
  author = {Kupfer, Tom R.},
  year = {2018},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {18},
  number = {7},
  pages = {959--970},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1931-1516, 1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/emo0000395},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {According to pathogen-avoidance perspectives on disgust, injuries, gore, mutilation, or body-envelope violations elicit disgust because they have infectious potential. Here, an alternative explanation is proposed: People empathically simulate an observed injury, leading to unpleasant vicarious feelings, and for lack of a more accurate word, they describe the feelings as disgust. In Study 1, factor analysis of participants' disgust ratings showed that injury items emerged as a separate factor from pathogen items. A behavioral experiment in Study 2 demonstrated that subjects were less willing to touch dressings that had ostensibly been in contact with infections compared with dressings that had contacted equally disgusting injuries, suggesting that the disgust reported toward injuries is not based on an appraisal of contamination threat. Analysis of participants' subjective feeling descriptions in Study 3 revealed that injury stimuli were predominantly associated with feelings of empathy and vicarious pain, rather than the prototypical disgust feelings associated with infection stimuli. Study 4 showed that the level of disgust reported toward injuries was more strongly predicted by perceived pain and horror than by perceived infectiousness, whereas disgust toward infections was equally well predicted by perceived infectiousness and perceived pain and horror. Together, these findings support the hypothesis that disgust reported toward injuries describes an unpleasant vicarious experience based on empathy, which is not the same emotion as the prototypical disgust elicited by pathogen cues.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/HEWKG3Y8/kupfer2018why.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JLBX45GL/kupfer2018whyb.pdf}
}

@article{kupfer2020reexamining,
  ids = {kupfer2020reexaminingb},
  title = {Reexamining the Role of Intent in Moral Judgements of Purity Violations},
  author = {Kupfer, Tom R. and Inbar, Yoel and Tybur, Joshua M.},
  year = {2020},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {91},
  pages = {104043},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {00221031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104043},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Perceived intent is a pivotal factor in moral judgement: intentional moral violations are considered more morally wrong than accidental ones. However, a body of recent research argues that intent is less important for moral judgements of impure acts \textendash{} that it, those acts that are condemned because they elicit disgust. But the literature supporting this claim is limited in multiple ways. We conducted a new test of the hypothesis that condemnation of purity violations operates independently from intent. In Study 1, participants judged the wrongness of moral violations that were either intentional or unintentional and were either harmful (e.g., stealing) or impure (e.g., public defecation). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness ratings that did not vary across harmful and disgusting scenarios. In Study 2, a registered report, participants judged the wrongness of disgusteliciting moral violations that were either mundane and dyadic (e.g., serving contaminated food) or abnormal and self-directed (e.g., consuming urine). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness judge\- ments that did not vary across mundane and abnormal scenarios. Findings challenge the claim that moral judgements about purity violations rely upon unique psychological mechanisms that are insensitive to in\- formation about the wrongdoer's mental state.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BLJ4JF43/kupfer2020reexamining.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/W52X7ILF/kupfer2020reexaminingb.pdf}
}

@article{laham2009easy,
  title = {Easy on the Mind, Easy on the Wrongdoer: {{Discrepantly}} Fluent Violations Are Deemed Less Morally Wrong},
  shorttitle = {Easy on the Mind, Easy on the Wrongdoer},
  author = {Laham, Simon M. and Alter, Adam L. and Goodwin, Geoffrey P.},
  year = {2009},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {112},
  number = {3},
  pages = {462--466},
  issn = {0010-0277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.001},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The present experiment tested the hypothesis that discrepancies in processing fluency influence the perceived wrongness of moral violations. Participants were presented with numerous moral violations in easy or difficult to read font. For some violations experienced perceptual fluency was consistent with the fluency associated with previous violations, whereas for others it was more fluent or more disfluent. Results show that, across multiple vignettes, participants rated moral violations that were processed with discrepant fluency as less morally wrong than those processed with discrepant disfluency. The current work highlights the importance of metacognitive experiences in moral judgment and contributes to the emerging literature on the role of experiential factors in moral judgment.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Metacognition,Morality,Processing fluency},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SJHEPDLQ/laham2009easy.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PQV64YXN/S0010027709001322.html}
}

@article{landy2015does,
  ids = {landy2014doesa,landy2015doe,landydoes},
  title = {Does {{Incidental Disgust Amplify Moral Judgment}}? {{A Meta-Analytic Review}} of {{Experimental Evidence}}},
  author = {Landy, Justin F. and Goodwin, Geoffrey P.},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  volume = {10},
  number = {4},
  pages = {518--536},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  abstract = {The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the severity of moral condemnation. Numerous researchers have found this effect, but there have also been several published failures to replicate it. Clarifying this issue would inform important theoretical debates among rival accounts of moral judgment. We metaanalyzed all available studies\textemdash published and unpublished\textemdash in which incidental disgust was manipulated prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment task (k = 50). We found evidence for a small amplification effect of disgust (d = 0.11), which is strongest for gustatory/olfactory modes of disgust induction. However, there is also some suggestion of publication bias in this literature, and when this is accounted for, the effect disappears entirely (d = -0.01). Moreover, prevalent confounds mean that the effect size that we estimate is best interpreted as an upper bound on the size of the amplification effect. On the basis of the results of this meta-analysis, we argue against strong claims about the causal role of affect in moral judgment and suggest a need for new, more rigorous research on this topic.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QJ285YZP/landy2014does.pdf}
}

@article{landy2019reevaluating,
  ids = {landmann2018testing,landy2017reevaluatinga,landy2019reevaluatinga},
  title = {Reevaluating {{Moral Disgust}}: {{Sensitivity}} to {{Many Affective States Predicts Extremity}} in {{Many Evaluative Judgments}}},
  shorttitle = {Reevaluating {{Moral Disgust}}},
  author = {Landy, Justin F. and Piazza, Jared},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {10},
  number = {2},
  pages = {211--219},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
  issn = {1948-5506, 1948-5514},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550617736110},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Disgust-sensitive individuals are particularly morally critical. Some theorists take this as evidence that disgust has a uniquely moral form: disgust contributes to moralization even of pathogen-free violations, and disgust's contribution to moralization is unique from other emotional states. We argue that the relationship between disgust sensitivity (DS) and moral judgment is not special in two respects. First, trait sensitivity to many other affective states, beyond disgust, predicts moral evaluations. Second, DS also predicts nonnormative evaluative judgments. Four studies supported these hypotheses, using multiple measures of DS, and judgments of moral violations (Studies 1 and 4), conventional violations (Study 1), imprudent actions (Study 1), competence (Study 2), and aesthetic evaluations (Study 3). Our findings call into question the usefulness of ``moral disgust'' as a psychological construct by showing that the relationship between DS and moral condemnation is one instantiation of a more general association between affect and judgment.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/93AX8XMG/landy2017reevaluating.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/AU437MPU/Landy Supp.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SAXA2IXZ/landmann2017testing.pdf}
}

@article{lazarus1982thoughts,
  title = {Thoughts on the Relations between Emotion and Cognition},
  author = {Lazarus, Richard S.},
  year = {1982},
  journal = {American Psychologist},
  volume = {37},
  number = {9},
  pages = {1019--1024},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1935-990X(Electronic),0003-066X(Print)},
  doi = {10.1037/0003-066X.37.9.1019},
  abstract = {Argues that thought is a necessary condition of emotion. The author therefore opposes the stance taken by R. B. Zajonc (1980), which reflects 2 widespread misunderstandings about what is meant by cognitive processes in emotion: (a) that a cognitive appraisal of the significance of an encounter for one's well-being must occur in fixed stages through the information processing of initially meaningless inputs from the environment and (b) that such an appraisal is necessarily deliberate, rational, and conscious. Some of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic implications of a cognitive theory of emotion are also discussed. It is concluded that rules should be formulated to explain how cognitive processes generate, influence, and shape the emotional response in every species that reacts with emotion. (41 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Cognitive Processes,Emotions},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5PDA6HTQ/lazarus1982thoughts.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/U2KC4GDN/1983-11728-001.html}
}

@article{lazarus1991progress,
  title = {Progress on a {{Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory}} of {{Emotion}}},
  author = {Lazarus, Richard S.},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {American Psychologist},
  volume = {46},
  number = {8},
  pages = {819--834},
  doi = {10.1037/0003-066X.46.8.819},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5BCWRJJF/ContentServer.asp-2.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/K2FWPGNM/lazarus1991progress.pdf}
}

@article{levine1985current,
  title = {The {{Current Formulation}} of {{Kohlberg}}'s {{Theory}} and a {{Response}} to {{Critics}}},
  author = {Levine, Charles and Kohlberg, Lawrence and Hewer, Alexandra},
  year = {1985},
  journal = {Human Development},
  volume = {28},
  number = {2},
  pages = {94--100},
  issn = {1423-0054, 0018-716X},
  doi = {10.1159/000272945},
  urldate = {2022-05-06},
  abstract = {This article is a synopsis of the monograph Moral St and a Response to Critics. Recent changes in the theory of mora ing a broadening of theoretical and research concerns, diff stages, clarification of the form-content distinction, revisio tion of Stages 6 and 7, discussion of moral action, listing of made prior to research, etc. In response to critics of the th primary concern is with justice reasoning per se, and it is argue cultural, or ideological bias to the theory in any strong sense of research include clarifying the conceptions of stage structure a ship between judgment and action, and the psychological a Stage 6.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZF4I3VET/levine1985current.pdf}
}

@article{levy2019examining,
  title = {Examining the Relationship of Vaping to Smoking Initiation among {{US}} Youth and Young Adults: A Reality Check},
  shorttitle = {Examining the Relationship of Vaping to Smoking Initiation among {{US}} Youth and Young Adults},
  author = {Levy, David T. and Warner, Kenneth E. and Cummings, K. Michael and Hammond, David and Kuo, Charlene and Fong, Geoffrey T. and Thrasher, James F. and Goniewicz, Maciej Lukasz and Borland, Ron},
  year = {2019},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Tobacco Control},
  volume = {28},
  number = {6},
  pages = {629--635},
  publisher = {{BMJ Publishing Group Ltd}},
  issn = {0964-4563, 1468-3318},
  doi = {10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054446},
  urldate = {2023-01-10},
  abstract = {Background The 2018 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Report found substantial evidence that electronic cigarette use (vaping) by youth is strongly associated with an increased risk of ever using cigarettes (smoking) and moderately associated with progressing to more established smoking. However, the Report also noted that recent increases in vaping have been associated with declining rates of youth smoking. This paper examines the temporal relationship between vaping and youth smoking using multiple data sets to explore the question of whether vaping promotes smoking initiation in the USA. Methods Using publicly available, nationally representative data on smoking and vaping among youth and young adults, we conducted a trend line analysis of deviations from long-term trends in smoking starting from when vaping became more prevalent. Results There was a substantial increase in youth vaping prevalence beginning in about 2014. Time trend analyses showed that the decline in past 30-day smoking prevalence accelerated by two to four times after 2014. Indicators of more established smoking rates, including the proportion of daily smokers among past 30-day smokers, also decreased more rapidly as vaping became more prevalent. Conclusions The inverse relationship between vaping and smoking was robust across different data sets for both youth and young adults and for current and more established smoking. While trying electronic cigarettes may causally increase smoking among some youth, the aggregate effect at the population level appears to be negligible given the reduction in smoking initiation during the period of vaping's ascendance.},
  chapter = {Research paper},
  copyright = {\textcopyright{} Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.. This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made indicated, and the use is non-commercial. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/.},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {30459182},
  keywords = {electronic nicotine delivery devices,harm reduction,surveillance and monitoring},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/49RPPQF7/levy_2019_examining.pdf}
}

@article{lien2003effects,
  ids = {lien2003effectsa},
  title = {Effects of Ginger on Motion Sickness and Gastric Slow-Wave Dysrhythmias Induced by Circular Vection},
  author = {Lien, Han-Chung and Sun, Wei Ming and Chen, Yen-Hsueh and Kim, Hyerang and Hasler, William and Owyang, Chung},
  year = {2003},
  month = mar,
  journal = {American Journal of Physiology-Gastrointestinal and Liver Physiology},
  volume = {284},
  number = {3},
  pages = {G481-G489},
  issn = {0193-1857, 1522-1547},
  doi = {10.1152/ajpgi.00164.2002},
  urldate = {2021-05-11},
  abstract = {Ginger has long been used as an alternative medication to prevent motion sickness. The mechanism of its action, however, is unknown. We hypothesize that ginger ameliorates the nausea associated with motion sickness by preventing the development of gastric dysrhythmias and the elevation of plasma vasopressin. Thirteen volunteers with a history of motion sickness underwent circular vection, during which nausea (scored 0\textendash 3, i.e., none to severe), electrogastrographic recordings, and plasma vasopressin levels were assessed with or without ginger pretreatment in a crossover-design, double-blind, randomized placebo-controlled study. Circular vection induced a maximal nausea score of 2.5 {$\pm$} 0.2 and increased tachygastric activity and plasma vasopressin. Pretreatment with ginger (1,000 and 2,000 mg) reduced the nausea, tachygastria, and plasma vasopressin. Ginger also prolonged the latency before nausea onset and shortened the recovery time after vection cessation. Intravenous vasopressin infusion at 0.1 and 0.2 U/min induced nausea and increased bradygastric activity; ginger pretreatment (2,000 mg) affected neither. Ginger effectively reduces nausea, tachygastric activity, and vasopressin release induced by circular vection. In this manner, ginger may act as a novel agent in the prevention and treatment of motion sickness.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GSFH3PLD/ajpgi.00164.2002.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/K3PVY84V/lien2003effects.pdf}
}

@article{lindquist2012functional,
  ids = {lindquist2012functionala,lindquist2012functionalb},
  title = {A Functional Architecture of the Human Brain: Emerging Insights from the Science of Emotion},
  shorttitle = {A Functional Architecture of the Human Brain},
  author = {Lindquist, Kristen A. and Barrett, Lisa Feldman},
  year = {2012},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {16},
  number = {11},
  pages = {533--540},
  issn = {13646613},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.005},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/64V9C99B/lindquist2012functional.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/88BIXQ39/1-s2.0-S1364661312002215-main.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FHU3PVWD/1-s2.0-S1364661312002215-main.pdf}
}

@article{lindstrom2018role,
  title = {The Role of a ``Common Is Moral'' Heuristic in the Stability and Change of Moral Norms},
  author = {Lindstr{\"o}m, Bj{\"o}rn and Jangard, Simon and Selbing, Ida and Olsson, Andreas},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
  volume = {147},
  number = {2},
  pages = {228--242},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-2222(Electronic),0096-3445(Print)},
  doi = {10.1037/xge0000365},
  abstract = {Moral norms are fundamental for virtually all social interactions, including cooperation. Moral norms develop and change, but the mechanisms underlying when, and how, such changes occur are not well-described by theories of moral psychology. We tested, and confirmed, the hypothesis that the commonness of an observed behavior consistently influences its moral status, which we refer to as the common is moral (CIM) heuristic. In 9 experiments, we used an experimental model of dynamic social interaction that manipulated the commonness of altruistic and selfish behaviors to examine the change of peoples' moral judgments. We found that both altruistic and selfish behaviors were judged as more moral, and less deserving of punishment, when common than when rare, which could be explained by a classical formal model (social impact theory) of behavioral conformity. Furthermore, judgments of common versus rare behaviors were faster, indicating that they were computationally more efficient. Finally, we used agent-based computer simulations to investigate the endogenous population dynamics predicted to emerge if individuals use the CIM heuristic, and found that the CIM heuristic is sufficient for producing 2 hallmarks of real moral norms; stability and sudden changes. Our results demonstrate that commonness shapes our moral psychology through mechanisms similar to behavioral conformity with wide implications for understanding the stability and change of moral norms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Computational Modeling,Conformity (Personality),Heuristics,Judgment,Morality,Simulation,Social Norms}
}

@article{liuzza2019body,
  ids = {liuzza2019bodya,liuzza2019bodyb},
  title = {Body {{Odor Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Moral Harshness Toward Moral Violations}} of {{Purity}}},
  author = {Liuzza, Marco Tullio and Olofsson, Jonas K. and {Cancino-Montecinos}, Sebastian and Lindholm, Torun},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {10},
  issn = {1664-1078},
  doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00458},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Detecting pathogen threats and avoiding disease is fundamental to human survival. The behavioral immune system (BIS) framework outlines a set of psychological functions that may have evolved for this purpose. Disgust is a core emotion that plays a pivotal role in the BIS, as it activates the behavioral avoidance motives that prevent people from being in contact with pathogens. To date, there has been little agreement on how disgust sensitivity might underlie moral judgments. Here, we investigated moral violations of ``purity'' (assumed to elicit disgust) and violations of ``harm'' (assumed to elicit anger). We hypothesized that individual differences in BIS-related traits would be associated with greater disgust (vs. anger) reactivity to, and greater condemnation of Purity (vs. Harm) violations. The study was pre-registered (https://osf.io/57nm8/). Participants (N = 632) rated scenarios concerning moral wrongness or inappropriateness and regarding disgust and anger. To measure individual differences in the activation of the BIS, we used our recently developed Body Odor Disgust Scale (BODS), a BIS-related trait measure that assesses individual differences in feeling disgusted by body odors. In line with our predictions, we found that scores on the BODS relate more strongly to affective reactions to Purity, as compared to Harm, violations. In addition, BODS relates more strongly to Moral condemnation than to perceived Inappropriateness of an action, and to the condemnation of Purity violations as compared to Harm violations. These results suggest that the BIS is involved in moral judgment, although to some extent this role seems to be specific for violations of ``moral purity,'' a response that might be rooted in disease avoidance. Data and scripts to analyze the data are available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) repository: https://osf.io/tk4x5/. Planned analyses are available at https://osf.io/x6g3u/.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7RAF2UUS/liuzza2019bodyc.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VYH9SHCW/liuzza2019body.pdf}
}

@article{lourenco2014domain,
  ids = {lourenço2014domain},
  title = {Domain Theory: {{A}} Critical Review},
  shorttitle = {Domain Theory},
  author = {Louren{\c c}o, Orlando},
  year = {2014},
  month = jan,
  journal = {New Ideas in Psychology},
  volume = {32},
  pages = {1--17},
  issn = {0732118X},
  doi = {10.1016/j.newideapsych.2013.08.001},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {The domain approach of Turiel and colleagues has emerging as the dominant paradigm in the field of social development, moral development in particular. If it is proven correct, Piaget's and Kohlberg's structural accounts of moral development must be radically modified and possibly even discarded. After an introduction where we set the context for our critical view, this study has three parts. In the first part, we present the main propositions of the domain approach. In the second part, we show that despite of its strengths, the domain approach suffers from several conceptual and methodological flaws. In the third part, we summarize the main ideas of our analysis, suggest avenues for future research, and articulate what can be learned for future research from our critique of the domain approach. Our main conclusion is that the domain approach should be seen more as complementary rather than an alternative to, existing accounts of moral development. Thus, despite some of its insights and power to stimulate empirical research and theoretical debate, the domain approach is not yet an unquestionable and complete alternative to existing accounts of moral development because of its conceptual and methodological flaws.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Development,Kohlberg,Piaget,Social domain theory,Turiel},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6H44YAAP/lourenço2014domain.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/H8RA9MLR/DomainTheory.pdf}
}

@article{maccoun2009citizens,
  title = {Citizens' {{Perceptions}} of {{Ideological Bias}} in {{Research}} on {{Public Policy Controversies}}},
  author = {MacCoun, Robert J. and Paletz, Susannah},
  year = {2009},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Political Psychology},
  volume = {30},
  number = {1},
  pages = {43--65},
  issn = {0162895X, 14679221},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00680.x},
  urldate = {2022-09-23},
  abstract = {How do ordinary citizens react to new policy-relevant findings that they learn about from media mentions or word of mouth? We conducted an experiment embedded in a randomdigit-dial (RDD) telephone survey of 1,050 California adults. Respondents heard a description of a hypothetical study on one of four politicized topics or a politically neutral topic (nutrition) and were asked to describe their reactions to the study's main finding. As in prior research, citizens were more skeptical when the findings contradicted their prior beliefs about the topic. But, we also found effects of partisanship and ideology even after controlling for specific issue attitudes. Citizens, especially those holding conservative beliefs, tended to attribute studies with liberal findings to the liberalism of the researcher, but citizens were less likely to attribute conservative findings to the conservatism of the researcher.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Z8ZE7SLA/maccoun_2009_citizens'.pdf}
}

@book{maccoun2009psychology,
  title = {Toward a Psychology of Harm Reduction},
  author = {MacCoun, Robert J.},
  year = {2009},
  series = {Addictive Behaviors: {{New}} Readings on Etiology, Prevention, and Treatment},
  pages = {158},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{Washington, DC, US}},
  doi = {10.1037/11855-006},
  abstract = {This reprinted article originally appeared in American Psychologist, 1998, Vol 53(11), 1199-1208. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1998-11971-003.) This article discusses 3 different strategies for dealing with the harmful consequences of drug use and other risky behaviors: We can discourage people from engaging in the behavior (prevalence reduction), we can encourage people to reduce the frequency or extent of the behavior (quantity reduction), or we can try to reduce the harmful consequences of the behavior when it occurs (harm reduction). These strategies are not mutually exclusive; this article offers a framework for integrating them. The framework is useful for examining frequent claims that harm reduction "sends the wrong message." Opposition to harm reduction is based in part on a recognition of potential trade-offs among the strategies, but it is also fueled by several more symbolic psychological factors. Strategies for successfully integrating prevalence reduction, quantity reduction, and harm reduction are explored. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)},
  isbn = {978-1-4338-0402-1},
  keywords = {Consequence,Drug Usage,Harm Reduction,Models,Prevention,Risk Taking,Strategies,Substance Use Prevention},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/D823745S/2008-13592-006.html}
}

@article{maccoun2013moral,
  title = {Moral {{Outrage}} and {{Opposition}} to {{Harm Reduction}}},
  author = {MacCoun, Robert J.},
  year = {2013},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {83--98},
  issn = {1871-9791, 1871-9805},
  doi = {10.1007/s11572-012-9154-0},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Three public opinion studies examined public attitudes toward prevalence reduction (PR; reducing the number of people engaging in an activity) and harm reduction (HR; reducing the harm associated with an activity) across a wide variety of domains. Studies 1 and 2 were telephone surveys of California adults' views on PR and HR strategies for a wide range of risk domains (heroin, alcoholism, tobacco, skateboarding, teen sex, illegal immigration, air pollution, and fast food). ``Moral outrage'' items (immoral, disgusting, irresponsible, dangerous) predicted preference for PR over HR, with disgust the most important predictor. In contrast, preferences were not predicted by whether the risk behavior was common, no one else's business, or harmless. Study 3 explored whether there are domains where liberals might reject HR. A sample of liberal students preferred HR [ PR for heroin, but PR [ HR for ritual female circumcision; path analysis suggested that this reversal was explained by moral outrage rather than consequentialist judgments of harm to self and harm to others.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6UDDVH94/MacCoun2013_Article_MoralOutrageAndOppositionToHar.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/IPJFYYPB/maccoun2013morala.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NFY7UVN2/maccoun2013moral.pdf}
}

@book{margolis1987patterns,
  title = {Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: {{A}} Theory of Judgment},
  author = {Margolis, Howard},
  year = {1987},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}}
}

@article{marsman2018introduction,
  title = {An {{Introduction}} to {{Network Psychometrics}}: {{Relating Ising Network Models}} to {{Item Response Theory Models}}},
  shorttitle = {An {{Introduction}} to {{Network Psychometrics}}},
  author = {Marsman, M. and Borsboom, D. and Kruis, J. and Epskamp, S. and {van Bork}, R. and Waldorp, L. J. and van der Maas, H. L. J. and Maris, G.},
  year = {2018},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Multivariate Behavioral Research},
  volume = {53},
  number = {1},
  pages = {15--35},
  issn = {0027-3171, 1532-7906},
  doi = {10.1080/00273171.2017.1379379},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {In recent years, network models have been proposed as an alternative representation of psychometric constructs such as depression. In such models, the covariance between observables (e.g., symptoms like depressed mood, feelings of worthlessness, and guilt) is explained in terms of a pattern of causal interactions between these observables, which contrasts with classical interpretations in which the observables are conceptualized as the effects of a reflective latent variable. However, few investigations have been directed at the question how these different models relate to each other. To shed light on this issue, the current paper explores the relation between one of the most important network models\textemdash the Ising model from physics\textemdash and one of the most important latent variable models\textemdash the Item Response Theory (IRT) model from psychometrics. The Ising model describes the interaction between states of particles that are connected in a network, whereas the IRT model describes the probability distribution associated with item responses in a psychometric test as a function of a latent variable. Despite the divergent backgrounds of the models, we show a broad equivalence between them and also illustrate several opportunities that arise from this connection.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DX8JLCCR/marsman2018introduction.pdf}
}

@article{mata2022deliberate,
  title = {Deliberate Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas: {{Protecting}} Judgment from Conflicting Information},
  shorttitle = {Deliberate Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas},
  author = {Mata, Andr{\'e} and Vaz, Andr{\'e} and Mendon{\c c}a, Bernardo},
  year = {2022},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
  volume = {90},
  pages = {102523},
  issn = {01674870},
  doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2022.102523},
  urldate = {2022-05-12},
  abstract = {People often protect themselves from information that might make their judgments and decisions look questionable; information that they could easily access, but that they choose not to see. This is a deliberate form of ignorance. In two studies, we investigated deliberate ignorance in moral judgment. Participants made judgments about trolley-type sacrificial dilemmas, pertaining to whether it is acceptable to sacrifice one person in order to save more. They were then asked whether they would like to receive additional information about the dilemma, which had the potential to make their previous judgment less defensible (e.g., information about the identity of the sacrificed person, or about the number of people who could benefit from the sacrifice). Finally, regardless of their preference to receive the information or ignore it, they were shown the additional information, and they were again asked to make a judgment. As predicted, some participants chose not to see the missing information. Critically, though, those who chose to ignore the information were just as likely to (significantly) revise their judgments when they saw the new information as those who indicated that they wanted to receive the information. Thus, these participants were deliberately ignorant of information that proved to be consequential.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Deliberate ignorance,Information avoidance,Moral judgment,Motivated reasoning},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NCDERQ3T/mata2022deliberate.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/3EKK7GV8/S016748702200037X.html}
}

@incollection{mcguire1983contextualist,
  title = {A {{Contextualist Theory}} of {{Knowledge}}: {{Its Implications}} for {{Innovation}} and {{Reform}} in {{Psychological Research}}},
  shorttitle = {A {{Contextualist Theory}} of {{Knowledge}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Experimental Social Psychology}}},
  author = {McGuire, William J.},
  editor = {Berkowitz, Leonard},
  year = {1983},
  month = jan,
  volume = {16},
  pages = {1--47},
  publisher = {{Academic Press}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60393-7},
  urldate = {2021-05-29},
  abstract = {This chapter discusses the contextualist epistemology as an appropriate metatheory for psychology. Contextualism's implications for reforming the process and product of psychology are also discussed in the chapter. The two phases of needed process reforms are described in the chapter for creatively generating hypotheses and developing them by the means of empirical confrontation. In the chapter, the psychological product is also discussed by reviewing the various theoretical depictions of the person that have guided and grown out of the research process. These implications are described for the process of developing psychological theory and then as relative to the product\textemdash the theories that emerge from the process. The various internal criteria for judging the relative adequacy of competing theories\textemdash that are sometimes even mutually contradictory\textemdash illustrates a basic descriptive tenet of contextualism. The four types of theories guiding and emerging from the research are (1) categorical theory, (2) process theories, (3) axiomatic theories, and (4) guiding-idea theories. The sixteen partial views of human nature that have served as guiding-idea theories for psychological research are tabulated in the chapter. The content aspect of social psychology or contextualism reveals the need for an ecumenical stance toward theory for recognizing the existence and utility of a wide variety of formulations to generate insights into the contents and determinants of experience and behavior.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CS6HZ82H/S0065260108603937.html}
}

@article{meindl2019distributive,
  title = {Distributive {{Justice Beliefs}} Are {{Guided}} by {{Whether People Think}} the {{Ultimate Goal}} of {{Society}} Is {{Well-Being}} or {{Power}}},
  author = {Meindl, Peter and Iyer, Ravi and Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Basic and Applied Social Psychology},
  volume = {41},
  number = {6},
  pages = {359--385},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  issn = {0197-3533},
  doi = {10.1080/01973533.2019.1663524},
  urldate = {2021-05-26},
  abstract = {Disagreements about how resources should be distributed are often heated, perhaps because people suspect that distributive justice beliefs that clash with their own derive from nefarious motives. In this paper, we consider a less pessimistic explanation for diversity in distributive justice beliefs: such beliefs are influenced by what one considers the primary utility or value of their society in the first place. In five studies (N = 21,515), we demonstrate the existence of two separable types of distributive justice beliefs, one (Equality/need) influenced by a focus on societal well-being, and the other (Equity/merit) by a focus on societal power. These findings lend insight into how growing tensions rooted in resource allocation might be defuzed.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FFYAQA7V/01973533.2019.html}
}

@article{melnikoff2018mythical,
  ids = {melnikoff2018mythicala},
  title = {The {{Mythical Number Two}}},
  author = {Melnikoff, David E. and Bargh, John A.},
  year = {2018},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {22},
  number = {4},
  pages = {280--293},
  issn = {13646613},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2018.02.001},
  urldate = {2021-05-14},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/K643UAJA/Melnikoff & Bargh 2018.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Z3R2R8RB/melnikoff2018mythical.pdf}
}

@article{meyer-rochow2009food,
  title = {Food Taboos: Their Origins and Purposes},
  shorttitle = {Food Taboos},
  author = {{Meyer-Rochow}, Victor Benno},
  year = {2009},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1},
  pages = {18},
  issn = {1746-4269},
  doi = {10.1186/1746-4269-5-18},
  urldate = {2023-03-24},
  abstract = {Food taboos are known from virtually all human societies. Most religions declare certain food items fit and others unfit for human consumption. Dietary rules and regulations may govern particular phases of the human life cycle and may be associated with special events such as menstrual period, pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, and \textendash{} in traditional societies \textendash{} preparation for the hunt, battle, wedding, funeral, etc. On a comparative basis many food taboos seem to make no sense at all, as to what may be declared unfit by one group may be perfectly acceptable to another. On the other hand, food taboos have a long history and one ought to expect a sound explanation for the existence (and persistence) of certain dietary customs in a given culture. Yet, this is a highly debated view and no single theory may explain why people employ special food taboos. This paper wants to revive interest in food taboo research and attempts a functionalist's explanation. However, to illustrate some of the complexity of possible reasons for food taboo five examples have been chosen, namely traditional food taboos in orthodox Jewish and Hindu societies as well as reports on aspects of dietary restrictions in communities with traditional lifestyles of Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and Nigeria. An ecological or medical background is apparent for many, including some that are seen as religious or spiritual in origin. On the one hand food taboos can help utilizing a resource more efficiently; on the other food taboos can lead to the protection of a resource. Food taboos, whether scientifically correct or not, are often meant to protect the human individual and the observation, for example, that certain allergies and depression are associated with each other could have led to declaring food items taboo that were identified as causal agents for the allergies. Moreover, any food taboo, acknowledged by a particular group of people as part of its ways, aids in the cohesion of this group, helps that particular group maintain its identity in the face of others, and therefore creates a feeling of "belonging".},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Eating Meat,Food Item,Food Taboo,Pregnant Woman,Word Taboo},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Z7SVF9RH/meyer-rochow_2009_food.pdf}
}

@techreport{mikhail2007moral,
  type = {{{SSRN Scholarly Paper}}},
  title = {Moral {{Cognition}} and {{Computational Theory}}},
  author = {Mikhail, John},
  year = {2007},
  number = {ID 1029511},
  address = {{Rochester, NY}},
  institution = {{Social Science Research Network}},
  urldate = {2021-05-14},
  abstract = {In his path-breaking work on the foundations of visual perception, the MIT neuroscientist David Marr distinguished three levels at which any information-processing task can be understood and emphasized the first of these: Although algorithms and mechanisms are empirically more accessible, it is the top level, the level of computational theory, which is critically important from an information-processing point of view. The reason for this is that the nature of the computations that underlie perception depends more upon the nature of the computational problems that have to be solved than upon the particular hardware in which their solutions are implemented.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {act tree,battery,Bentham,Chomsky,computational theory,deontic judgment,deontic logic,Greene,Haidt,Marr,moral cognition,moral grammar,trolley problem},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ADIE7MEF/mikhail2007moral.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/J8SSTDD5/papers.html}
}

@article{miller1992culture,
  title = {Culture and {{Moral Judgment}}: {{How Are Conflicts Between Justice}} and {{Interpersonal Responsibilities Resolved}}?},
  author = {Miller, Joan G. and Bersoff, David M.},
  year = {1992},
  journal = {Attitudes and Social Cognition},
  volume = {62},
  pages = {541--554},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.62.4.541},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/3XUIYZ3P/millder1992culture.pdf}
}

@article{miller2014bad,
  ids = {millerbad},
  title = {Bad Actions or Bad Outcomes? {{Differentiating}} Affective Contributions to the Moral Condemnation of Harm},
  shorttitle = {Bad Actions or Bad Outcomes?},
  author = {Miller, Ryan M. and Hannikainen, Ivar A. and Cushman, Fiery A.},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {14},
  number = {3},
  pages = {573--587},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1931-1516},
  doi = {10.1037/a0035361},
  abstract = {Moral condemnation of harmful behavior is influenced by both cognitive and affective processes. However, despite much recent research, the proximate source of affect remains unclear. One obvious contender is empathy; simulating the victim's pain could lead one to judge an action as wrong (``outcome aversion''). An alternative, less obvious source is one's own aversion to performing the action itself (``action aversion''). To dissociate these alternatives, we developed a scale that assessed individual aversions to (a) witnessing others experience painful outcomes (e.g., seeing someone fall down stairs); and (b) performing actions that are harmless yet aversive (e.g., stabbing a fellow actor with a fake stage knife). Across 4 experiments, we found that moral condemnation of both first-person and third-party harmful behavior in the context of moral dilemmas is better predicted by one's aversion to action properties than by an affective response to victim suffering. In a fifth experiment, we manipulated both action aversion and the degree of expected suffering across a number of actions and found that both factors make large, independent contributions to moral judgment. Together, these results suggest we may judge others' actions by imagining what it would feel like to perform the action rather than experience the consequences of the action. Accordingly, they provide a counterpoint to a dominant but largely untested assumption that empathy is the key affective response governing moral judgments of harm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,Aversion,Emotions,Empathy,Morality},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4I4VGJAT/miller2014bad.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GCQ2BV28/2014-04654-001.html}
}

@article{molho2017disgust,
  ids = {molho2017disgusta},
  title = {Disgust and {{Anger Relate}} to {{Different Aggressive Responses}} to {{Moral Violations}}},
  author = {Molho, Catherine and Tybur, Joshua M. and G{\"u}ler, Ezgi and Balliet, Daniel and Hofmann, Wilhelm},
  year = {2017},
  month = may,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {609--619},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0956-7976, 1467-9280},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797617692000},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {In response to the same moral violation, some people report experiencing anger, and others report feeling disgust. Do differences in emotional responses to moral violations reflect idiosyncratic differences in the communication of outrage, or do they reflect differences in motivational states? Whereas equivalence accounts suggest that anger and disgust are interchangeable expressions of condemnation, sociofunctional accounts suggest that they have distinct antecedents and consequences. We tested these accounts by investigating whether anger and disgust vary depending on the costs imposed by moral violations and whether they differentially correspond with aggressive tendencies. Results across four studies favor a sociofunctional account: When the target of a moral violation shifts from the self to another person, anger decreases, but disgust increases. Whereas anger is associated with high-cost, direct aggression, disgust is associated with less costly indirect aggression. Finally, whether the target of a moral violation is the self or another person influences direct aggression partially via anger and influences indirect aggression partially via disgust.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LU23EGKW/molho2017disgust.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/RGA2R6YT/molho2017disgust.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZEU9XZ6B/molho2017disgustb.pdf}
}

@article{monroe2019people,
  title = {People Systematically Update Moral Judgments of Blame},
  author = {Monroe, Andrew E. and Malle, Bertram F.},
  year = {2019},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {116},
  number = {2},
  pages = {215--236},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  issn = {0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/pspa0000137},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other's behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for 'warrant'\textemdash evidence that one's moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and evenhanded in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test 2 sets of predictions derived from the socially regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1\textendash 4 demonstrate (across student, Internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations. Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions. Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load. Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed\textemdash as in the case of judging outgroup members. We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Adult,blame,Blame,Female,Humans,Intention,intentionality,Judgment,Male,mental states,moral judgment,Morality,Morals,Motivation,motivational bias,Predictability (Measurement),Prediction,Response Bias,Test Construction,Young Adult},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5HQREDJ4/monroe2019people.pdf}
}

@article{moons2007thinking,
  ids = {moons2007thinkinga,moons2007thinkingb},
  title = {Thinking {{Straight While Seeing Red}}: {{The Influence}} of {{Anger}} on {{Information Processing}}},
  shorttitle = {Thinking {{Straight While Seeing Red}}},
  author = {Moons, Wesley G. and Mackie, Diane M.},
  year = {2007},
  month = may,
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  volume = {33},
  number = {5},
  pages = {706--720},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0146-1672},
  doi = {10.1177/0146167206298566},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Because angry people apparently rely on heuristic cues when making judgments, anger has been claimed to trigger superficial, nonanalytic information processing. In three studies, the authors found that induced anger promoted analytic processing. Experiment 1 showed that angry participants were more likely to discriminate between weak and strong arguments than participants in neutral moods. Experiment 2 demonstrated that anger overrode dispositional preferences not to process, causing even those low in need for cognition to process analytically. Experiment 3 reconciled these findings with previous work by showing that angry people used accessible, valid, and relevant heuristics but otherwise processed analytically, as indicated by attitude change and elaboration data. Together, these experiments showed that angry people can have both the capacity and motivation to process and that their selective use of heuristics reflects the cue's perceived validity and not the failure to process analytically.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {anger,attitude change,emotion,information processing,mood},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JUMIU5F9/0146167206298566.pdf}
}

@article{moreno1938statistics,
  title = {Statistics of {{Social Configurations}}},
  author = {Moreno, J. L. and Jennings, H. H.},
  year = {1938},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Sociometry},
  volume = {1},
  number = {3/4},
  eprint = {2785588},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {342},
  issn = {00380431},
  doi = {10.2307/2785588},
  urldate = {2022-09-22},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/K2ZW6VGA/Moreno and Jennings - 1938 - Statistics of Social Configurations.pdf}
}

@article{nadarevic2020easy,
  title = {Easy on the Mind, Easy on the Wrongdoer? {{No}} Evidence for Perceptual Fluency Effects on Moral Wrongness Ratings},
  shorttitle = {Easy on the Mind, Easy on the Wrongdoer?},
  author = {Nadarevic, Lena and Kroneisen, Meike},
  year = {2020},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {196},
  pages = {104156},
  issn = {0010-0277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104156},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Processing fluency\textemdash the subjective ease of information processing\textemdash influences a variety of judgments (e.g., judgments of familiarity, liking, and truth). A study by Laham, Alter, and Goodwin (2009) suggests that this is also true for moral judgments. More specifically, the authors found that discrepant perceptual fluency mitigates moral wrongness ratings. In five studies (total N\,=\,694), we tested the replicability of this finding for different kinds of scenarios (moral versus conventional transgressions) and different perceptual fluency manipulations. In Studies 1a and 1b we manipulated fluency by text background, in Studies 2a and 2b by font type, and in Study 3 by word spaces. Critically, none of the studies replicated Laham et al.'s discrepant fluency effect on moral wrongness ratings. In turn, we found that moral wrongness ratings were strongly affected by participants' emotional responses to the scenarios. Taken together, the findings of our five studies cast very strong doubt on perceptual fluency effects on moral judgments.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Moral judgment,Moral transgression,Negative emotions,Perceptual fluency},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/42BBRVP5/nadarevic2020easy.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/N7ZNXQ4M/S0010027719303300.html}
}

@article{napier2013moral,
  ids = {napier2013morala},
  title = {Moral {{Mind-Sets}}: {{Abstract Thinking Increases}} a {{Preference}} for ``{{Individualizing}}'' {{Over}} ``{{Binding}}'' {{Moral Foundations}}},
  shorttitle = {Moral {{Mind-Sets}}},
  author = {Napier, Jaime L. and Luguri, Jamie B.},
  year = {2013},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {4},
  number = {6},
  pages = {754--759},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1948-5506, 1948-5514},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550612473783},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Moral foundations theory contends that people's morality goes beyond concerns about justice and welfare, and asserts that humans have five innate foundations of morality: harm and fairness (individualizing foundations) and in-group loyalty, deference to authority, and purity (binding foundations). The current research investigates whether people's moral judgments are consistently informed by these five values, or whether individualizing and binding foundations might be differentially endorsed depending on individuals' mind-sets. Results from our study demonstrated that when participants were experimentally manipulated to think abstractly (vs. concretely), which presumably makes their higher level core values salient, they increased in their valuations of the individualizing foundations and decreased in their valuations of the binding foundations. This effect was not moderated by political ideology. Implications and areas for future directions are discussed.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {construal level,mind-set,moral foundations,morality},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GAUUCHUY/napier2013moral.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XSHAJHV5/napier2013moral.pdf}
}

@article{nisan1987moral,
  title = {Moral {{Norms}} and {{Social Conventions}}: {{A Cross-Cultural Comparison}}},
  author = {Nisan, Mordecai},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {Developmental Psychology},
  volume = {23},
  number = {5},
  pages = {719--725},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.23.5.719},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/L7JSMYCP/ContentServer.asp-2 copy.pdf}
}

@article{nisbett1977telling,
  title = {Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.},
  author = {Nisbett, Richard E and Wilson, Timothy D},
  year = {1977},
  journal = {Psychological review},
  volume = {84},
  number = {3},
  pages = {231},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}}
}

@article{nucci1978social,
  title = {Social Interactions and the Development of Social Concepts in Preschool Children},
  author = {Nucci, Larry P. and Turiel, Elliot},
  year = {1978},
  journal = {Child Development},
  volume = {49},
  number = {2},
  pages = {400--407},
  publisher = {{[Wiley, Society for Research in Child Development]}},
  issn = {00093920, 14678624},
  abstract = {Observations were made in 10 preschools of interactions in 2 domains of social events: social conventional and moral. On the basis of criteria defining each domain, observed events could be reliably classified as social conventional or moral. As another aspect of the study, an interview was administered to children from the preschool who had witnessed the same events as the observer. The children's view of the events as social conventional or moral was in agreement with our classifications of the events in 83\% of the cases. It was hypothesized that the responses of both children and adults to social conventional events differ from their responses to moral events. Observed behaviors were rated on a standard checklist of response categories. Different types of responses were elicited by the 2 types of events. Almost all responses to social conventional transgressions were initiated by adults. Children and adults responded with equal frequency to moral transgressions. Adults responded to social conventional transgressions differently from the ways they reacted to moral transgressions.},
  jstor = {1128704},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/AP6XCFLT/nucci1978social.pdf}
}

@article{oaten2018moral,
  title = {Moral {{Violations}} and the {{Experience}} of {{Disgust}} and {{Anger}}},
  author = {Oaten, Megan and Stevenson, Richard J. and Williams, Mark A. and Rich, Anina N. and Butko, Marina and Case, Trevor I.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience},
  volume = {12},
  issn = {1662-5153},
  doi = {10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00179},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Disgust is a natural defensive emotion that has evolved to protect against potential sources of contamination and has been recently linked to moral judgements in many studies. However, that people often report feelings of disgust when thinking about feces or moral transgressions alike does not necessarily mean that the same mechanisms mediate these reactions. The present study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (n = 22) to investigate whether core and moral disgusts entrain common neural systems. We provide evidence that: (i) activation of overlapping brain regions between core and moral disgust is the result of content overlap in the vignettes\textemdash core disgust elicitors\textemdash across conditions, and not from moral violations per se, and (ii) moral residue (i.e., the remaining or ``residual'' activation after the influence of core disgust elicitors have been taken into account) produced a pattern of activation that is more consistent with moral anger, than one of ``residual disgust.'' These findings run contrary to the premise that our ``moral center'' is connected to the area of the brain in which physical revulsion is located.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DCVHCB4U/oaten2018moral.pdf}
}

@techreport{olthof2020complexity,
  type = {Preprint},
  title = {Complexity {{Theory}} of {{Psychopathology}}},
  author = {Olthof, Merlijn and Hasselman, Fred and Oude Maatman, Freek Johannes Wilhelmus and Bosman, Anna Maria Theodora and {Lichtwarck-Aschoff}, Anna},
  year = {2020},
  institution = {{PsyArXiv}},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/f68ej},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {There is a renewed interest for complex adaptive system approaches that can account for the inherently complex and dynamic nature of psychopathology. Yet, a theory of psychopathology grounded in the principles of complex adaptive systems is lacking. Here, we present such a theory based on in the notion of adaptive dynamic patterns. We postulate that all observable phenomena of the body and mind are dynamic patterns that emerge from an open complex adaptive system constituted by interdependent biopsychosocial processes located in the individual and its environment, which operate on multiple timescales. Psychopathology is a self-organizing emergent property of a system, meaning that psychopathology arises solely from the interdependencies in the system and is not prescribed by an internal or external `blueprint'. While dynamic patterns of psychopathology are highly idiographic in content due to continuous individual-environment transactions, we claim that their change over time can be described by general principles of pattern formation in complex adaptive systems. Our theory thus integrates idiographic and nomothetic science. A discussion of implications for classification, intervention and public health concludes the paper.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7XSV8I2T/olthof2020complexity.pdf}
}

@article{opensciencecollaboration2015estimating,
  title = {Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science},
  author = {{Open Science Collaboration}},
  year = {2015},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Science},
  volume = {349},
  number = {6251},
  pages = {aac4716},
  issn = {0036-8075, 1095-9203},
  doi = {10.1126/science.aac4716},
  urldate = {2022-09-15},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WRP89IML/open science collaboration_2015_estimating.pdf}
}

@article{orben2020crud,
  title = {Crud ({{Re}}){{Defined}}},
  author = {Orben, Amy and Lakens, Dani{\"e}l},
  year = {2020},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {238--247},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {2515-2459},
  doi = {10.1177/2515245920917961},
  urldate = {2023-03-21},
  abstract = {The idea that in behavioral research everything correlates with everything else was a niche area of the scientific literature for more than half a century. With the increasing availability of large data sets in psychology, the ?crud? factor has, however, become more relevant than ever before. When referenced in empirical work, it is often used by researchers to discount minute?but statistically significant?effects that are deemed too small to be considered meaningful. This review tracks the history of the crud factor and examines how its use in the psychological- and behavioral-science literature has developed to this day. We highlight a common and deep-seated lack of understanding about what the crud factor is and discuss whether it can be proven to exist or estimated and how it should be interpreted. This lack of understanding makes the crud factor a convenient tool for psychologists to use to disregard unwanted results, even though the presence of a crud factor should be a large inconvenience for the discipline. To inspire a concerted effort to take the crud factor more seriously, we clarify the definitions of important concepts, highlight current pitfalls, and pose questions that need to be addressed to ultimately improve understanding of the crud factor. Such work will be necessary to develop the crud factor into a useful concept encouraging improved psychological research.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YGKCX5HQ/orben_2020_crud.pdf}
}

@article{pacheco2011trends,
  title = {Trends\textemdash{{Public Opinion}} on {{Smoking}} and {{Anti-Smoking Policies}}},
  author = {Pacheco, Julianna},
  year = {2011},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
  volume = {75},
  number = {3},
  pages = {576--592},
  issn = {0033-362X},
  doi = {10.1093/poq/nfr031},
  urldate = {2023-01-09},
  abstract = {This article traces public opinion toward tobacco use and anti-smoking legislation over time. Public views on the health effects of tobacco use have changed such that now a majority of individuals believe that smoking and secondhand smoke are harmful. While the public tends to blame the smoker for health problems, there is strong support for restrictions on tobacco advertising, although support is lower in tobacco-producing states. Generally, the public has become more supportive of smoking restrictions in various public domains, although there are important differences across states depending on tobacco production. Evidence suggests that trends in opinion toward tobacco use and anti-smoking legislation have coincided with the decline in smoking prevalence and the increase in anti-smoking policies and public health awareness reports at the federal, state, and local levels.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2E4YVAUP/pacheco_2011_trends—pub.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XLL7Z2EA/1837107.html}
}

@incollection{page-gould2022intergroup,
  title = {The Intergroup Perspective on Cross-Group Friendship},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Experimental Social Psychology}}},
  author = {{Page-Gould}, Elizabeth and Harris, Kelci and MacInnis, Cara C. and Danyluck, Chad M. and Miller, Ian D.},
  editor = {Gawronski, Bertram},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  edition = {First},
  volume = {65},
  pages = {1--56},
  publisher = {{Academic Press}},
  googlebooks = {zZxBEAAAQBAJ},
  isbn = {978-0-323-99079-0},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Psychology / Experimental Psychology,Psychology / General,Psychology / Social Psychology}
}

@article{paluck2009reducing,
  ids = {paluck2009reducinga},
  title = {Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: {{A}} Field Experiment in {{Rwanda}}.},
  shorttitle = {Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media},
  author = {Paluck, Elizabeth Levy},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {96},
  number = {3},
  pages = {574--587},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0011989},
  urldate = {2021-05-12},
  abstract = {Can the media reduce intergroup prejudice and conflict? Despite the high stakes of this question, understanding of the mass media's role in shaping prejudiced beliefs, norms, and behavior is limited. A yearlong field experiment in Rwanda tested the impact of a radio soap opera featuring messages about reducing intergroup prejudice, violence, and trauma in 2 fictional Rwandan communities. Compared with a control group who listened to a health radio soap opera, listeners' perceptions of social norms and their behaviors changed with respect to intermarriage, open dissent, trust, empathy, cooperation, and trauma healing. However, the radio program did little to change listeners' personal beliefs. Group discussion and emotion were implicated in the process of media influence. Taken together, the results point to an integrated model of behavioral prejudice and conflict reduction that prioritizes the communication of social norms over changes in personal beliefs.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Conflict,Mass Media,Observation Methods,Prejudice,Radio,Social Norms},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VHAPHHYR/paluck2009reducing.pdf}
}

@article{parkinson2017judgments,
  ids = {parkinson2017judgment,parkinson2017judgmentsb},
  title = {Judgments of {{Moral Responsibility}} and {{Wrongness}} for {{Intentional}} and {{Accidental Harm}} and {{Purity Violations}}},
  author = {Parkinson, Mary and Byrne, Ruth M. J.},
  year = {2017},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology},
  pages = {17470218.2016.1},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
  issn = {1747-0218, 1747-0226},
  doi = {10.1080/17470218.2016.1276942},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Two experiments examine whether people reason differently about intentional and accidental violations in the moral domains of harm and purity, by examining moral responsibility and wrongness judgments for violations that affect others or the self. The first experiment shows that intentional violations are judged to be worse than accidental ones, regardless of whether they are harm or purity violations\textemdash for example, Sam poisons his colleague versus Sam eats his dog, when participants judge how morally responsible was Sam for what he did, or how morally wrong was what Sam did. The second experiment shows that violations of others are judged to be worse than violations of the self, regardless of whether they are harm or purity violations, when their content and context is matched\textemdash for example, on a tropical holiday Sam orders poisonous starfruit for dinner for his friend, or for himself, versus on a tropical holiday Sam orders dog meat for dinner for his friend, or for himself. Moral reasoning is influenced by whether the violation was intentional or accidental, and whether its target was the self or another person, rather than by the moral domain, such as harm or purity.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6VVMJ9VJ/parkinson2017judgments.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9XYL78XK/parkinson2017judgmentsb.pdf}
}

@article{patel2012functional,
  title = {Functional Brain Changes Following Cognitive and Motor Skills Training: A Quantitative Meta-Analysis.},
  shorttitle = {Functional Brain Changes Following Cognitive and Motor Skills Training},
  author = {R, Patel and Rn, Spreng and Gr, Turner},
  year = {2012},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair},
  volume = {27},
  number = {3},
  pages = {187--199},
  issn = {1545-9683, 1552-6844},
  doi = {10.1177/1545968312461718},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Europe PMC is an archive of life sciences journal literature., Functional brain changes following cognitive and motor skills training: a quantitative meta-analysis.},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {23093519},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NRD65VLZ/23093519.html}
}

@article{paxton2010moral,
  title = {Moral {{Reasoning}}: {{Hints}} and {{Allegations}}},
  shorttitle = {Moral {{Reasoning}}},
  author = {Paxton, Joseph M. and Greene, Joshua D.},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science},
  volume = {2},
  number = {3},
  pages = {511--527},
  issn = {17568757},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01096.x},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic tendencies toward bias that would otherwise dominate behavior. We argue that little is known about the psychology of moral reasoning and that it may yet prove to be a potent social force.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2HEPR6SK/paxton2010moral.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YWI4SD2N/j.1756-8765.2010.01096.x.pdf}
}

@article{paxton2012reflection,
  title = {Reflection and {{Reasoning}} in {{Moral Judgment}}},
  author = {Paxton, Joseph M. and Ungar, Leo and Greene, Joshua D.},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Cognitive Science},
  volume = {36},
  number = {1},
  pages = {163--177},
  issn = {03640213},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01210.x},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/24VGWXBC/j.1551-6709.2011.01210.x.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/3U97VVTG/paxton2012reflection.pdf}
}

@article{peirce2007psychopy,
  title = {{{PsychoPy}}\textemdash{{Psychophysics}} Software in Python},
  author = {Peirce, Jonathan W.},
  year = {2007},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Neuroscience Methods},
  volume = {162},
  number = {1-2},
  pages = {8--13},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jneumeth.2006.11.017}
}

@article{pennycook2014role,
  ids = {pennycook2013role,pennycook2014rolea,pennycook2014roleb},
  title = {The Role of Analytic Thinking in Moral Judgements and Values},
  author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Cheyne, James Allan and Barr, Nathaniel and Koehler, Derek J. and Fugelsang, Jonathan A.},
  year = {2014},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Thinking \& Reasoning},
  volume = {20},
  number = {2},
  pages = {188--214},
  publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  issn = {1354-6783, 1464-0708},
  doi = {10.1080/13546783.2013.865000},
  urldate = {2022-05-13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Cognitive ability,Cognitive style,Dual-process theories.,Moral judgements,Moral values,Religiosity},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/38P722R9/pennycook2013rolea.pdf}
}

@article{pennycook2018mythical,
  ids = {pennycook2018mythicala},
  title = {The {{Mythical Dual-Process Typology}}},
  author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Neys, Wim De and Evans, Jonathan St. B.T. and Stanovich, Keith E. and Thompson, Valerie A.},
  year = {2018},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {22},
  number = {8},
  pages = {667--668},
  issn = {13646613},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2018.04.008},
  urldate = {2021-05-14},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/G3V9P6LW/The-Mythical-Dual-Process-Typology_2018_Trends-in-Cognitive-Sciences.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/U9ZTU2RY/pennycook2018mythical.pdf}
}

@article{pennycook2019lazy,
  title = {Lazy, Not Biased: {{Susceptibility}} to Partisan Fake News Is Better Explained by Lack of Reasoning than by Motivated Reasoning},
  shorttitle = {Lazy, Not Biased},
  author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Rand, David G.},
  year = {2019},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {188},
  pages = {39--50},
  issn = {00100277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Why do people believe blatantly inaccurate news headlines (``fake news'')? Do we use our reasoning abilities to convince ourselves that statements that align with our ideology are true, or does reasoning allow us to effectively differentiate fake from real regardless of political ideology? Here we test these competing accounts in two studies (total N = 3446 Mechanical Turk workers) by using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as a measure of the propensity to engage in analytical reasoning. We find that CRT performance is negatively correlated with the perceived accuracy of fake news, and positively correlated with the ability to discern fake news from real news \textendash even for headlines that align with individuals' political ideology. Moreover, overall discernment was actually better for ideologically aligned headlines than for misaligned headlines. Finally, a headline-level analysis finds that CRT is negatively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively implausible (primarily fake) headlines, and positively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively plausible (primarily real) headlines. In contrast, the correlation between CRT and perceived accuracy is unrelated to how closely the headline aligns with the participant's ideology. Thus, we conclude that analytic thinking is used to assess the plausibility of headlines, regardless of whether the stories are consistent or inconsistent with one's political ideology. Our findings therefore suggest that susceptibility to fake news is driven more by lazy thinking than it is by partisan bias per se \textendash{} a finding that opens potential avenues for fighting fake news.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/U4ZBYAFT/pennycook2018lazy.pdf}
}

@article{pennycook2021psychology,
  title = {The {{Psychology}} of {{Fake News}}},
  author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Rand, David G.},
  year = {2021},
  month = may,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {25},
  number = {5},
  pages = {388--402},
  issn = {1364-6613},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007},
  urldate = {2023-03-22},
  abstract = {We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share false or highly misleading news online. Contrary to a common narrative whereby politics drives susceptibility to fake news, people are `better' at discerning truth from falsehood (despite greater overall belief) when evaluating politically concordant news. Instead, poor truth discernment is associated with lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge, and the use of heuristics such as familiarity. Furthermore, there is a substantial disconnect between what people believe and what they share on social media. This dissociation is largely driven by inattention, more so than by purposeful sharing of misinformation. Thus, interventions can successfully nudge social media users to focus more on accuracy. Crowdsourced veracity ratings can also be leveraged to improve social media ranking algorithms.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {attention,crowdsourcing,dual process theory,fake news,information sharing,misinformation,motivated reasoning,news media,social media},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4M7L55L4/pennycook_2021_the.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BAEL4NTI/S1364661321000516.html}
}

@article{perkins1991everyday,
  title = {Everyday Reasoning and the Roots of Intelligence.},
  author = {Perkins, D. N. and Farady, Michael and Bushey, Barbara},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {Informal reasoning and education.},
  pages = {83--105},
  publisher = {{Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc}},
  address = {{Hillsdale,  NJ,  US}},
  issn = {0-8058-0208-8 (Hardcover); 0-8058-0209-6 (Paperback)},
  abstract = {addresses everyday reasoning and the aspects of intelligence that contribute most to its good practice  is everyday reasoning generally sound / does undermotivation account for faulty situation modeling / does lack of knowledge account four faulty situation modeling / do variations in general intelligence affect situation modeling / does know-how about reasoning improve situation modeling / why people reason as they do: a makes-sense epistemology / how people could reason better: a critical epistemology  the roots of intelligence / prior knowledge / interest / IQ [intelligence quotient] / metacognitive know-how (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {*Intelligence,*Reasoning,Intelligence Quotient,Knowledge Level,Metacognition,Schema}
}

@article{pessoa2017network,
  title = {A {{Network Model}} of the {{Emotional Brain}}},
  author = {Pessoa, Luiz},
  year = {2017},
  month = may,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {21},
  number = {5},
  pages = {357--371},
  issn = {1364-6613},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2017.03.002},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {Emotion is often understood in terms of a circumscribed set of cortical and subcortical brain regions. I propose, instead, that emotion should be understood in terms of large-scale network interactions spanning the entire neuroaxis. I describe multiple anatomical and functional principles of brain organization that lead to the concept of `functionally integrated systems', cortical\textendash subcortical systems that anchor the organization of emotion in the brain. The proposal is illustrated by describing the cortex\textendash amygdala integrated system and how it intersects with systems involving the ventral striatum/accumbens, septum, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and brainstem. The important role of the thalamus is also highlighted. Overall, the model clarifies why the impact of emotion is wide-ranging, and how emotion is interlocked with perception, cognition, motivation, and action.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {amygdala,brain,brainstem,emotion,networks,thalamus},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WFHFPD5J/pessoa2017network.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/D6YIKPNR/S1364661317300360.html}
}

@book{petty2014attitude,
  title = {Attitude {{Strength}}: {{Antecedents}} and {{Consequences}}},
  shorttitle = {Attitude {{Strength}}},
  author = {Petty, Richard E. and Krosnick, Jon A.},
  year = {2014},
  month = jan,
  publisher = {{Psychology Press}},
  abstract = {Social psychologists have long recognized the possibility that attitudes might differ from one another in terms of their strength, but only recently had the profound implications of this view been explored. Yet because investigators in the area were pursuing interesting but independent programs of research exploring different aspects of strength, there was little articulation of assumptions underlying the work, and little effort to establish a common research agenda. The goals of this book are to highlight these assumptions, to review the discoveries this work has produced, and to suggest directions for future work in the area.  The chapter authors include individuals who have made significant contributions to the published literature and represent a diversity of perspectives on the topic. In addition to providing an overview of the broad area of attitude strength, particular chapters deal in depth with specific features of attitudes related to strength and integrate the diverse bodies of relevant theory and empirical evidence. The book will be of interest to graduate students initiating work on attitudes as well as to longstanding scholars in the field. Because of the many potential directions for application of work on attitude strength to amelioration of social problems, the book will be valuable to scholars in various applied disciplines such as political science, marketing, sociology, public opinion, and others studying attitudinal phenomena.},
  googlebooks = {taWYAgAAQBAJ},
  isbn = {978-1-317-78236-0},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Psychology / General,Psychology / Social Psychology}
}

@book{piaget1932moral,
  title = {The Moral Judgment of the Child.},
  author = {Piaget, J.},
  year = {1932},
  publisher = {{Harcourt, Brace}}
}

@misc{R-papaja,
  title = {Papaja: {{Create APA}} Manuscripts with r Markdown},
  author = {Aust, Frederik and Barth, Marius},
  year = {2022}
}

@misc{R2022langauge,
  title = {R: {{A}} Language and Environment for Statistical Computing},
  author = {{R Core Team}},
  year = {2022},
  address = {{Vienna, Austria}},
  organization = {{R Foundation for Statistical Computing}}
}

@article{rai2011moral,
  title = {Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation: Moral Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality.},
  author = {Rai, Tage Shakti and Fiske, Alan Page},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Psychological review},
  volume = {118},
  number = {1},
  pages = {57},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XNB5GEGL/rai2011moral.pdf}
}

@article{rai2017dehumanization,
  ids = {rai2017dehumanizationa},
  title = {Dehumanization Increases Instrumental Violence, but Not Moral Violence},
  author = {Rai, Tage Shakti and Valdesolo, Piercarlo and Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {114},
  number = {32},
  pages = {8511--8516},
  issn = {0027-8424, 1091-6490},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.1705238114},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FAZYGNX7/8511.full.pdf}
}

@article{rhee2019what,
  ids = {rhee2019whata},
  title = {The What, How, and Why of Moralization: {{A}} Review of Current Definitions, Methods, and Evidence in Moralization Research},
  shorttitle = {The What, How, and Why of Moralization},
  author = {Rhee, Joshua J. and Schein, Chelsea and Bastian, Brock},
  year = {2019},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Social and Personality Psychology Compass},
  volume = {13},
  number = {12},
  eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/spc3.12511},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  issn = {1751-9004, 1751-9004},
  doi = {10.1111/spc3.12511},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Moralization has major social and political implications. Although there is a depth of research on the nature and implications of moral attitudes and moral convictions, there has been less of a focus on the psychological processes by which actions, attitudes, or entities become moralized, or move from lesser to greater moral significance, and the research that does exist is highly fragmented. In the present paper, we provide a two-factor structure for understanding the current state of research on moralization, categorizing extant moralization research by (1) whether it examines judgments of actions, attitudes, or entities and (2) whether it captures moral recognition (the shift from neutral to moral), or moral amplification. Using this framework, we then consider the various routes through which moralization may occur, discuss emerging research on the influence that social norms can have on this process, and address future areas of research. Overall, we hope to provide some initial steps toward developing a more integrated framework for understanding moralization.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KWCJZLKP/rhee2019what.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZNW4NPBN/rhee2019whatb.pdf}
}

@article{robinaugh2016identifying,
  title = {Identifying {{Highly Influential Nodes}} in the {{Complicated Grief Network}}},
  author = {Robinaugh, Donald J. and Millner, Alexander J. and McNally, Richard J.},
  year = {2016},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Journal of abnormal psychology},
  volume = {125},
  number = {6},
  pages = {747--757},
  issn = {0021-843X},
  doi = {10.1037/abn0000181},
  urldate = {2022-09-28},
  abstract = {The network approach to psychopathology conceptualizes mental disorders as networks of mutually reinforcing nodes (i.e., symptoms). Researchers adopting this approach have suggested that network topology can be used to identify influential nodes, with nodes central to the network having the greatest influence on the development and maintenance of the disorder. However, because commonly used centrality indices do not distinguish between positive and negative edges, they may not adequately assess the nature and strength of a node's influence within the network. To address this limitation, we developed two indices of a node's expected influence (EI) that account for the presence of negative edges. To evaluate centrality and EI indices, we simulated single-node interventions on randomly generated networks. In networks with exclusively positive edges, centrality and EI were both strongly associated with observed node influence. In networks with negative edges, EI was more strongly associated with observed influence than was centrality. We then used data from a longitudinal study of bereavement to examine the association between (a) a node's centrality and EI in the complicated grief (CG) network and (b) the strength of association between change in that node and change in the remainder of the CG network from 6 to 18-months post-loss. Centrality and EI were both correlated with the strength of the association between node change and network change. These findings suggest high-EI nodes, such as emotional pain and feeling of emptiness, may be especially important to the etiology and treatment of CG., Complicated grief can be conceptualized as a network of mutually reinforcing symptoms. Centrality and expected influence indices aim to use the structure of the complicated grief network to identify symptoms that should be especially important to its development and persistence. We found that change in symptoms with high expected influence was more strongly tied to change in the severity of complicated grief than was change in symptoms with low expected influence, suggesting that this index is able to identify symptoms that may play an important role in the etiology and treatment of complicated grief.},
  pmcid = {PMC5060093},
  pmid = {27505622},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QEGRES9V/robinaugh_2016_identifyin.pdf}
}

@article{robinaugh2019advancing,
  title = {Advancing the Network Theory of Mental Disorders: {{A}} Computational Model of Panic Disorder},
  author = {Robinaugh, Donald J. and Haslbeck, Jonas M.B. and Waldorp, Lourens and Kossakowski, Jolanda Jacqueline and Fried, Eiko I. and Millner, Alexander and McNally, Richard and {van Nes}, Egbert and Scheffer, Marten and Kendler, Kenneth and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {{PsyArXiv}},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/km37w},
  abstract = {\&lt;p\&gt;The network theory of psychopathology posits that mental disorders are complex systems of mutually reinforcing symptoms. This overarching framework has proven highly generative but does not specify precisely how any specific mental disorder operates as such a system. We address this gap in the literature by developing a network theory of Panic Disorder and formalizing that theory as a computational model. We first review prior psychological theory and research on Panic Disorder in order to identify its core components as well as the plausible causal relations among those components. We then construct and evaluate a computational model of Panic Disorder as a non-linear dynamical system. We show that this model can explain a great deal, including individual differences in the propensity to experience panic attacks, key phenomenological characteristics of those attacks, the onset of Panic Disorder, and the efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy. We also show that the model identifies significant gaps in our understanding of Panic Disorder and propose a theory-driven research agenda for Panic Disorder that follows from our evaluation of the model. We conclude by discussing the implications of the model for how we understand and investigate mental disorders as complex systems.\&lt;/p\&gt;},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VMWMVQ2P/robinaugh2019advancing.pdf}
}

@article{robinaugh2020network,
  title = {The {{Network Approach}} to {{Psychopathology}}: {{A Review}} of the {{Literature}} 2008\textendash 2018 and an {{Agenda}} for {{Future Research}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Network Approach}} to {{Psychopathology}}},
  author = {Robinaugh, Donald J. and Hoekstra, Ria H. A. and Toner, Emma R. and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2020},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Psychological medicine},
  volume = {50},
  number = {3},
  pages = {353--366},
  issn = {0033-2917},
  doi = {10.1017/S0033291719003404},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  pmcid = {PMC7334828},
  pmid = {31875792},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/G8F2KHFU/robinaugh2020network.pdf}
}

@article{robinaugh2021invisible,
  ids = {robinaughinvisible},
  title = {Invisible {{Hands}} and {{Fine Calipers}}: {{A Call}} to {{Use Formal Theory}} as a {{Toolkit}} for {{Theory Construction}}},
  author = {Robinaugh, Donald J. and Haslbeck, Jonas M.B. and Ryan, Ois{\'i}n and Fried, Eiko I.},
  year = {2021},
  eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691620974697},
  pages = {28},
  abstract = {In recent years, a growing chorus of researchers have argued that psychological theory is in a state of crisis: theories are rarely developed in a way that indicates an accumulation of knowledge. Paul Meehl raised this very concern more than 40 years ago. Yet, in the ensuing decades, little has improved. We aim to chart a better path forward for psychological theory by revisiting Meehl's criticisms, his proposed solution, and the reasons his solution failed to meaningfully change the status of psychological theory. We argue that Meehl identified serious shortcomings in our evaluation of psychological theories and that his proposed solution would substantially strengthen theory testing. However, we also argue that Meehl failed to provide researchers with the tools necessary to construct the kinds of rigorous theories his approach required. To advance psychological theory, we must equip researchers with tools that allow them to better generate, evaluate, and develop their theories. We argue that formal theories provide this much needed set of tools, equipping researchers with tools for thinking, evaluating explanation, enhancing measurement, informing theory development, and promoting the collaborative construction of psychological theories.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/96LMZAJF/InvisibleHands_FormalTheoryToolkit.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DB77YVDE/robinaugh2021invisible.pdf}
}

@article{rottman2014tainting,
  ids = {rottman2014taintinga},
  title = {Tainting the Soul: {{Purity}} Concerns Predict Moral Judgments of Suicide},
  shorttitle = {Tainting the Soul},
  author = {Rottman, Joshua and Kelemen, Deborah and Young, Liane},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {130},
  number = {2},
  pages = {217--226},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {00100277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.007},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Moral violations are typically defined as actions that harm others. However, suicide is considered immoral even though the perpetrator is also the victim. To determine whether concerns about purity rather than harm predict moral condemnation of suicide, we presented American adults with obituaries describing suicide or homicide victims. While harm was the only variable predicting moral judgments of homicide, perceived harm (toward others, the self, or God) did not significantly account for variance in moral judgments of suicide. Instead, regardless of political and religious views and contrary to explicit beliefs about their own moral judgments, participants were more likely to morally condemn suicide if they (i) believed suicide tainted the victims' souls, (ii) reported greater concerns about purity in an independent questionnaire, (iii) experienced more disgust in response to the obituaries, or (iv) reported greater trait disgust. Thus, suicide is deemed immoral to the extent that it is considered impure.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BS99ISSG/rottman2014tainting.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PY79LDKJ/rottman2014tainting.pdf}
}

@article{royzman2014CAD,
  ids = {royzman2014cad,royzman2014cadb},
  title = {{{CAD}} or {{MAD}}? {{Anger}} (Not Disgust) as the Predominant Response to Pathogen-Free Violations of the Divinity Code.},
  shorttitle = {{{CAD}} or {{MAD}}?},
  author = {Royzman, Edward B. and Atanasov, Pavel and Landy, Justin F. and Parks, Amanda and Gepty, Andrew},
  year = {2014},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {14},
  number = {5},
  pages = {892--907},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1931-1516, 1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/a0036829},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, \& Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally, people feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations of divinity. Although the disgustϪdivinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to retaliate, as a major component of individuals' projected response to ``pure'' (pathogen-free) violations of the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure. Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life sacred violation\textemdash the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity\textemdash pure scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one's own group rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge's own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4IEB6ZJT/royzman2014cadb.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/APDB9FJB/royzman2014cad.pdf}
}

@article{royzman2015curious,
  ids = {royzman2015curiou,royzman2015curiousa},
  title = {The Curious Tale of {{Julie}} and {{Mark}}: {{Unraveling}} the Moral Dumbfounding Effect},
  author = {Royzman, Edward B. and Kim, Kwanwoo and Leeman, Robert F},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  volume = {10},
  number = {4},
  pages = {18},
  abstract = {The paper critically reexamines the well-known ``Julie and Mark'' vignette, a stylized account of two college-age siblings opting to engage in protected sex while vacationing abroad (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Since its inception, the story has been viewed as a rhetorically powerful validation of Hume's ``sentimentalist'' dictum that moral judgments are not rationally deduced but arise directly from feelings of pleasure or displeasure (e.g., disgust). People's typical reactions to the vignette are alleged to support this view by demonstrating that individuals are prone to become morally dumbfounded (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Bjorklund, \& Murphy, 2000), i.e., they tend to ``stubbornly'' maintain their disapproval of the act without supporting reasons. In what follows, we critically reassess the traditional account, predicated on the notion that, among other things, most subjects simply fail to be convinced that the siblings' actions are truly harm-free, thus having excellent reasons to disapprove of these acts. In line with this critique, 3 studies found that subjects 1) tended not to believe that the siblings' actions were in fact harmless; 2) notwithstanding that, and in spite of holding a number of ``counterargument-immune'' reasons, subjects could be effectively maneuvered into exhibiting all the trademark signs of a morally dumbfounded state (which they subsequently recanted), and 3) with subjects' beliefs about harm and standards of normative evaluation properly factored in, a more rigorous assessment procedure yielded a dumbfounding estimate of about 0. Based on these and related results, we contend that subjects' reactions are wholly in line with the rationalist model of moral judgment and that their use in support of claims of moral arationalism should be reevaluated.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZB8DBZB4/royzman2015curious.pdf}
}

@article{royzman2022puzzle,
  ids = {royzman2022puzzlea},
  title = {The Puzzle of Wrongless Harms: {{Some}} Potential Concerns for Dyadic Morality and Related Accounts},
  shorttitle = {The Puzzle of Wrongless Harms},
  author = {Royzman, Edward B. and Borislow, Samuel H.},
  year = {2022},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {220},
  pages = {104980},
  issn = {00100277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104980},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {There is wide-ranging consensus that harm or perceptions of harm play a significant role in judgments of moral wrongdoing. On one prominent view, the pattern that makes up the ``essence'' (Gray, Waytz, \& Young, 2012) of acts of moral wrongdoing is ``harm caused by an agent'' (Schein, Goranson, \& Gray, 2015, p. 983). According to Gray, Schein, and colleagues, events matching this pattern\textemdash a thinking/intentional agent inflicting some manner of harm (i.e., emotional/physical pain) upon a suffering patient\textemdash will be perceived as immoral. With this pro\- posal in mind, we argue two basic points: (1) the current specification of the dyadic template would need to be further refined or ``fortified'' to withstand some obvious counter-examples; (2) this ``fortified'' formulation is still unfit to address the underlying concern: for any general pattern that is supposed to link perceptions of harm and wrongdoing, there are a number of cases (the ``wrongless harms'' of the title) that match the pattern quite well but are not viewed as immoral. We show this in four studies and one supplementary study. In our original study, we find, across six vignettes, that people may judge a behavior to be intended, self-serving, as well as foreseeably harmful and yet not judge it immoral. In our subsequent studies, we replicate these results with further checks and controls. With these findings in mind, we argue that moral cognition is far too complex and capricious to be reduced to a template.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZXGSU4QJ/royzman_2022_the.pdf}
}

@article{rozin1999moralization,
  title = {The {{Moralization}} of {{Cigarette Smoking}} in the {{United States}}},
  author = {Rozin, Paul and Singh, L.},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Psychology},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {321--337},
  issn = {10577408},
  doi = {10.1207/s15327663jcp0803_07},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7NCVJP59/rozin_1999_the.pdf}
}

@article{rozin1999process,
  title = {The {{Process}} of {{Moralization}}},
  author = {Rozin, Paul},
  year = {1999},
  month = may,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {10},
  number = {3},
  eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00139},
  pages = {218--221},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0956-7976},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-9280.00139},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Moralization is the process through which preferences are converted into values, both in individual lives and at the level of culture. Moralization is often linked to health concerns, including addiction. It is significant because moralized entities are more likely to receive attention from governments and institutions, to encourage supportive scientific research, to license censure, to become internalized, to show enhanced parent-to-child transmission of attitudes, to motivate the search by individuals for supporting reasons, and, in at least some cases, to recruit the emotion of disgust. Moralization seems to be promoted in predominantly Protestant cultures and if the entity is associated with stigmatized groups or harmful to children. The recent history and current status of cigarette smoking in the United States are used to illustrate moralization.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7HSZYXPQ/rozin1999process.pdf}
}

@article{rozincad,
  ids = {rozin1999cada,rozincada},
  title = {The {{CAD Triad Hypothesis}}: {{A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions}} ({{Contempt}}, {{Anger}}, {{Disgust}}) and {{Three Moral Codes}} ({{Community}}, {{Autonomy}}, {{Divinity}})},
  author = {Rozin, Paul and Lowery, Laura and Haidt, Jonathan and Imada, Sumio},
  pages = {13},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.574},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/IQ59VBKI/rozin1999cad.pdf}
}

@article{ruby2019disgust,
  title = {Disgust, Sushi Consumption, and Other Predictors of Acceptance of Insects as Food by {{Americans}} and {{Indians}}},
  author = {Ruby, Matthew B. and Rozin, Paul},
  year = {2019},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Food Quality and Preference},
  volume = {74},
  pages = {155--162},
  issn = {0950-3293},
  doi = {10.1016/j.foodqual.2019.01.013},
  urldate = {2021-05-27},
  abstract = {Insects are an important human food source, especially in developing countries, because of their efficiency at converting plant foods into animal protein, and their relatively low environment impact. The present study builds on some prior research on eating insects by surveying Indian and American adults. A composite measure of insect acceptance is developed. The results confirm prior findings that Americans are more accepting of insects as a potential food than Indians, and that men are more accepting than women. Substantially more Indians than Americans consider insect ingestion a violation of a protected/sacred value, suggesting a moral objection. Attitudes to and beliefs about insects and insect consumption are decomposed through factor analysis into the same five factors in both countries: Benefits, Risks, Disgust, Religion, and Suffering. Multiple regression indicates that for Americans, Disgust is the major predictor, followed by Benefits. For Indians, the best predictor is Benefits, followed by Disgust and Religion. In both countries, frequency of sushi consumption (a food commonly met with disgust when it was first introduced) is also a significant and substantial predictor of insect acceptance.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Attitudes,Culture,Entomophagy,Morality,Nutrition,Sustainability},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9BACHBF2/S0950329318306451.html}
}

@article{russell1999core,
  title = {Core Affect, Prototypical Emotional Episodes, and Other Things Called Emotion: {{Dissecting}} the Elephant},
  shorttitle = {Core Affect, Prototypical Emotional Episodes, and Other Things Called Emotion},
  author = {Russell, James A. and Barrett, Lisa Feldman},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {76},
  number = {5},
  pages = {805--819},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315(Electronic),0022-3514(Print)},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.76.5.805},
  abstract = {What is the structure of emotion? Emotion is too broad a class of events to be a single scientific category, and no one structure suffices. As an illustration, core affect is distinguished from prototypical emotional episode. Core affect refers to consciously accessible elemental processes of pleasure and activation, has many causes, and is always present. Its structure involves two bipolar dimensions. Prototypical emotional episode refers to a complex process that unfolds over time, involves causally connected subevents (antecedent; appraisal; physiological, affective, and cognitive changes; behavioral response; self-categorization), has one perceived cause, and is rare. Its structure involves categories (anger, fear, shame, jealousy, etc.) vertically organized as a fuzzy hierarchy and horizontally organized as part of a circumplex. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Emotional Content,Emotions},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/X57LF37Q/russell1999core.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/AZD4ZA4H/1999-13561-009.html}
}

@article{russell2011morala,
  ids = {russell2011moral},
  title = {Moral {{Anger Is More Flexible Than Moral Disgust}}},
  author = {Russell, Sophie P. and {Giner-Sorolla}, Roger},
  year = {2011},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  volume = {2},
  number = {4},
  pages = {360--364},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1948-5506},
  doi = {10.1177/1948550610391678},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The research examines whether anger rather than disgust is more likely to be responsible for changes in moral judgment, after individuals consider potential circumstances. Participants first read a scenario that described a moral violation (harm or fairness vs. purity) and then gave their initial moral judgment and emotions toward the act. They were then asked to list things that could change their opinion and were provided with an opportunity to fill out the measures again, re-evaluating the scenario with these changes in mind. It was found that ratings of disgust did not change after generating potential circumstances; however, anger changed in differential ways for the two violation types. It was also found that anger but not disgust predicted change in moral judgment. These findings suggest that moral anger is a more flexible emotion than moral disgust because anger is more likely to respond to changes in circumstances.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7CPPKDTV/russell2011moral.pdf}
}

@article{russell2011moralb,
  title = {Moral Anger, but Not Moral Disgust, Responds to Intentionality.},
  author = {Russell, Sophie P. and {Giner-Sorolla}, Roger},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {11},
  number = {2},
  pages = {233},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}}
}

@article{russell2011social,
  title = {Social Justifications for Moral Emotions: {{When}} Reasons for Disgust Are Less Elaborated than for Anger.},
  shorttitle = {Social Justifications for Moral Emotions},
  author = {Russell, Sophie P. and {Giner-Sorolla}, Roger},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {11},
  number = {3},
  pages = {637--646},
  issn = {1931-1516, 1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/a0022600},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {In the present research, we tested the unreasoning disgust hypothesis: moral disgust, in particular in response to a violation of a bodily norm, is less likely than moral anger to be justified with cognitively elaborated reasons. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to explain why they felt anger and disgust toward pedophiles. Participants were more likely to invoke elaborated reasons, versus merely evaluative responses, when explaining their anger, versus disgust. Experiment 2 used a between-participants design; participants explained why they felt either anger or disgust toward seven groups that either violated a sexual or nonsexual norm. Again, elaborated reasons were less prevalent when explaining their disgust versus anger and, in particular, when explaining disgust toward a group that violated a sexual norm. Experiment 3 further established that these findings are due to a lower accessibility of elaborated reasons for bodily disgust, rather than inhibition in using them when provided. From these findings, it can be concluded that communicating external reasons for moral disgust at bodily violations is made more difficult due to the unavailability of those reasons to people.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DMTU5AGM/russell2011social.pdf}
}

@article{russell2013bodily,
  title = {Bodily Moral Disgust: {{What}} It Is, How It Is Different from Anger, and Why It Is an Unreasoned Emotion.},
  shorttitle = {Bodily Moral Disgust},
  author = {Russell, Sophie P. and {Giner-Sorolla}, Roger},
  year = {2013},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Psychological Bulletin},
  volume = {139},
  number = {2},
  pages = {328--351},
  issn = {1939-1455, 0033-2909},
  doi = {10.1037/a0029319},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {With the recent upswing in research interest on the moral implications of disgust, there has been uncertainty about what kind of situations elicit moral disgust and whether disgust is a rational or irrational player in moral decision making. We first outline the benefits of distinguishing between bodily violations (e.g., sexual taboos, such as pedophilia and incest) and nonbodily violations (e.g., deception or betrayal) when examining moral disgust. We review findings from our lab and others' showing that, although many existing studies do not control for anger when studying disgust, disgust at nonbodily violations is often associated with anger and hard to separate from it, while bodily violations more consistently predict disgust independently of anger. Building on this distinction, we present further empirical evidence that moral disgust, in the context of bodily violations, is a relatively primitively appraised moral emotion compared to others such as anger, and also that it is less flexible and less prone to external justifications. Our review and results underscore the need to distinguish between the different consequences of moral emotions.},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {23458436},
  keywords = {Anger,Deception,Decision Making,Emotions,Humans,Incest,Judgment,Morals,Pedophilia},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YCTUFJL8/a0029319.pdf}
}

@article{russell2017network,
  title = {The {{Network Structure}} of {{Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms}} in {{Children}} and {{Adolescents Exposed}} to {{Disasters}}},
  author = {Russell, Justin D. and Neill, Erin L. and Carri{\'o}n, Victor G. and Weems, Carl F.},
  year = {2017},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Journal of the American Academy of Child \& Adolescent Psychiatry},
  volume = {56},
  number = {8},
  pages = {669-677.e5},
  issn = {0890-8567},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jaac.2017.05.021},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Objective To evaluate current theoretical assumptions about the nature of pediatric posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by examining the network structure of PTSD in a sample of youth exposed to disasters and testing for age differences. Network analysis provides the opportunity to identify ``central'' symptoms that might hold an outsized influence over others and are important targets for research and treatment. The authors hypothesized that particular symptoms would exhibit greater influence over others. They further hypothesized marked differences in symptom networks across children and adolescents. Method Participants were 786 youth 8 to 13 years old (children) and 14 to 18 years old (adolescents) exposed to Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav who were assessed for PTSD symptoms using the University of California\textendash Los Angeles PTSD Reaction Index for Children. Network models were computed and constructed using the R-package qgraph, which estimates associations between symptoms and forms graphic network models. Results Consistent with the hypotheses, the symptom network demonstrated meaningful variability across age, particularly in the strength of associations, and the relative importance of individual symptoms to the network as a whole. Results further demonstrated that symptoms cluster together in a manner that adds a unique perspective to current model conceptualizations. Conclusion Network analysis is a potentially important additional conceptualization of psychopathology with related data analytic techniques. Results suggest that PTSD can be characterized as a web of interactions between symptoms. This work illuminates differences in the PTSD symptom network across development, such as the link between numbness of negative affect and amnesia in children, but not in teens, and how the critical symptoms within that network differ across childhood and adolescence. Network analysis could allow the re-envisioning of the nature of this complex disorder with new avenues for research and clinical practice.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {causal systems,child psychology,disaster trauma,network analysis,posttraumatic stress disorder},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/STEH8WGU/russell2017network.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/D25W9RNW/S0890856717302538.html}
}

@article{rusting1998regulating,
  title = {Regulating Responses to Anger: {{Effects}} of Rumination and Distraction on Angry Mood},
  shorttitle = {Regulating Responses to Anger},
  author = {Rusting, Cheryl L. and {Nolen-Hoeksema}, Susan},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {74},
  number = {3},
  pages = {790--803},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.790},
  abstract = {Previous research has found that self-focused rumination maintains or increases depressed mood, whereas distraction decreases depressed mood (S. Nolen-Hoeksema \& J. Morrow, 1993; S. Nolen-Hoeksema, J. Morrow, \& B. L. Fredrickson, 1993). The present series of experiments examined these mood regulation strategies in the context of an angry mood. In Experiments 1 and 3, rumination increased anger, whereas distraction decreased or had no effect on anger. In Experiments 2 and 4, women were more likely to choose to ruminate when in a neutral mood but to distract themselves following induction of an angry mood. Men were equally likely to choose rumination or distraction, regardless of mood condition. The results are interpreted and discussed within the framework of an associative-network model of anger. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Anger,Distraction,Introspection,Self-Monitoring (Personality)},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PPVCI8RH/doiLanding.html}
}

@article{saarimaki2018distributed,
  title = {Distributed Affective Space Represents Multiple Emotion Categories across the Human Brain},
  author = {Saarim{\"a}ki, Heini and Ejtehadian, Lara Farzaneh and Glerean, Enrico and J{\"a}{\"a}skel{\"a}inen, Iiro P and Vuilleumier, Patrik and Sams, Mikko and Nummenmaa, Lauri},
  year = {2018},
  month = may,
  journal = {Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience},
  volume = {13},
  number = {5},
  pages = {471--482},
  issn = {1749-5016},
  doi = {10.1093/scan/nsy018},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {The functional organization of human emotion systems as well as their neuroanatomical basis and segregation in the brain remains unresolved. Here, we used pattern classification and hierarchical clustering to characterize the organization of a wide array of emotion categories in the human brain. We induced 14 emotions (6 `basic', e.g. fear and anger; and 8 `non-basic', e.g. shame and gratitude) and a neutral state using guided mental imagery while participants' brain activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Twelve out of 14 emotions could be reliably classified from the haemodynamic signals. All emotions engaged a multitude of brain areas, primarily in midline cortices including anterior and posterior cingulate gyri and precuneus, in subcortical regions, and in motor regions including cerebellum and premotor cortex. Similarity of subjective emotional experiences was associated with similarity of the corresponding neural activation patterns. We conclude that different basic and non-basic emotions have distinguishable neural bases characterized by specific, distributed activation patterns in widespread cortical and subcortical circuits. Regionally differentiated engagement of these circuits defines the unique neural activity pattern and the corresponding subjective feeling associated with each emotion.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/UAWDYCVI/saarimaki2018distributed.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/H3G9K8PG/4956228.html}
}

@article{scheel2020why,
  title = {Why {{Hypothesis Testers Should Spend Less Time Testing Hypotheses}}},
  author = {Scheel, Anne M and Tiokhin, Leonid and Isager, Peder M and Lakens, Dani{\"e}l},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  volume = {16},
  number = {4},
  pages = {744--755},
  doi = {1o0i.1or1g7/170/.1177475/6179415629019626069769657},
  abstract = {For almost half a century, Paul Meehl educated psychologists about how the mindless use of null-hypothesis significance tests made research on theories in the social sciences basically uninterpretable. In response to the replication crisis, reforms in psychology have focused on formalizing procedures for testing hypotheses. These reforms were necessary and influential. However, as an unexpected consequence, psychological scientists have begun to realize that they may not be ready to test hypotheses. Forcing researchers to prematurely test hypotheses before they have established a sound ``derivation chain'' between test and theory is counterproductive. Instead, various nonconfirmatory research activities should be used to obtain the inputs necessary to make hypothesis tests informative. Before testing hypotheses, researchers should spend more time forming concepts, developing valid measures, establishing the causal relationships between concepts and the functional form of those relationships, and identifying boundary conditions and auxiliary assumptions. Providing these inputs should be recognized and incentivized as a crucial goal in itself. In this article, we discuss how shifting the focus to nonconfirmatory research can tie together many loose ends of psychology's reform movement and help us to develop strong, testable theories, as Paul Meehl urged.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LTE3ERCK/scheel_2020_why.pdf}
}

@article{schein2015unifying,
  ids = {schein2015unifyinga},
  title = {The {{Unifying Moral Dyad}}: {{Liberals}} and {{Conservatives Share}} the {{Same Harm-Based Moral Template}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Unifying Moral Dyad}}},
  author = {Schein, Chelsea and Gray, Kurt},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  volume = {41},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1147--1163},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0146-1672, 1552-7433},
  doi = {10.1177/0146167215591501},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is ``no.'' Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition\textemdash in both liberals and conservatives\textemdash is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested\textemdash and confirmed\textemdash through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes\textemdash and overlaps with\textemdash diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2AU4XV79/schein2015unifying.pdf}
}

@article{schein2016harm,
  ids = {schein2016harma},
  title = {Harm Mediates the Disgust-Immorality Link.},
  author = {Schein, Chelsea and Ritter, Ryan S. and Gray, Kurt},
  year = {2016},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {16},
  number = {6},
  pages = {862--876},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1931-1516, 1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/emo0000167},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Many acts are disgusting, but only some of these acts are immoral. Dyadic morality predicts that disgusting acts should be judged as immoral to the extent that they seem harmful. Consistent with this prediction, 3 studies reveal that perceived harm mediates the link between feelings of disgust and moral condemnation\textemdash{} even for ostensibly harmless ``purity'' violations. In many cases, accounting for perceived harm completely eliminates the link between disgust and moral condemnation. Analyses also reveal the predictive power of anger and typicality/weirdness in moral judgments of disgusting acts. The mediation of disgust by harm holds across diverse acts including gay marriage, sex acts, and religious blasphemy. Revealing the endogenous presence and moral relevance of harm within disgusting-but-ostensibly harmless acts argues against modular accounts of moral cognition such as moral foundations theory. Instead, these data support pluralistic conceptions of harm and constructionist accounts of morality and emotion. Implications for moral cognition and the concept of ``purity'' are discussed.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6HA4CKCT/schein2016harm.pdf}
}

@article{schein2016moralization,
  ids = {schein2016moralizationa},
  title = {Moralization and {{Harmification}}: {{The Dyadic Loop Explains How}} the {{Innocuous Becomes Harmful}} and {{Wrong}}},
  shorttitle = {Moralization and {{Harmification}}},
  author = {Schein, Chelsea and Gray, Kurt},
  year = {2016},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
  volume = {27},
  number = {1},
  pages = {62--65},
  publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  issn = {1047-840X, 1532-7965},
  doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2016.1111121},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VBSNEYIG/schein2016moralization.pdf}
}

@article{schlaug1995increased,
  title = {Increased Corpus Callosum Size in Musicians},
  author = {Schlaug, Gottfried and J{\"a}ncke, Lutz and Huang, Yanxiong and Staiger, Jochen F. and Steinmetz, Helmuth},
  year = {1995},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Neuropsychologia},
  series = {Neuropsychological {{And Developmental Studies Of The Corpus Callosum}}},
  volume = {33},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1047--1055},
  issn = {0028-3932},
  doi = {10.1016/0028-3932(95)00045-5},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Using in-vivo magnetic resonance morphometry it was investigated whether the midsagittal area of the corpus callosum (CC) would differ between 30 professional musicians and 30 age-, sex- and handedness-matched controls. Our analyses revealed that the anterior half of the CC was significantly larger in musicians. This difference was due to the larger anterior CC in the subgroup of musicians who had begun musical training before the age of 7. Since anatomic studies have provided evidence for a positive correlation between midsagittal callosal size and the number of fibers crossing through the CC, these data indicate a difference in interhemispheric communication and possibly in hemispheric (a)symmetry of sensorimotor areas. Our results are also compatible with plastic changes of components of the CC during a maturation period within the first decade of human life, similar to those observed in animal studies.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {corpus callosum,laterality,magnetic resonance imaging,motor cortex,motor skills,music,neuronal plasticity},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/9UXWXSYS/schlaug1995increased.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/HJLNJCB8/0028393295000455.html}
}

@article{schmittmann2013deconstructing,
  title = {Deconstructing the Construct: {{A}} Network Perspective on Psychological Phenomena},
  shorttitle = {Deconstructing the Construct},
  author = {Schmittmann, Verena D. and Cramer, Ang{\'e}lique O.J. and Waldorp, Lourens J. and Epskamp, Sacha and Kievit, Rogier A. and Borsboom, Denny},
  year = {2013},
  month = apr,
  journal = {New Ideas in Psychology},
  volume = {31},
  number = {1},
  pages = {43--53},
  issn = {0732118X},
  doi = {10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.02.007},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {In psychological measurement, two interpretations of measurement systems have been developed: the reflective interpretation, in which the measured attribute is conceptualized as the common cause of the observables, and the formative interpretation, in which the measured attribute is seen as the common effect of the observables. We advocate a third interpretation, in which attributes are conceptualized as systems of causally coupled (observable) variables. In such a view, a construct like 'depression' is not seen as a latent variable that underlies symptoms like 'lack of sleep' or 'fatigue', and neither as a composite constructed out of these symptoms, but as a system of causal relations between the symptoms themselves (e.g., lack of sleep / fatigue, etc.). We discuss methodological strategies to investigate such systems as well as theoretical consequences that bear on the question in which sense such a construct could be interpreted as real.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Dynamical systems,Formative model,Latent variable model,Network,Psychological construct,Reflective model},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/G7W7FRDJ/schmittmann2013deconstructing.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JWW4G3QA/schmittmann2013.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/QEJGFPW3/S0732118X1100016X.html}
}

@article{schnall2011clean,
  ids = {schnall2011cleana},
  title = {Clean, {{Proper}} and {{Tidy Are More Than}} the {{Absence}} of {{Dirty}}, {{Disgusting}} and {{Wrong}}},
  author = {Schnall, Simone},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Emotion Review},
  volume = {3},
  number = {3},
  pages = {264--266},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
  issn = {1754-0739, 1754-0747},
  doi = {10.1177/1754073911402397},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The desire to feel clean and pure might not merely be the absence of contamination and resulting feelings of disgust. Instead, it might have a social function because early in evolution social grooming not only involved improved personal hygiene and cleanliness, but also increased group cohesion. Thus, knowing that one's body is clean, proper and tidy might have social implications that go beyond morality.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/MH4Y3DIY/schnall2011clean.pdf}
}

@article{schwartz1994are,
  title = {Are {{There Universal Aspects}} in the {{Structure}} and {{Contents}} of {{Human Values}}?},
  author = {Schwartz, Shalom H.},
  year = {1994},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Social Issues},
  volume = {50},
  number = {4},
  pages = {19--45},
  issn = {00224537, 15404560},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x},
  urldate = {2021-05-11},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YD9BYBCB/schwartz1994are.pdf}
}

@inproceedings{scott2020evidence,
  title = {Evidence for Meta-Ethical Monism: {{Moral}} Conviction Predicts Perceived Objectivity and Universality across Issues.},
  booktitle = {Annual {{Meeting}} of the {{Society}} for {{Personality}} and {{Social Psychology}}},
  author = {Scott, G.S. and Skitka, Linda J.},
  year = {2020},
  address = {{New Orleans, LA}}
}

@article{seidel2013sound,
  title = {Sound Morality: {{Irritating}} and Icky Noises Amplify Judgments in Divergent Moral Domains},
  shorttitle = {Sound Morality},
  author = {Seidel, Angelika and Prinz, Jesse},
  year = {2013},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {127},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--5},
  issn = {0010-0277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.004},
  urldate = {2022-09-15},
  abstract = {Theoretical models and correlational research suggest that anger and disgust play different roles in moral judgment. Anger is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against persons, such as battery and unfairness, and disgust is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against nature, such as sexual transgressions and cannibalism. To date, however, it has not been shown that induction of these two emotions has divergent effects. In this experiment we show divergent effects of anger and disgust. We use sounds to elicit anger and disgust, and participants are then asked to consider moral vignettes. As compared to disgust and control condition, anger increases severity of judgments about crimes against persons, and disgust increases severity of judgments about crimes against nature, but not conversely.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Anger,Disgust,Emotion,Moral judgment,Music},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SAZCDVXG/seidel_2013_sound.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4VCFYTMM/S0010027712002557.html}
}

@article{sherman2009color,
  title = {The Color of Sin: {{White}} and Black Are Perceptual Symbols of Moral Purity and Pollution},
  shorttitle = {The Color of Sin},
  author = {Sherman, Gary D. and Clore, Gerald L.},
  year = {2009},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {20},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1019--1025},
  publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.}},
  issn = {0956-7976},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02403.x},
  urldate = {2022-05-13},
  abstract = {Three studies examined automatic associations between words with moral and immoral meanings and the colors black and white. The speed of color naming in a Stroop task was faster when words in black concerned immorality (e.g., greed), rather than morality, and when words in white concerned morality (e.g., honesty), rather than immorality. In addition, priming immorality by having participants hand-copy an unethical statement speeded identification of words in the black font. Making immorality salient in this way also increased the moral Stroop effect among participants who had not previously shown it. In the final study, participants also rated consumer products. Moral meanings interfered with color naming most strongly among those participants who rated personal cleaning products as especially desirable. The moderation of the moral Stroop effect by individual differences in concerns about personal cleanliness suggests that ideas about purity and pollution are central to seeing morality in black and white. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Adult,Association Learning,black,c,Color,Color Perception,Conflict (Psychology),Female,Humans,Male,Metaphor,moral purity,Morality,Morals,Perceptual Stimulation,perceptual symbols,pollution,Reaction Time,Religion and Psychology,Semantics,Social Desirability,Stroop Test,Vocabulary,white,words},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7HKB8WJQ/sherman2009color.pdf}
}

@article{sherman2012faintest,
  ids = {sherman2012faintesta},
  title = {The Faintest Speck of Dirt: {{Disgust}} Enhances the Detection of Impurity},
  shorttitle = {The {{Faintest Speck}} of {{Dirt}}},
  author = {Sherman, Gary D. and Haidt, Jonathan and Clore, Gerald L.},
  year = {2012},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {23},
  number = {12},
  pages = {1506--1514},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0956-7976, 1467-9280},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797612445318},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Purity is commonly regarded as being physically embodied in the color white, with even trivial deviations from whiteness indicating a loss of purity. In three studies, we explored the implications of this ``white = pure'' association for disgust, an emotion that motivates the detection and avoidance of impurities that threaten purity and cleanliness. We hypothesized that disgust tunes perception to prioritize the light end of the light-dark spectrum, which results in a relative hypersensitivity to changes in lightness in this range. In Studies 1 and 2, greater sensitivity to disgusting stimuli was associated with greater ability to make subtle gray-scale discriminations (e.g., detecting a faint gray stimulus against a white background) at the light end of the spectrum relative to ability to make subtle gray-scale discriminations at the dark end of the spectrum. In Study 3, after viewing disgusting images, disgust-sensitive individuals demonstrated a heightened ability to detect deviations from white. These findings suggest that disgust not only motivates people to avoid impurities, but actually makes them better able to see them.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Adult,Color Perception,Color Saturation,Contrast Sensitivity,Discrimination (Psychology),disgust,Disgust,emotions,Emotions,Fear,Female,Humans,Illumination,impurity detection,individual differences,light-dark spectrum,lightness,Male,perception,purity,white,Young Adult},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/67A864TE/10.1.1.708.9125-2.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7252TDKI/sherman2012faintesta.pdf}
}

@article{shook2019testing,
  ids = {shook2019testinga},
  title = {Testing the Relation between Disgust and General Avoidance Behavior},
  author = {Shook, Natalie J. and Thomas, Ronald and Ford, Cameron G.},
  year = {2019},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Personality and Individual Differences},
  volume = {150},
  pages = {109457},
  issn = {01918869},
  doi = {10.1016/j.paid.2019.05.063},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Disgust is posited to serve a disease-avoidance function, signaling the potential presence of a contaminant and encouraging prophylactic behavior. Indeed, some research indicates that disgust sensitivity is associated with avoidance of specific, disgust-related stimuli. However, disgust may be related to more general behavioral avoidance tendencies, but relatively little research has empirically tested this link. Across two studies, we sought to fill this gap. In Study 1, participants completed measures of disgust sensitivity, as well as a performance-based task and a self-report measure of approach-avoidance tendencies. Greater disgust sensitivity was generally correlated with more self-reported avoidance tendencies and more avoidance behavior of positive stimuli in the performance-based task. In Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to either a disgust or control condition, which entailed consuming disgusting flavored or normally flavored jellybeans, respectively. They then completed the performance-based measure of avoidance. Participants in the disgust condition exhibited more avoidance behavior than participants in the control condition. Across both studies, disgust was associated with avoidance tendencies. These findings have broad implications for the role of disgust is shaping worldview and attitudes, in addition to disease avoidance.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Approach-avoidance,BeanFest,Behavioral immune system,Disgust,Disgust sensitivity},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/85L4L34H/shook2019testing.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VT2ZJY83/S0191886919303654.html}
}

@incollection{shweder1981moral,
  title = {The Moral Intuitions of the Child},
  booktitle = {Social Cognitive Development: {{Frontiers}} and Possible Futures},
  author = {Shweder, Richard A. and Turiel, Elliot and Much, Nancy C.},
  year = {1981},
  pages = {288--305},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  address = {{New York}},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WCZY23KK/shweder1981moral.pdf}
}

@article{shweder1986divergent,
  title = {Divergent Rationalities},
  author = {Shweder, Richard A.},
  year = {1986},
  journal = {Metatheory in social science: Pluralisms and subjectivities},
  pages = {163--196},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press Chicago}}
}

@article{shweder1987culture,
  title = {Culture and Moral Development},
  author = {Shweder, Richard A. and Mahapatra, Manamohan and Miller, Joan G.},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {The emergence of morality in young children},
  pages = {1--83}
}

@article{shweder1993future,
  ids = {shweder1993futurea,shweder1993futureb},
  title = {The {{Future}} of {{Moral Psychology}}: {{Truth}}, {{Intuition}}, and the {{Pluralist Way}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Future}} of {{Moral Psychology}}},
  author = {Shweder, Richard A. and Haidt, Jonathan},
  year = {1993},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {4},
  number = {6},
  pages = {360--365},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}},
  issn = {0956-7976, 1467-9280},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00582.x},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PSDBFSGY/shweder1993future.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/R5BH2X9W/shweder1993future.pdf}
}

@article{shweder1997divinity,
  title = {Divinity and the ``Big Three'' Explanations of Suffering},
  author = {Shweder, Richard A. and Much, Nancy C. and Mahapatra, Manamohan and Park, Lawrence},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Morality and health},
  volume = {119},
  pages = {119--169},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GYRLHTKA/shweder1997divinity.pdf}
}

@misc{simmons201221,
  type = {{{SSRN Scholarly Paper}}},
  title = {A 21 {{Word Solution}}},
  author = {Simmons, Joseph P. and Nelson, Leif D. and Simonsohn, Uri},
  year = {2012},
  month = oct,
  number = {2160588},
  address = {{Rochester, NY}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2160588},
  urldate = {2023-03-24},
  abstract = {One year after publishing "False-Positive Psychology," we propose a simple implementation of disclosure that requires but 21 words to achieve full transparency. This article is written in a casual tone. It includes phone-taken pictures of milk-jars and references to ice-cream and sardines.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {disclosure,false positive,p-hacking,psycholog,transparency},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PVFCX7TR/simmons_2012_a 21 word.pdf}
}

@article{simpson1951interpretation,
  title = {The {{Interpretation}} of {{Interaction}} in {{Contingency Tables}}},
  author = {Simpson, E. H.},
  year = {1951},
  journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological)},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  pages = {238--241},
  issn = {2517-6161},
  doi = {10.1111/j.2517-6161.1951.tb00088.x},
  urldate = {2021-05-29},
  abstract = {The definition of second order interaction in a (2 \texttimes{} 2 \texttimes{} 2) table given by Bartlett is accepted, but it is shown by an example that the vanishing of this second order interaction does not necessarily justify the mechanical procedure of forming the three component 2 \texttimes{} 2 tables and testing each of these for significance by standard methods.*},
  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 1951 The Authors},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SBFVWRZ3/j.2517-6161.1951.tb00088.html}
}

@article{singer1988mood,
  title = {Mood and Memory: {{Evaluating}} the Network Theory of Affect},
  shorttitle = {Mood and Memory},
  author = {Singer, Jefferson A. and Salovey, Peter},
  year = {1988},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Clinical Psychology Review},
  volume = {8},
  number = {2},
  pages = {211--251},
  issn = {0272-7358},
  doi = {10.1016/0272-7358(88)90060-8},
  urldate = {2021-05-22},
  abstract = {For nearly 80 years, psychologists have investigated the relationship between affect and memory. During much of this time, researchers were influenced by a variety of theoretical positions that failed to converge on a unified model. However, during the most recent decade, Bower's Network Theory of Affect has lent a coherency to this area of investigation. His theory specified four distinct ways in which mood could have an observable effect on memory: (a) memory is facilitated when mood state at learning matches mood state at recall, (b) material with affective tone that is congruent with current mood is most easily retrieved from memory, (c) material with affective tone that is congruent with current mood is most easily learned, and (d) affectively intense material is learned best. The present paper reviews the empirical literature that addresses each of these four predictions by looking at studies that manipulate mood in the laboratory as well as those that utilize naturally occurring moods. Each prediction is supported, although congruency during learning (prediction ``c'') yields the most consistent findings. Methodological strengths and weaknesses are noted throughout. Based on this review, we conclude with some suggestions for refinement of a network model of mood and memory.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6R5EMUTM/0272735888900608.html}
}

@article{skitka2002means,
  title = {Do the {{Means Always Justify}} the {{Ends}}, or {{Do}} the {{Ends Sometimes Justify}} the {{Means}}? {{A Value Protection Model}} of {{Justice Reasoning}}},
  shorttitle = {Do the {{Means Always Justify}} the {{Ends}}, or {{Do}} the {{Ends Sometimes Justify}} the {{Means}}?},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J.},
  year = {2002},
  month = may,
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {588--597},
  issn = {0146-1672, 1552-7433},
  doi = {10.1177/0146167202288003},
  urldate = {2022-06-22},
  abstract = {This study explored whether personal identity concerns relate in important ways to how people decide whether an event is fair or unfair. Because moral mandates are selective expressions of values that are central to people's sense of personal identity, people should be highly motivated to protect these positions from possible threat. Consistent with predictions based on a value protection model of justice, whether people had a moral mandate on abortion, civil rights, or immigration was completely independent of the perceived procedural fairness of political institutions when those institutions posed no salient threat to these policy concerns. However, strength of moral mandate, and not prethreat judgments of procedural fairness of the Supreme Court or a state referendum, predicted perceived procedural fairness, outcome fairness, decision acceptance, and other indices of moral outrage when either the Supreme Court or a state referendum posed a possible threat to perceivers' moral mandates.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/73KA95NK/Do_the_Means_Always_Justify_the_Ends_or_Do_the_End.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/HMLB9HMW/skitka2002meansa.pdf}
}

@article{skitka2002understanding,
  title = {Understanding {{Judgments}} of {{Fairness}} in a {{Real-World Political Context}}: {{A Test}} of the {{Value Protection Model}} of {{Justice Reasoning}}},
  shorttitle = {Understanding {{Judgments}} of {{Fairness}} in a {{Real-World Political Context}}},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J. and Mullen, Elizabeth},
  year = {2002},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  volume = {28},
  number = {10},
  pages = {1419--1429},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0146-1672},
  doi = {10.1177/014616702236873},
  urldate = {2023-03-23},
  abstract = {Current theories of justice emphasize social identity reasons for why people care about justice to the relative neglect of personal identity concerns, that is, people?s need to express, defend, and live up to personal moral standards. The authors present a value protection model that predicts that self-expressive moral positions or stands (?moral mandates?) are important determinants of how people reason about fairness. Hypotheses were tested and supported in the context of a natural experiment: reactions of a national random sample of adults to the Eli\'an Gonz\'alez case pre-raid, post-raid, and then post-resolution of the case. Models that included strength of moral mandates, but not pre-raid judgments of procedural fairness, best predicted reactions to the raid and post-resolution judgments of both procedural and outcome fairness and were associated with expressions of moral outrage and attempts to morally cleanse.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/WFGMSAQM/skitka_2002_understand.pdf}
}

@article{skitka2005moral,
  ids = {skitka2005moralb},
  title = {Moral {{Conviction}}: {{Another Contributor}} to {{Attitude Strength}} or {{Something More}}?},
  shorttitle = {Moral {{Conviction}}},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J. and Bauman, Christopher W. and Sargis, Edward G.},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {88},
  number = {6},
  pages = {895--917},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.895},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Attitudes held with strong moral conviction (moral mandates) were predicted to have different interpersonal consequences than strong but nonmoral attitudes. After controlling for indices of attitude strength, the authors explored the unique effect of moral conviction on the degree that people preferred greater social (Studies 1 and 2) and physical (Study 3) distance from attitudinally dissimilar others and the effects of moral conviction on group interaction and decision making in attitudinally homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups (Study 4). Results supported the moral mandate hypothesis: Stronger moral conviction led to (a) greater preferred social and physical distance from attitudinally dissimilar others, (b) intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., friend) and distant relationships (e.g., owner of a store one frequents), (c) lower levels of good will and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogeneous groups, and (d) a greater inability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/J2NIG46Z/skitka2005moral.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/RNSYVPG7/skitka2005moralb.pdf}
}

@article{skitka2008morala,
  ids = {skitka2008moral,skitka2008moralb},
  title = {Moral {{Conviction}} and {{Political Engagement}}: {{Moral Conviction}}},
  shorttitle = {Moral {{Conviction}} and {{Political Engagement}}},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J. and Bauman, Christopher W.},
  year = {2008},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Political Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {1},
  pages = {29--54},
  publisher = {{Wiley}},
  issn = {0162895X},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00611.x},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies\textemdash one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election\textemdash indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/RAW97F2Z/skitka_2008_moral.pdf}
}

@article{skitka2008moralb,
  title = {Moral {{Convictions Often Override Concerns About Procedural Fairness}}: {{A Reply}} to {{Napier}} and {{Tyler}}},
  shorttitle = {Moral {{Convictions Often Override Concerns About Procedural Fairness}}},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J. and Mullen, Elizabeth},
  year = {2008},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Social Justice Research},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {529--546},
  issn = {0885-7466, 1573-6725},
  doi = {10.1007/s11211-008-0085-9},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Napier and Tyler (this issue) question whether moral convictions about outcomes really override the influence of procedural fairness (PF) on fairness judgments and decision acceptance. The empirical answer to this question is ``yes.'' When people have strong moral convictions about outcomes, perceptions of outcome fairness and decision acceptance are primarily shaped by whether the morally ``correct'' outcomes are achieved. Pre-decision perceptions of PF have surprisingly little or no effect on these judgments. That said, pre-outcome perceptions of PF sometimes predict post-outcome perceptions of PF, even when people have morally vested outcome preferences. We provide further details supporting the validity and superiority of our data analytic approach and argue that our original conclusions were justified.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/YN36NBNM/Skitka-Mullen2008_Article_MoralConvictionsOftenOverrideC.pdf}
}

@article{skitka2009limits,
  title = {Limits on Legitimacy: {{Moral}} and Religious Convictions as Constraints on Deference to Authority},
  shorttitle = {Limits on Legitimacy},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J. and Bauman, Christopher W. and Lytle, Brad L.},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {97},
  number = {4},
  pages = {567--578},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1315},
  doi = {10.1037/a0015998},
  abstract = {Various versions of legitimacy theory predict that a duty and obligation to obey legitimate authorities generally trumps people's personal moral and religious values. However, most research has assumed rather than measured the degree to which people have a moral or religious stake in the situations studied. This study tested compliance with and reactions to legitimate authorities in the context of a natural experiment that tracked public opinion before and after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a case that challenged states' rights to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Results indicated that citizens' degree of moral conviction about the issue of physician-assisted suicide predicted post-ruling perceptions of outcome fairness, decision acceptance, and changes in perceptions of the Court's legitimacy from pre- to post-ruling. Other results revealed that the effects of religious conviction independently predicted outcome fairness and decision acceptance but not perceptions of post-ruling legitimacy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Adjudication,Assisted Suicide,Attitudes,Authority,Legal Decisions,Morality,Obedience,Religiosity},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/UVR8AJHG/skitka2009limits.pdf}
}

@incollection{skitka2012Moral,
  title = {Moral Convictions and Moral Courage: {{Common}} Denominators of Good and Evil.},
  shorttitle = {Moral Convictions and Moral Courage},
  booktitle = {The Social Psychology of Morality: {{Exploring}} the Causes of Good and Evil.},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J.},
  editor = {Mikulincer, Mario and Shaver, Phillip R.},
  year = {2012},
  pages = {349--365},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{Washington}},
  doi = {10.1037/13091-019},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  isbn = {978-1-4338-1011-4},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LJENENHF/ContentServer.asp-21.pdf}
}

@article{skitka2018attitude,
  title = {Attitude {{Moralization}}: {{Probably Not Intuitive}} or {{Rooted}} in {{Perceptions}} of {{Harm}}},
  shorttitle = {Attitude {{Moralization}}},
  author = {Skitka, Linda J. and Wisneski, Daniel C. and Brandt, Mark J.},
  year = {2018},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
  volume = {27},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417727861},
  pages = {9--13},
  issn = {0963-7214, 1467-8721},
  doi = {10.1177/0963721417727861},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {People vary in the extent to which they imbue attitudes with moral conviction, and this variation is consequential. Yet we know relatively little about what makes people's feelings about a given attitude object transform from a relatively nonmoral preference to a moral conviction. In this article, we review evidence from two experiments and a field study that sheds some light on the processes that lead to attitude moralization. This research explored the roles of incidental and integral affect, cognitive factors such as recognition of harm, and whether attitude-moralization processes can occur outside conscious awareness or require some level of conscious deliberation. The findings present some challenges to contemporary theories that emphasize the roles of intuition and harm and indicate that more research designed to better understand moralization processes is needed.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/S8TQPE6F/skitka2018attitude.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/UJ2EENDE/skitka2018attitude.pdf}
}

@article{sklar2012reading,
  title = {Reading and Doing Arithmetic Nonconsciously},
  author = {Sklar, Asael Y. and Levy, Nir and Goldstein, Ariel and Mandel, Roi and Maril, Anat and Hassin, Ran R.},
  year = {2012},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {109},
  number = {48},
  pages = {19614--19619},
  publisher = {{National Academy of Sciences}},
  issn = {0027-8424, 1091-6490},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.1211645109},
  urldate = {2021-05-14},
  abstract = {The modal view in the cognitive and neural sciences holds that consciousness is necessary for abstract, symbolic, and rule-following computations. Hence, semantic processing of multiple-word expressions, and performing of abstract mathematical computations, are widely believed to require consciousness. We report a series of experiments in which we show that multiple-word verbal expressions can be processed outside conscious awareness and that multistep, effortful arithmetic equations can be solved unconsciously. All experiments used Continuous Flash Suppression to render stimuli invisible for relatively long durations (up to 2,000 ms). Where appropriate, unawareness was verified using both objective and subjective measures. The results show that novel word combinations, in the form of expressions that contain semantic violations, become conscious before expressions that do not contain semantic violations, that the more negative a verbal expression is, the more quickly it becomes conscious, and that subliminal arithmetic equations prime their results. These findings call for a significant update of our view of conscious and unconscious processes.},
  chapter = {Social Sciences},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {23150541},
  keywords = {automaticity,CFS,nonconscious processes},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4H83S7E8/sklar2012reading.pdf}
}

@article{smetana1983socialcognitive,
  title = {Social-Cognitive Development: {{Domain}} Distinctions and Coordinations},
  shorttitle = {Social-Cognitive Development},
  author = {Smetana, Judith G.},
  year = {1983},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Developmental Review},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {131--147},
  issn = {02732297},
  doi = {10.1016/0273-2297(83)90027-8},
  urldate = {2022-05-05},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/P8S3T4TI/smetana1983socialcognitive.pdf}
}

@article{smetana1990development,
  title = {The {{Development}} of {{Toddlers}}' {{Moral}} and {{Conventional Judgments}}},
  author = {Smetana, Judith G. and Braeges, Judith L.},
  year = {1990},
  journal = {Merrill-Palmer Quarterly},
  volume = {36},
  number = {3},
  eprint = {23087284},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {329--346},
  publisher = {{Wayne State University Press}},
  issn = {0272-930X},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {The development of toddlers' (n = 108) moral and conventional judgments and the effects of language development on those judgments were examined. Equal numbers of 26- 34-, and 42-month-old boys and girls judged the permissibility, seriousness, generalizability, and rule and authority contingency of 10 familiar moral and conventional transgressions, and also responded to parallel language comprehension items. The youngest subjects did not distinguish morality and convention on any of the criteria, but 34-month-olds judged moral transgressions to be more generalizably wrong than conventional transgressions. By age 42 months, morality and convention were distinguished on all the criteria. Children who responded correctly to the corresponding language comprehension items differentiated moral and conventional transgressions on the basis of generalizability, rule contingency, and authority contingency at earlier ages than when language ability was not considered. Thus, rudimentary distinctions between morality and conventionality emerge and become more consistently applied during the third year of life.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/LXHVZED8/smetana1990development.pdf}
}

@inbook{smetana2013moral,
  title = {Moral {{Development}}: {{The Social Domain Theory View}}},
  shorttitle = {Moral {{Development}}},
  booktitle = {The {{Oxford Handbook}} of {{Developmental Psychology}}, {{Vol}}. 1},
  author = {Smetana, Judith G.},
  year = {2013},
  month = mar,
  pages = {831--864},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199958450.013.0029},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {This chapter describes moral judgment development through the lens of social domain theory. Morality, or individuals' concepts of justice, welfare, and rights, is seen as a distinct system or organized domain of social knowledge that develops separately from concepts of social conventions and personal issues; these concepts are constructed from children's differentiated social interactions and social experiences. In this chapter, basic theoretical propositions of social domain theory and methods used to test those propositions are described, and then relevant empirical research is reviewed. The chapter highlights how children's understanding and interpretation of their social worlds are elaborated and change from infancy through adolescence. The complexity and diversity of social life is described as entailing a consideration of moral concepts as informed by informational assumptions and knowledge of regularities in the affective consequences of different events. It is also considered in terms of the coexistence of and coordination with other social knowledge domains.},
  collaborator = {Smetana, Judith G.},
  isbn = {978-0-19-995845-0},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CVC57IC3/smetana2013moral.pdf}
}

@article{smetana2018normative,
  title = {Normative {{Changes}} and {{Individual Differences}} in {{Early Moral Judgments}}: {{A Constructivist Developmental Perspective}}},
  shorttitle = {Normative {{Changes}} and {{Individual Differences}} in {{Early Moral Judgments}}},
  author = {Smetana, Judith~G. and Jambon, Marc and Ball, Courtney~L.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Human Development},
  volume = {61},
  number = {4-5},
  pages = {264--280},
  publisher = {{Karger Publishers}},
  issn = {0018-716X, 1423-0054},
  doi = {10.1159/000492803},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {This paper discusses the emergence and development of morality as a distinct form of social knowledge in early childhood. Drawing on social domain theory, we define morality in terms of individuals' concerns regarding others' welfare, fair treatment, rights, and the equitable distribution of resources. Moral judgments are described as building on early predispositions but constructed through children's varied social experiences. We highlight some of the morally relevant interactions in the first few years of life that contribute to early moral development and then summarize evidence regarding young children's increasing ability to distinguish moral and nonmoral concepts in their judgments. Consistent with our constructivist emphasis, we also draw attention to sources of individual differences in early moral judgment development. We conclude with some suggestions for future research that build on the innovative methods and new findings reported here to further expand our understanding of early moral development.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5SFI8QYD/6.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4P837ED9/492803.html}
}

@article{southward2018identifying,
  title = {Identifying {{Core Deficits}} in a {{Dimensional Model}} of {{Borderline Personality Disorder Features}}: {{A Network Analysis}}},
  shorttitle = {Identifying {{Core Deficits}} in a {{Dimensional Model}} of {{Borderline Personality Disorder Features}}},
  author = {Southward, Matthew W. and Cheavens, Jennifer S.},
  year = {2018},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Clinical Psychological Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {5},
  pages = {685--703},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {2167-7026},
  doi = {10.1177/2167702618769560},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Researchers have proposed three core deficits of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD): emotion dysregulation, interpersonal problems, and self-identity disturbance. Previous methods for testing these deficits rest on problematic assumptions (e.g., the assumption that observable/measured features of BPD, such as chaotic relationships and affective intensity, occur independently). A network model of psychopathology assumes that observable features of disorders directly interact, and network analytic methods quantify how central each feature is. We conducted a network analysis of core deficits of BPD features using a large (N = 4,386) sample of participants with a range of BPD features. The most central features of participants in the High BPD group were loneliness, recklessness/impulsivity, and intense moods, supporting models of emotion dysregulation and interpersonal problems. The networks of BPD features did not differ between men and women. We provide directions for future research to enhance our understanding of how networks of BPD features change over time.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/F2BLJ4Z7/southward2018identifying.pdf}
}

@article{stanovich2011complexity,
  title = {The Complexity of Developmental Predictions from Dual Process Models},
  author = {Stanovich, Keith E. and West, Richard F. and Toplak, Maggie E.},
  year = {2011},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Developmental Review},
  series = {Special {{Issue}}: {{Dual-Process Theories}} of {{Cognitive Development}}},
  volume = {31},
  number = {2},
  pages = {103--118},
  issn = {0273-2297},
  doi = {10.1016/j.dr.2011.07.003},
  urldate = {2021-05-14},
  abstract = {Drawing developmental predictions from dual-process theories is more complex than is commonly realized. Overly simplified predictions drawn from such models may lead to premature rejection of the dual process approach as one of many tools for understanding cognitive development. Misleading predictions can be avoided by paying attention to several cautions about the complexity of developmental extrapolations. The complexity of developmental predictions follows from the fact that overall normative responding at a given age derives from several different mental characteristics: (1) the developmental course of Type 1 processing, (2) the developmental course of Type 2 processing, (3) the acquisition of mindware usable by Type 1 processing, (4) the acquisition of mindware usable by Type 2 processing, and (5) the practicing of the mindware available to Type 2 processing to the extent that it is available to be processed in an autonomous manner. The complexity of all these interacting processes and sources of information can sometimes result in U-shaped developmental functions on some heuristics and biases tasks, making younger children look like they are responding more optimally than older children. This is particularly true when the youngest groups are ill-equipped to even understand the task and thus respond randomly. A final caution concerns terminology: The terms normative or rational should be reserved for responses and not attributed to subpersonal processes.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Biases,Dual process theory,Heuristics},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KWQ3FF3E/stanovich2011complexity.pdf}
}

@incollection{stich2018moral,
  ids = {grayatlas},
  title = {The Moral Domain},
  booktitle = {Atlas of Moral Psychology},
  author = {Stich, Stephen},
  editor = {Gray, Kurt and Graham, Jesse},
  year = {2018},
  pages = {547--555},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{storbeck2008affective,
  title = {Affective {{Arousal}} as {{Information}}: {{How Affective Arousal Influences Judgments}}, {{Learning}}, and {{Memory}}},
  shorttitle = {Affective {{Arousal}} as {{Information}}},
  author = {Storbeck, Justin and Clore, Gerald L.},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Social and Personality Psychology Compass},
  volume = {2},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1824--1843},
  issn = {1751-9004},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00138.x},
  urldate = {2021-06-30},
  abstract = {The affect-as-information framework posits that affect is embodied information about value and importance. The valence dimension of affect provides evaluative information about stimulus objects, which plays a role in judgment and decision-making. Affect can also provide evaluative information about one's own cognitions and response inclinations, information that guides thinking and reasoning. In particular, positive affect often promotes, and negative affect inhibits, accessible responses or dominant modes of thinking. Affect thus moderates many of the textbook phenomena in cognitive psychology. In the current review, we suggest additionally that the arousal dimension of affect amplifies reactions, leading to intensified evaluations, increased reliance on particular styles of learning, and enhanced long-term memory for events. We conclude that whereas valenced affective cues serve as information about value, the arousal dimension provides information about urgency or importance.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FDZ86ARR/storbeck2008affective.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4SKDRJXH/j.1751-9004.2008.00138.html}
}

@article{tetlock2000psychology,
  title = {The Psychology of the Unthinkable: {{Taboo}} Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals},
  shorttitle = {The Psychology of the Unthinkable},
  author = {Tetlock, Philip E. and Kristel, Orie V. and Elson, S. Beth and Green, Melanie C. and Lerner, Jennifer S.},
  year = {2000},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {78},
  number = {5},
  pages = {853--870},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  issn = {0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.853},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Five studies explored cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to proscribed forms of social cognition. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that people responded to taboo trade-offs that monetized sacred values with moral outrage and cleansing. Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that racial egalitarians were least likely to use, and angriest at those who did use, race-tainted base rates and that egalitarians who inadvertently used such base rates tried to reaffirm their fair-mindedness. Experiment 5 revealed that Christian fundamentalists were most likely to reject heretical counterfactuals that applied everyday causal schemata to Biblical narratives and to engage in moral cleansing after merely contemplating such possibilities. Although the results fit the sacred-value-protection model (SVPM) better than rival formulations, the SVPM must draw on cross-cultural taxonomies of relational schemata to specify normative boundaries on thought. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Affect,Attitudes,Behavior,Cognition,Cognitions,cognitive \& affective \& behavioral responses,college students,Decision Making,Emotional Responses,Humans,Random Allocation,Social Cognition,Social Perception,Social Values,Taboo,taboo trade-off \& forbidden base rate \& heretical counterfactual forms of proscribed social cognition},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/F5JSTE4E/tetlock2000psychology.pdf}
}

@article{tetlock2003thinking,
  title = {Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions},
  shorttitle = {Thinking the Unthinkable},
  author = {Tetlock, Philip E.},
  year = {2003},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {7},
  number = {7},
  pages = {320--324},
  issn = {1364-6613},
  doi = {10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00135-9},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Many people insist that their commitments to certain values (e.g. love, honor, justice) are absolute and inviolable \textendash{} in effect, sacred. They treat the mere thought of trading off sacred values against secular ones (such as money) as transparently outrageous \textendash{} in effect, taboo. Economists insist, however, that in a world of scarce resources, taboo trade-offs are unavoidable. Research shows that, although people do respond with moral outrage to taboo trade-offs, they often acquiesce when secular violations of sacred values are rhetorically reframed as routine or tragic trade-offs. The results reveal the peculiar character of moral boundaries on what is thinkable, alternately punitively rigid and forgivingly flexible.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2F6KBKYC/tetlock2003thinking.pdf}
}

@article{theriault2017examining,
  title = {Examining Overlap in Behavioral and Neural Representations of Morals, Facts, and Preferences},
  author = {Theriault, Jordan and Waytz, Adam and Heiphetz, Larisa and Young, Liane},
  year = {2017},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
  volume = {146},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1586--1605},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  issn = {0096-3445},
  doi = {10.1037/xge0000350},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims. Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can (a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and (b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the theory of mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Ethics,fMRI,Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging,Judgment,metaethics,morality,Morality,Preferences,social cognition,Social Cognition,theory of mind,Theory of Mind},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DH4TNGPN/theriault2017examininga.pdf}
}

@article{tononi2004information,
  title = {An Information Integration Theory of Consciousness},
  author = {Tononi, Giulio},
  year = {2004},
  month = nov,
  journal = {BMC Neuroscience},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1},
  pages = {42},
  issn = {1471-2202},
  doi = {10.1186/1471-2202-5-42},
  urldate = {2023-01-10},
  abstract = {Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is understanding the conditions that determine to what extent a system has conscious experience. For instance, why is our consciousness generated by certain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not by other parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during wakefulness and much less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is understanding the conditions that determine what kind of consciousness a system has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute specific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and audition?},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Binocular Rivalry,Conscious Experience,Conscious State,Firing Pattern,Information Integration},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/34KRBRPQ/tononi_2004_an.pdf}
}

@article{tracy2019physiological,
  title = {The {{Physiological Basis}} of {{Psychological Disgust}} and {{Moral Judgments}}},
  author = {Tracy, Jessica L and Steckler, Conor M and Heltzel, Gordon},
  year = {2019},
  pages = {18},
  abstract = {To address ongoing debates about whether feelings of disgust are causally related to moral judgments, we pharmacologically inhibited spontaneous disgust responses to moral infractions and examined effects on moral thinking. Findings demonstrated, first, that the antiemetic ginger (Zingiber officinale), known to inhibit nausea, reduces feelings of disgust toward nonmoral purity-offending stimuli (e.g., bodily fluids), providing the first experimental evidence that disgust is causally rooted in physiological nausea (Study 1). Second, this same physiological experience was causally related to moral thinking: ginger reduced the severity of judgments toward purity-based moral violations (Studies 2 and 4) or eliminated the tendency for people higher in bodily sensation awareness to make harsher moral judgments than those low in this dispositional tendency (Study 3). In all studies, effects were restricted to moderately severe purity-offending stimuli, consistent with preregistered predictions. Together, findings provide the first evidence that psychological disgust can be disrupted by an antiemetic and that doing so has consequences for moral judgments.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/JGVTWYDM/tracy2019physiological.pdf}
}

@book{turiel1983development,
  title = {The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention},
  shorttitle = {The Development of Social Knowledge},
  author = {Turiel, Elliot},
  year = {1983},
  series = {Cambridge Studies in Social and Emotional Development},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  address = {{Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York}},
  isbn = {978-0-521-25309-3 978-0-521-27305-3},
  langid = {english},
  lccn = {HQ783 .T9 1983},
  keywords = {Cognition and culture,Convention (Philosophy),Social ethics,Social interaction,Socialization},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZD63LQ72/The Development of Social Knowledge. Morality  Convention by Elliott Turiel (z-lib.org).pdf}
}

@article{turiel1987morality,
  title = {Morality: {{Its}} Structure, Functions, and Vagaries},
  author = {Turiel, Elliot and Killen, Melanie and Helwig, Charles C},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {The emergence of morality in young children},
  pages = {155--243},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VZIJEBSW/turiel1987morality.pdf}
}

@article{turiel1991judging,
  title = {Judging {{Social Issues}}: {{Difficulties}}, {{Inconsistencies}}, and {{Consistencies}}},
  shorttitle = {Judging {{Social Issues}}},
  author = {Turiel, Elliot and Hildebrandt, Carolyn and Wainryb, Cecilia and Saltzstein, Herbert D.},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development},
  volume = {56},
  number = {2},
  eprint = {1166056},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {i},
  publisher = {{[Society for Research in Child Development, Wiley]}},
  issn = {0037976X},
  doi = {10.2307/1166056},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KZ5SJIWW/1166056-2.pdf}
}

@incollection{turiel2014morality,
  ids = {killen2014handbook},
  title = {Morality: {{Epistemology}}, {{Development}}, and {{Social Opposition}}},
  booktitle = {Handbook of Moral Development},
  author = {Turiel, Elliot},
  editor = {Killen, Melanie and Smetana, Judith G.},
  year = {2014},
  edition = {Second Edition},
  pages = {3--22},
  publisher = {{Psychology Press}},
  address = {{New York}},
  isbn = {978-1-84872-959-9 978-0-415-81844-5},
  langid = {english},
  lccn = {BF723.M54 H354 2014},
  keywords = {Moral development}
}

@article{tybur2009microbes,
  ids = {tybur2009microbesa,tybur2009microbesb},
  title = {Microbes, Mating, and Morality: {{Individual}} Differences in Three Functional Domains of Disgust.},
  shorttitle = {Microbes, Mating, and Morality},
  author = {Tybur, Joshua M. and Lieberman, Debra and Griskevicius, Vladas},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {97},
  number = {1},
  pages = {103--122},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1939-1315, 0022-3514},
  doi = {10.1037/a0015474},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {What is the function of disgust? Whereas traditional models have suggested that disgust serves to protect the self or neutralize reminders of our animal nature, an evolutionary perspective suggests that disgust functions to solve 3 qualitatively different adaptive problems related to pathogen avoidance, mate choice, and social interaction. The authors investigated this 3-domain model of disgust across 4 studies and examined how sensitivity to these functional domains relates to individual differences in other psychological constructs. Consistent with their predictions, factor analyses demonstrated that disgust sensitivity partitions into domains related to pathogens, sexuality, and morality. Further, sensitivity to the 3 domains showed predictable differentiation based on sex, perceived vulnerability to disease, psychopathic tendencies, and Big 5 personality traits. In exploring these 3 domains of disgust, the authors introduce a new measure of disgust sensitivity. Appreciation of the functional heterogeneity of disgust has important implications for research on individual differences in disgust sensitivity, emotion, clinical impairments, and neuroscience.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XNZZGAA6/tybur2009microbes.pdf}
}

@article{vaidyanathan2020theory,
  title = {Theory, in {{Practice}}},
  author = {Vaidyanathan, Uma},
  year = {2020},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2020.1853479},
  pages = {334--335},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  issn = {1047-840X, 1532-7965},
  doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2020.1853479},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/2D53J72N/vaidyanathan2020theory.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/732T3UZY/08-Theory_ in Practice.pdf}
}

@article{vanaman2019novel,
  title = {A {{Novel Measure}} of the {{Need}} for {{Moral Cognition}}},
  author = {\textbf{Vanaman}, Matthew E. and Leggett, Mary-Page and Crysel, Laura and Askew, Robert},
  year = {2019},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Basic and Applied Social Psychology},
  volume = {41},
  number = {1},
  pages = {20--33},
  issn = {0197-3533, 1532-4834},
  doi = {10.1080/01973533.2018.1531000},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {This research developed the first measure of the need for moral cognition, or the tendency to seek out, talk about, reflect on, or otherwise engage with ethical or moral issues. Interpretative phenomenological analysis was conducted on transcripts from interviews with members of the target population and focus groups with content experts. Pilot items were administered to a large online sample; 2 latent factors were identified. Scores were assessed for test\textendash retest reliability, and convergent-, discriminant-, and criterion-validity. Collectively, these studies demonstrate that the Need for Moral Cognition scale is a valid and reliable measure suitable for use in psychological research.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {mypapers},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/X8FRRVMS/vanaman2019novel.pdf}
}

@article{vanaman2020disgust,
  ids = {vanaman2020disgusta,vanaman2020disgustb},
  title = {Disgust and Disgust-Driven Moral Concerns Predict Support for Restrictions on Transgender Bathroom Access},
  author = {\textbf{Vanaman}, Matthew E. and Chapman, Hanah A.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Politics and the Life Sciences},
  volume = {39},
  number = {2},
  pages = {200--214},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  issn = {0730-9384, 1471-5457},
  doi = {10.1017/pls.2020.20},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Many U.S. states have proposed policies that restrict bathroom access to an individual's birth sex. These policies have had widespread effects on safety for transgender and gender-nonconforming people, as well as on state economies. In this registered report, we assessed the role of disgust in support for policies that restrict transgender bathroom access. We found that sensitivity to pathogen disgust was positively associated with support for bathroom restrictions; sexual and injury disgust were unrelated. We also examined the role of disgust-driven moral concerns, known as purity concerns, as well as harm-related moral concerns in support for bathroom restrictions. While concerns about harm to cisgender and transgender people predicted support for bathroom restrictions, purity was a much stronger predictor. Also, purity partially mediated the link between pathogen disgust and support for bathroom restrictions, even after accounting for harm concerns. Findings and implications are discussed.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {mypapers},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/TC65HEQA/vanaman2020disgust.pdf}
}

@unpublished{vanaman2020where,
  title = {Where (and When) Is the Harm? {{Judgments}} of Purity under Time Pressure.},
  author = {\textbf{Vanaman}, Matthew E. and Chapman, Hanah A.},
  year = {2020},
  keywords = {myunpublished}
}

@article{vanbavel2012evaluation,
  title = {Evaluation Is a {{Dynamic Process}}: {{Moving Beyond Dual System Models}}: {{Evaluation}} Is a {{Dynamic Process}}},
  shorttitle = {Evaluation Is a {{Dynamic Process}}},
  author = {Van Bavel, Jay J. and Jenny Xiao, Yi and Cunningham, William A.},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Social and Personality Psychology Compass},
  volume = {6},
  number = {6},
  pages = {438--454},
  issn = {17519004},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00438.x},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {Over the past few decades, dual attitude {$\fracslash$} process {$\fracslash$} system models have emerged as the dominant framework for understanding a wide range of psychological phenomena. Most of these models characterize the unconscious and conscious mind as being built from discrete processes or systems: one that is reflexive, automatic, fast, affective, associative, and primitive, and a second that is deliberative, controlled, slow, cognitive, propositional, and more uniquely human. Although these models serve as a useful heuristic for characterizing the human mind, recent developments in social and cognitive neuroscience suggest that the human evaluative system, like most of cognition, is widely distributed and highly dynamic. Integrating these advances with current attitude theories, we review how the recently proposed Iterative Reprocessing Model can account for apparent dual systems as well as discrepancies between traditional dual system models and recent research revealing the dynamic nature of evaluation. Furthermore, we describe important implications this dynamical system approach has for various social psychological domains.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KGVB36CT/Evaluation_is_a_Dynamic_Process_Moving_Beyond_Dual.pdf}
}

@article{vanbavel2015neuroscience,
  ids = {bavel2015neuroscience},
  title = {The Neuroscience of Moral Cognition: From Dual Processes to Dynamic Systems},
  shorttitle = {The Neuroscience of Moral Cognition},
  author = {Van Bavel, Jay J. and FeldmanHall, Oriel and {Mende-Siedlecki}, Peter},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology},
  volume = {6},
  pages = {167--172},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {2352250X},
  doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.08.009},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/F4RYPM9V/bavel2015neuroscience.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Q3XAW3SN/bavel2015neuroscience.pdf}
}

@article{vanborkulo2015association,
  title = {Association of {{Symptom Network Structure With}} the {{Course}} of {{Depression}}},
  author = {{van Borkulo}, Claudia and Boschloo, Lynn and Borsboom, Denny and Penninx, Brenda W. J. H. and Waldorp, Lourens J. and Schoevers, Robert A.},
  year = {2015},
  month = dec,
  journal = {JAMA Psychiatry},
  volume = {72},
  number = {12},
  pages = {1219},
  issn = {2168-622X},
  doi = {10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2015.2079},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  abstract = {OBJECTIVE To examine whether the baseline network structure of MDD symptoms is associated with the longitudinal course of MDD. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In this prospective study, in which remittent and persistent MDD was defined on the basis of a follow-up assessment after 2 years, 515 patients from the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety with past-year MDD (established with the Composite International Diagnostic Interview) and at least moderate depressive symptoms (assessed with the Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology [IDS]) at baseline were studied. Baseline starting and ending dates were September 1, 2004, through February 28, 2007. Follow-up starting and ending dates were September 1, 2006, through February 28, 2009. Analysis was conducted August 2015. The MDD was considered persistent if patients had at least moderate depressive symptoms (IDS) at 2-year follow-up; otherwise, the MDD was considered remitted. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Sparse network structures of baseline MDD symptoms assessed via IDS were computed. Global and local connectivity of network structures were compared across persisters and remitters using a permutation test. RESULTS Among the 515 patients, 335 (65.1\%) were female, mead (SD) age was 40.9 (12.1) years, and 253 (49.1\%) had persistent MDD at 2-year follow-up. Persisters (n = 253) had a higher baseline IDS sum score than remitters (n = 262) (mean [SD] score, 40.2 [8.9] vs 35.1 [7.1]; the test statistic for the difference in IDS sum score was 22 027; P {$<$} .001). The test statistic for the difference in network connectivity was 1.79 (P = .01) for the original data, 1.55 for data matched on IDS sum score (P = .04), and 1.65 for partialed out data (P = .02). At the symptom level, fatigue or loss of energy and feeling guilty had the largest difference in importance in persisters' network compared with that of remitters (Cohen d = 1.13 and 1.18, respectively). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE This study reports that symptom networks of patients with MDD are related to longitudinal course: persisters exhibited a more densely connected network at baseline than remitters. More pronounced associations between symptoms may be an important determinant of persistence in MDD.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/CVZ7BBEM/van borkulo_2015_associatio.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/KQHZKLBD/jamapsychiatry_van_borkulo_2015_oi_150061.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/SNGI9G36/vanborkulo2015association.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/8XL88ZUK/2469105.html}
}

@misc{vanborkulo2019statistical,
  title = {Statistical {{Comparison}} of {{Two Networks Based}} on {{Three Invariance Measures}}},
  author = {{van Borkulo}, Claudia D.},
  year = {2019},
  month = jun,
  abstract = {This permutation based hypothesis test, suited for Gaussian and binary data, assesses the difference between two networks based on several invariance measures (e.g., network structure invariance, global strength invariance, edge invariance). Network structures are estimated with l1-regularized partial correlations (Gaussian data) or with l1-regularized logistic regression (eLasso, binary data). Suited for comparison of independent and dependent samples. For dependent samples, only supported for data of one group which is measured twice. See van Borkulo et al. (2017)},
  collaborator = {Epskamp, Sacha S. and Jones, Payton J. and Haslbeck, Jonas M. B. and Millner, Alexander J.}
}

@article{vanborkulo2022comparing,
  title = {Comparing Network Structures on Three Aspects: {{A}} Permutation Test},
  shorttitle = {Comparing Network Structures on Three Aspects},
  author = {{van Borkulo}, Claudia D. and {van Bork}, Riet and Boschloo, Lynn and Kossakowski, Jolanda J. and Tio, Pia and Schoevers, Robert A. and Borsboom, Denny and Waldorp, Lourens J.},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Psychological Methods},
  pages = {No Pagination Specified-No Pagination Specified},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  address = {{US}},
  issn = {1939-1463},
  doi = {10.1037/met0000476},
  abstract = {Network approaches to psychometric constructs, in which constructs are modeled in terms of interactions between their constituent factors, have rapidly gained popularity in psychology. Applications of such network approaches to various psychological constructs have recently moved from a descriptive stance, in which the goal is to estimate the network structure that pertains to a construct, to a more comparative stance, in which the goal is to compare network structures across populations. However, the statistical tools to do so are lacking. In this article, we present the network comparison test (NCT), which uses resampling-based permutation testing to compare network structures from two independent, cross-sectional data sets on invariance of (a) network structure, (b) edge (connection) strength, and (c) global strength. Performance of NCT is evaluated in simulations that show NCT to perform well in various circumstances for all three tests: The Type I error rate is close to the nominal significance level, and power proves sufficiently high if sample size and difference between networks are substantial. We illustrate NCT by comparing depression symptom networks of males and females. Possible extensions of NCT are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Major Depression,Psychometrics,Sample Size,Simulation,Test Validity,Type I Errors},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/6B3IPZXA/NCT_manuscript_updatedversion.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/5AAICQRE/2022-52276-001.html}
}

@article{vandenberg2020application,
  title = {The {{Application}} of {{Network Analysis}} to {{Dynamic Risk Factors}} in {{Adult Male Sex Offenders}}},
  author = {{van den Berg}, Jan Willem and Smid, Wineke and Kossakowski, Jolanda J. and {van Beek}, Daan and Borsboom, Denny and Janssen, Erick and Gijs, Luk},
  year = {2020},
  month = may,
  journal = {Clinical Psychological Science},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {539--554},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {2167-7026},
  doi = {10.1177/2167702620901720},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {Although dynamic risk factors are considered important in the assessment and treatment of adult male sex offenders, little is known about their interrelationships. We apply network analysis to assess their associations and to provide an analysis of their shortest pathways to sexual and violent (including sexual contact) recidivism. Analyses revealed a central position for general rejection/loneliness (in all networks), poor cognitive problem solving (in networks containing sexual or violent\textemdash including sexual contact\textemdash recidivism), and impulsive acts (only in the network including sexual recidivism). These variables represented links between clusters of dynamic risk factors composed of factors relating to sexual self-regulation, emotionally intimate relationships, antisocial traits, and self-management. Impulsive acts showed the strongest independent association with sexual and violent (including sexual contact) recidivism.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {dynamic risk factors,network analysis,sex offenders},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FT4DYT9Y/vandenberg2020application.pdf}
}

@article{vandermaas2020polarization,
  title = {The Polarization within and across Individuals: The Hierarchical {{Ising}} Opinion Model},
  shorttitle = {The Polarization within and across Individuals},
  author = {{van der Maas}, Han L J and Dalege, Jonas and Waldorp, Lourens},
  editor = {Moreno, Yamir},
  year = {2020},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Journal of Complex Networks},
  volume = {8},
  number = {2},
  pages = {cnaa010},
  issn = {2051-1310, 2051-1329},
  doi = {10.1093/comnet/cnaa010},
  urldate = {2022-09-16},
  abstract = {Abstract             Polarization of opinions is a societal threat. It involves psychological processes as well as group dynamics, a popular topic in statistical physics. However, the interaction between the within individual dynamics of attitude formation and across person polarization is rarely studied. By modelling individual attitudes as Ising networks of attitude elements, and approximating this behaviour by the cusp singularity, we developed a fundamentally new model of social dynamics. In this hierarchical model, agents behave either discretely or continuously depending on their attention to the issue. At the individual level, the model reproduces the mere thought effect and resistance to persuasion. At the social level, the model implies polarization and the persuasion paradox. We propose a new intervention for escaping polarization in bounded confidence models of opinion dynamics.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FGFGKDMF/van der Maas et al. - 2020 - The polarization within and across individuals th.pdf}
}

@article{vanrooij2020formalizing,
  title = {Formalizing {{Verbal Theories}}},
  author = {{van Rooij}, Iris and Blokpoel, Mark},
  year = {2020},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Social Psychology},
  volume = {51},
  number = {5},
  pages = {285--298},
  publisher = {{Hogrefe Publishing}},
  issn = {1864-9335},
  doi = {10.1027/1864-9335/a000428},
  urldate = {2021-05-23},
  abstract = {. We present a tutorial for formalizing verbal theories of psychological phenomena           \textendash{} social or otherwise. The approach builds on concepts and tools from the mathematics of computation.           We use intuitive examples and illustrate the intrinsic dialectical nature of the formalization process by           presenting dialogues between two fictive characters, called Verbal and             Formal. These characters' conversations and thought experiments serve to highlight           important lessons in theoretical modeling.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ESWHCLNJ/vanrooij2020formalizing.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Z5QMFN8R/a000428.html}
}

@article{vera-estay2015cognitive,
  title = {Cognitive Underpinnings of Moral Reasoning in Adolescence: {{The}} Contribution of Executive Functions},
  shorttitle = {Cognitive Underpinnings of Moral Reasoning in Adolescence},
  author = {{Vera-Estay}, E. and Dooley, J.J. and Beauchamp, M.H.},
  year = {2015},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Journal of Moral Education},
  volume = {44},
  number = {1},
  pages = {17--33},
  issn = {0305-7240, 1465-3877},
  doi = {10.1080/03057240.2014.986077},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Adolescence is a developmental period characterized by intense changes, which impact the interaction between individuals and their environments. Moral reasoning (MR) is an important skill during adolescence because it guides social decisions between right and wrong. Identifying the cognitive underpinnings of MR is essential to understanding the development of this function. The aim of this study was to explore predictors of MR in typically developing adolescents (n = 92, 33 males, M = 16.3 years, SD = 2.2 years) and the specific contribution of higher order cognitive processing using an innovative visual MR assessment tool and measures of executive functioning and intelligence. MR maturity was correlated with four executive functions (cognitive flexibility, feedback utilization, conceptual reasoning, verbal fluency) and was predicted by four variables: age, intelligence, nonverbal flexibility and verbal fluency. Overall, these results contribute to a better understanding of MR during adolescence and highlight the importance of using innovative tools to measure social cognition.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/BQYDHTHT/vera-estay2015cognitive.pdf}
}

@incollection{von1991exposition,
  title = {An Exposition of Constructivism: {{Why}} Some like It Radical},
  booktitle = {Facets of Systems Science},
  author = {Von Glasersfeld, Ernst},
  year = {1991},
  pages = {229--238},
  publisher = {{Springer}}
}

@article{vosoughi2018spread,
  title = {The Spread of True and False News Online},
  author = {Vosoughi, Soroush and Roy, Deb and Aral, Sinan},
  year = {2018},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Science},
  volume = {359},
  number = {6380},
  pages = {1146--1151},
  publisher = {{American Association for the Advancement of Science}},
  issn = {0036-8075, 1095-9203},
  doi = {10.1126/science.aap9559},
  urldate = {2021-05-28},
  abstract = {{$<$}p{$>$}We investigated the differential diffusion of all of the verified true and false news stories distributed on Twitter from 2006 to 2017. The data comprise \textasciitilde 126,000 stories tweeted by \textasciitilde 3 million people more than 4.5 million times. We classified news as true or false using information from six independent fact-checking organizations that exhibited 95 to 98\% agreement on the classifications. Falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news than for false news about terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information. We found that false news was more novel than true news, which suggests that people were more likely to share novel information. Whereas false stories inspired fear, disgust, and surprise in replies, true stories inspired anticipation, sadness, joy, and trust. Contrary to conventional wisdom, robots accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate, implying that false news spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it.{$<$}/p{$>$}},
  chapter = {Report},
  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 2018 The Authors, some rights reserved; exclusive licensee American Association for the Advancement of Science. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. http://www.sciencemag.org/about/science-licenses-journal-article-reuseThis is an article distributed under the terms of the Science Journals Default License.},
  langid = {english},
  pmid = {29590045},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/TEMN964R/vosoughi2018spread.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/J7AICFJ5/1146.html}
}

@article{wagemans2012century,
  title = {A {{Century}} of {{Gestalt Psychology}} in {{Visual Perception II}}. {{Conceptual}} and {{Theoretical Foundations}}},
  author = {Wagemans, Johan and Feldman, Jacob and Gepshtein, Sergei and Kimchi, Ruth and Pomerantz, James R. and {van der Helm}, Peter A. and {van Leeuwen}, Cees},
  year = {2012},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Psychological bulletin},
  volume = {138},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1218--1252},
  issn = {0033-2909},
  doi = {10.1037/a0029334},
  urldate = {2021-05-20},
  abstract = {Our first review paper on the occasion of the centennial anniversary of Gestalt psychology focused on perceptual grouping and figure-ground organization. It concluded that further progress requires a reconsideration of the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the Gestalt approach, which is provided here. In particular, we review contemporary formulations of holism within an information-processing framework, allowing for operational definitions (e.g., integral dimensions, emergent features, configural superiority, global precedence, primacy of holistic/configural properties) and a refined understanding of its psychological implications (e.g., at the level of attention, perception, and decision). We also review four lines of theoretical progress regarding the law of Pr\"agnanz\textemdash the brain's tendency of being attracted towards states corresponding to the simplest possible organization, given the available stimulation. The first considers the brain as a complex adaptive system and explains how self-organization solves the conundrum of trading between robustness and flexibility of perceptual states. The second specifies the economy principle in terms of optimization of neural resources, showing that elementary sensors working independently to minimize uncertainty can respond optimally at the system level. The third considers how Gestalt percepts (e.g., groups, objects) are optimal given the available stimulation, with optimality specified in Bayesian terms. Fourth, Structural Information Theory explains how a Gestaltist visual system that focuses on internal coding efficiency yields external veridicality as a side-effect. To answer the fundamental question of why things look as they do, a further synthesis of these complementary perspectives is required.},
  pmcid = {PMC3728284},
  pmid = {22845750},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ULRXZY9U/wagemans2012century.pdf}
}

@article{wagemans2018disgust,
  ids = {wagemans2018disgusta,wagemans2018disgustb},
  title = {Disgust Sensitivity Is Primarily Associated with Purity-Based Moral Judgments.},
  author = {Wagemans, Fieke M.A. and Brandt, Mark J. and Zeelenberg, Marcel},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Emotion},
  volume = {18},
  number = {2},
  pages = {277--289},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association (APA)}},
  issn = {1931-1516, 1528-3542},
  doi = {10.1037/emo0000359},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (i.e., purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across 5 studies (total N ϭ 1,104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgressions (meta-analytic r ϭ .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic rs: .07\textendash.27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/7ZFCSNIN/wagemans2018disgust.pdf}
}

@article{wagemans2019weirdness,
  title = {Weirdness of Disgust Sensitivity Items Predicts Their Relationship to Purity Moral Judgments},
  author = {Wagemans, Fieke M.A. and Brandt, Mark J. and Zeelenberg, Marcel},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Personality and Individual Differences},
  volume = {146},
  pages = {182--187},
  issn = {01918869},
  doi = {10.1016/j.paid.2018.07.042},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {Disgust sensitivity predicts judgments of moral issues, especially when they concern transgressions of the purity domain. The reason for this domain-specific relationship is unclear. One potential explanation is that measures of disgust sensitivity and purity transgressions share an important characteristic: They are weird. We test this ``weirdness overlap'' hypothesis by examining whether weirdness of disgust sensitivity items relates to purity moral judgments (total N = 805). Weirder disgust sensitivity items were more strongly associated with moral judgments of purity, but not care, transgressions, suggesting support for the weirdness overlap hypothesis. However, the implications of this finding are limited as we find that eliminating the weirdest items from disgust sensitivity measures does not affect the tendency for the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments to be especially pronounced for purity transgressions. Although weirdness of disgust sensitivity items is associated with the disgust sensitivity-purity link, it cannot explain why disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments of purity transgressions.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/62J8ESCC/wagemans2019weirdness.pdf}
}

@article{wainryb1991understanding,
  title = {Understanding Differences in Moral Judgments: {{The}} Role of Informational Assumptions},
  author = {Wainryb, Cecilia},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {Child development},
  volume = {62},
  number = {4},
  pages = {840--851},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}
}

@article{wainryb1993conceptual,
  title = {Conceptual and Informational Features in Moral Decision Making},
  author = {Wainryb, Cecilia and Turiel, Elliot},
  year = {1993},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Educational Psychologist},
  volume = {28},
  number = {3},
  pages = {205--218},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  issn = {0046-1520, 1532-6985},
  doi = {10.1207/s15326985ep2803_2},
  urldate = {2022-05-30},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/L2Z9K9FV/WainrybTuriel1993.pdf}
}

@incollection{warner2006tobacco,
  title = {Tobacco Policy Research: Insights and Contributions to Public Health Policy},
  booktitle = {Tobacco {{Control Policy}}},
  author = {Warner, Kenneth E.},
  editor = {Warner, Kenneth E. and Isaacs, Stephen L. and Knickman, James R.},
  year = {2006},
  series = {Health {{Policy}}},
  edition = {First},
  pages = {3--86},
  publisher = {{Jossey-Bass/Wiley}},
  address = {{San Francisco, CA, US}},
  urldate = {2023-01-09},
  isbn = {978-0-7879-8745-9},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/H5445PFU/2006-20036-001.html}
}

@article{warner2019ecigarettes,
  title = {E-Cigarettes: {{Comparing}} the {{Possible Risks}} of {{Increasing Smoking Initiation}} with the {{Potential Benefits}} of {{Increasing Smoking Cessation}}},
  shorttitle = {E-Cigarettes},
  author = {Warner, Kenneth E. and Mendez, David},
  year = {2019},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Nicotine \& Tobacco Research},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {41--47},
  issn = {1469-994X},
  doi = {10.1093/ntr/nty062},
  urldate = {2023-01-10},
  abstract = {The public health community is divided regarding electronic cigarettes. Skeptics emphasize potential vaping-induced increases in smoking among children and possible health hazards for adults. Enthusiasts consider e-cigarettes much less dangerous than smoking and believe they increase adult smoking cessation. We compare potential health benefits and costs to put these two perspectives in context.Using a dynamic model that tracks the US adult population's smoking status and smoking-related deaths over time, we simulate the effects of vaping-induced smoking initiation and cessation on life-years saved or lost to the year 2070. The base case assumes that vaping annually increases smoking initiation by 2\% and smoking cessation by 10\%. Sensitivity analyses raise the initiation rate increase to 6\% while decreasing the cessation rate increase to 5\%. Sensitivity analyses also test vaping's reducing the health benefits of quitting smoking by 10\%.With base-case assumptions, the population gains almost 3.3 million life-years by 2070. If all people who quit smoking by vaping lose 10\% of the benefit of quitting smoking, the net life-year gain falls to 2.4 million. Under worst-case assumptions, in which vaping increases smoking initiation by 6\% and cessation by 5\%, and vaping-induced quitters lose 10\% of the health benefits, the population gains over 580000 life-years.Potential life-years gained as a result of vaping-induced smoking cessation are projected to exceed potential life-years lost due to vaping-induced smoking initiation. These results hold over a wide range of plausible parameters.Our analysis strongly suggests that the upside health benefit associated with e-cigarettes, in terms of their potential to increase adult smoking cessation, exceeds their downside risk to health as a result of their possibly increasing the number of youthful smoking initiators. Public messaging and policy should continue to strive to reduce young people's exposure to all nicotine and tobacco products. But, they should not do so at the expense of limiting such products' potential to help adult smokers to quit.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZRTJJJLI/warner_2019_e-cigarett.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/MCEZCG3S/4956222.html}
}

@article{watts1998collective,
  title = {Collective Dynamics of `Small-World' Networks},
  author = {Watts, Duncan J. and Strogatz, Steven H.},
  year = {1998},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Nature},
  volume = {393},
  number = {6684},
  pages = {440--442},
  publisher = {{Nature Publishing Group}},
  issn = {1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/30918},
  urldate = {2022-09-28},
  abstract = {Networks of coupled dynamical systems have been used to model biological oscillators1,2,3,4, Josephson junction arrays5,6, excitable media7, neural networks8,9,10, spatial games11, genetic control networks12 and many other self-organizing systems. Ordinarily, the connection topology is assumed to be either completely regular or completely random. But many biological, technological and social networks lie somewhere between these two extremes. Here we explore simple models of networks that can be tuned through this middle ground: regular networks `rewired' to introduce increasing amounts of disorder. We find that these systems can be highly clustered, like regular lattices, yet have small characteristic path lengths, like random graphs. We call them `small-world' networks, by analogy with the small-world phenomenon13,14 (popularly known as six degrees of separation15). The neural network of the worm Caenorhabditis elegans, the power grid of the western United States, and the collaboration graph of film actors are shown to be small-world networks. Models of dynamical systems with small-world coupling display enhanced signal-propagation speed, computational power, and synchronizability. In particular, infectious diseases spread more easily in small-world networks than in regular lattices.},
  copyright = {1998 Macmillan Magazines Ltd.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Humanities and Social Sciences,multidisciplinary,Science},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/NDJ89FXT/watts_1998_collective.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/DHW3G4QX/30918..html}
}

@article{willemsen2018new,
  title = {A New Look at the Attribution of Moral Responsibility: {{The}} Underestimated Relevance of Social Roles},
  shorttitle = {A New Look at the Attribution of Moral Responsibility},
  author = {Willemsen, Pascale and Newen, Albert and Kaspar, Kai},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {595--608},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  address = {{United Kingdom}},
  issn = {1465-394X(Electronic),0951-5089(Print)},
  doi = {10.1080/09515089.2018.1429592},
  abstract = {What are the main features that influence our attribution of moral responsibility? It is widely accepted that there are various factors which strongly influence our moral judgments, such as the agent's intentions, the consequences of the action, the causal involvement of the agent, and the agent's freedom and ability to do otherwise. In this paper, we argue that this picture is incomplete: We argue that social roles are an additional key factor that is radically underestimated in the extant literature. We will present an experiment to support this claim. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {Blame,Judgment,Morality,Philosophies,Social Perception,Social Psychology}
}

@book{wilson1999conscilience,
  title = {Conscilience: The Unity of Knowledge},
  author = {Wilson, Edward O.},
  year = {1999},
  publisher = {{Vintage (Reprint edition)}},
  isbn = {0-679-76867-X}
}

@article{wisneski2017moralization,
  title = {Moralization {{Through Moral Shock}}: {{Exploring Emotional Antecedents}} to {{Moral Conviction}}},
  shorttitle = {Moralization {{Through Moral Shock}}},
  author = {Wisneski, Daniel C. and Skitka, Linda J.},
  year = {2017},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  volume = {43},
  number = {2},
  pages = {139--150},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {0146-1672},
  doi = {10.1177/0146167216676479},
  urldate = {2021-05-11},
  abstract = {The current research tested whether exposure to disgusting images increases moral conviction and whether this happens in the presence of incidental disgust cues versus disgust cues relevant to the target of moralization. Across two studies, we exposed participants to one of the four sets of disgusting versus control images to test the moralization of abortion attitudes: pictures of aborted fetuses, animal abuse, non-harm related disgusting images, harm related disgusting images, or neutral pictures, at either sub- or supraliminal levels of awareness. Moral conviction about abortion increased (compared with control) only for participants exposed to abortion-related images at speeds slow enough to allow conscious awareness. Study 2 replicated this finding, and found that the relationship between attitudinally relevant disgust and moral conviction was mediated by disgust, and not anger or harm appraisals. Findings are discussed in terms of their relevance for intuitionist theories of morality and moral theories that emphasize harm.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {attitudes,disgust,emotion,moral conviction,morality},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/ZALQV9ZU/wisneski2017moralization.pdf}
}

@article{wright2011role,
  ids = {wright2011rolea},
  title = {The Role of Cognitive Resources in Determining Our Moral Intuitions: {{Are}} We All Liberals at Heart?},
  shorttitle = {The Role of Cognitive Resources in Determining Our Moral Intuitions},
  author = {Wright, Jennifer Cole and Baril, Galen},
  year = {2011},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {47},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1007--1012},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {0022-1031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2011.03.014},
  urldate = {2022-05-13},
  abstract = {Recent research provides evidence that one important difference between liberals and conservatives is their basic moral intuitions. These studies suggest that while liberals and conservatives respond similarly to considerations of harm/care and fairness (what Graham and Haidt call the ``individualizing'' foundations), conservatives also respond strongly to considerations of in-group, authority, and purity (the ``binding'' foundations) while liberals do not. Our study examined two alternative hypotheses for this difference\textemdash the first being that liberals cognitively override, and the alternative being that conservatives cognitively enhance, their binding foundation intuitions. Using self-regulation depletion and cognitive load tasks to compromise people's ability to monitor and regulate their automatic moral responses, we found support for the latter hypothesis\textemdash when cognitive resources were depleted/distracted, conservatives became more like liberals (de-prioritizing the binding foundations), rather than the other way around. This provides support for the view that conservatism is a form of motivated social cognition.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Cognitive load,Moral Foundations Theory,Moral intuitions,Self-regulation depletion},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/R4TTW4WH/wright2011role.pdf}
}

@article{wylie2022anything,
  title = {``{{Anything}} That Looks like Smoking Is Bad'': {{Moral}} Opposition and Support for Harm Reduction Policy},
  shorttitle = {``{{Anything}} That Looks like Smoking Is Bad''},
  author = {Wylie, Jordan and Sharma, Nirupika and Gantman, Ana P.},
  year = {2022},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {101},
  number = {104343},
  publisher = {{Academic Press}},
  issn = {0022-1031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104343},
  urldate = {2023-01-10},
  abstract = {One dilemma faced by policy makers is the choice between banning a harmful behavior and allowing the behavior to continue but with mitigated harm. Thi\ldots},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/VLS9N8BH/wylie_2022_“anything.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/F2T5JK34/S0022103122000622.html}
}

@article{yilmaz2017activating,
  title = {Activating Analytic Thinking Enhances the Value given to Individualizing Moral Foundations},
  author = {Yilmaz, Onurcan and Saribay, S. Adil},
  year = {2017},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {165},
  pages = {88--96},
  issn = {0010-0277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.009},
  urldate = {2022-05-13},
  abstract = {Two central debates within Moral Foundations Theory concern (1) which moral foundations are core and (2) how conflict between ideological camps stemming from valuing different moral foundations can be resolved. Previous studies have attempted to answer the first question by imposing cognitive load on participants to direct them toward intuitive and automatic thought. However, this method has limitations and has produced mixed findings. In the present research, in two experiments, instead of directing participants toward intuitive thought, we tested the effects of activating high-effort, analytic thought on participants' moral foundations. In both experiments, analytic thought activation caused participants to value individualizing foundations greater than the control condition. This effect was not qualified by participants' political orientation. No effect was observed on binding foundations. The results are consistent with the idea that upholding individualizing foundations requires mental effort and may provide the basis for reconciliation between different ideological camps.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Analytic cognitive style,Dual-process model of the mind,High-effort thinking,Moral foundations theory,Political psychology},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/K3LAQF8W/yilmaz2017activating.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/GIVCKYHM/S0010027717301269.html}
}

@article{yoo2022distinctions,
  title = {Distinctions between Moral and Conventional Judgments from Early to Middle Childhood: {{A}} Meta-Analysis of Social Domain Theory Research.},
  shorttitle = {Distinctions between Moral and Conventional Judgments from Early to Middle Childhood},
  author = {Yoo, Ha Na and Smetana, Judith G.},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  journal = {Developmental Psychology},
  volume = {58},
  number = {5},
  pages = {874--889},
  issn = {1939-0599, 0012-1649},
  doi = {10.1037/dev0001330},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Understanding distinctions between morality and conventions is an important milestone in children's moral development. The current meta-analysis integrated decades of social domain theory research (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) on moral and conventional judgments from early to middle childhood. We examined 95 effect sizes from 18 studies (2,707 children; Mage = 7.30 years; 51\% females; 42\% Whites). Along with these, effects from additional 28 studies were estimated with imputed correlations in a secondary analysis of 248 effect sizes from 46 studies (4,469 children; Mage = 7.34 years; 46\% females; 32\% Whites). Across all judgments, moral/conventional distinction effects were significant, positive, and moderate. Consistent with social domain theory definitions of morality, children evaluated moral transgressions as more wrong independent of authorities' commands or rules than conventional transgressions and moral rules as more generalizable and inalterable than conventional rules. Moral transgressions also were seen as more unacceptable and more deserving of punishment than conventional transgressions. The aggregated effects were also significant for each type of judgment. However, effects were stronger for criteria considered definitional of the domains than for acceptability or punishment judgments, which are not considered criteria. Moreover, children made greater domain distinctions with age across all types of judgments. When examined separately, age moderated effects only for criterion judgments, not for acceptability or punishment judgments. Effects for distinctions also were moderated by the types of moral and conventional rules assessed. Thus, moral/conventional distinctions were found across early and middle childhood, but there was variability in children's developing understanding.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/FQRU2L7A/yoo2022distinctions.pdf}
}

@article{young2011when,
  ids = {young2011whena,young2011whenb,young2011whenc},
  title = {When Ignorance Is No Excuse: {{Different}} Roles for Intent across Moral Domains},
  shorttitle = {When Ignorance Is No Excuse},
  author = {Young, Liane and Saxe, Rebecca},
  year = {2011},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {120},
  number = {2},
  pages = {202--214},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  issn = {00100277},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.005},
  urldate = {2022-05-25},
  abstract = {A key factor in legal and moral judgments is intent. Intent differentiates, for instance, murder from manslaughter. Is this true for all moral judgments? People deliver moral judgments of many kinds of actions, including harmful actions (e.g., assault) and purity violations (e.g., incest, consuming taboo substances). We show that intent is a key factor for moral judgments of harm, but less of a factor for purity violations. Based on the agent's innocent intent, participants judged accidental harms less morally wrong than accidental incest; based on the agent's guilty intent, participants judged failed attempts to harm more morally wrong than failed attempts to commit incest. These patterns were specific to moral judgments versus judgments of the agent's control, knowledge, or intent, the action's overall emotional salience, or participants' ratings of disgust. The current results therefore reveal distinct cognitive signatures of distinct moral domains, and may inform the distinct functional roles of moral norms.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/28B294YF/young2011whenc.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/L3HDPBG3/young2011when.pdf;/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/PALSTN4W/young2011whenc.pdf}
}

@article{yucel2020young,
  title = {Young {{Children}} and {{Adults Show Differential Arousal}} to {{Moral}} and {{Conventional Transgressions}}},
  author = {Yucel, Meltem and Hepach, Robert and Vaish, Amrisha},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {11},
  issn = {1664-1078},
  doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00548},
  urldate = {2022-05-18},
  abstract = {From a young age, children understand and enforce moral norms, which are aimed at preserving the rights and welfare of others. Children also distinguish moral norms from other types of norms such as conventional norms, which serve to ensure coordination within social groups or institutions. However, far less is known about the mechanisms driving this differentiation. This article investigates the role of internal arousal in distinguishing moral from conventional norms. In a between-subjects design, 3-year-olds (n = 32), 4-year-olds (n = 34), and undergraduate students (n = 64) watched a video of either a moral norm violation (e.g., destroying another person's artwork) or a conventional norm violation (e.g., playing a game wrong). Participants of all age groups showed differential physiological arousal (pupil dilation) to moral and conventional norm violations. Participants of all age groups also attended significantly more to the victim of the moral transgression than the bystander in the conventional transgression. Further, this differential attention to the victim/bystander positively correlated with the change in participants' phasic pupil dilation to the norm violation. This is the first evidence that differences in internal arousal co-occur with (and possibly contribute to) the distinction that even young children draw between moral and conventional norms.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/4KA3UDUN/yucel2020young.pdf}
}

@article{zajonc1980feeling,
  title = {Feeling and Thinking: {{Preferences}} Need No Inferences.},
  author = {Zajonc, Robert B},
  year = {1980},
  journal = {American psychologist},
  volume = {35},
  number = {2},
  pages = {151},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/Y5LNAPCA/zajonc1980feeling.pdf}
}

@article{zarkadi2013black,
  ids = {zarkadi2013blacka},
  title = {``{{Black}} and {{White}}'' Thinking: {{Visual}} Contrast Polarizes Moral Judgment},
  shorttitle = {``{{Black}} and {{White}}'' Thinking},
  author = {Zarkadi, Theodora and Schnall, Simone},
  year = {2013},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {49},
  number = {3},
  pages = {355--359},
  issn = {0022-1031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2012.11.012},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {Recent research has emphasized the role of intuitive processes in morality by documenting the link between affect and moral judgment. The present research tested whether incidental visual cues without any affective connotation can similarly shape moral judgment by priming a certain mindset. In two experiments we showed that exposure to an incidental black and white visual contrast leads people to think in a ``black and white'' manner, as indicated by more extreme moral judgments. Participants who were primed with a black and white checkered background while considering a moral dilemma (Experiment 1) or a series of social issues (Experiment 2) gave ratings that were significantly further from the response scale's mid-point, relative to participants in control conditions without such priming. These findings suggest that in addition to affective cues and gut feelings, non-affective cues relating to processing style can influence moral judgments.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Black and white,Embodiment,Metaphor,Moral judgment,Morality,Visual contrast},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XPTNG8M4/zarkadi2013black.pdf}
}

@article{zelazo1996intention,
  title = {Intention, {{Act}}, and {{Outcome}} in {{Behavioral Prediction}} and {{Moral Judgment}}},
  author = {Zelazo, Philip David and Helwig, Charles C. and Lau, Anna},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Child Development},
  volume = {67},
  number = {5},
  eprint = {1131635},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {2478--2492},
  publisher = {{[Wiley, Society for Research in Child Development]}},
  issn = {0009-3920},
  doi = {10.2307/1131635},
  urldate = {2022-05-18},
  abstract = {72 children at 3, 4, and 5 years of age and 24 undergraduates were required to use information about intention under a normal causal system or a noncanonical one (e. g., hitting causes pleasure) to predict an agent's behavior. Additionally, they were asked to integrate intentions, acts, and outcomes to judge an act's acceptability and assign punishment. 3-year-olds performed poorly on behavioral prediction in the noncanonical condition. Most participants at all ages made categorical judgments of act acceptability based solely on outcome, although quantitative ratings reflected an age-related increase in sensitivity to intention information. When assigning punishment, many 3-year-olds used a simple intention or outcome rule, whereas older participants were more likely to use a conjunction rule (if outcome is negative and intention is negative then punish). Together, the results reveal both an early understanding of harm and changes in the complexity of the rules that children use to predict behavior and integrate information.},
  file = {/Users/matthew/Zotero/storage/XYVV26VB/zelazo1996intention.pdf}
}